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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Near East & South Asia**

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# Near East & South Asia

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**Status of Iran Armenians Discussed**  
*46050008 Beirut AZTAG in Armenian*  
*22 Oct 88 pp 3, 7*

[Second installment of interview with the Armenian Prelate of Tehran, Archbishop Artak Manukian; date and place not given]

[Excerpt] [AZTAG] We discussed the historic and cultural heritage of the Iranian-Armenian community. Now let us turn to the present circumstances of the Armenian community in Iran. How would you describe the present communal, cultural and educational life of the Iranian-Armenian community?

[Manukian] Since 1948, Armenians have been migrating to central Tehran from various parts of the country. Today, there are more than 100,000 Armenians in Tehran. There are 35 Armenian schools (elementary, middle and high). There are also several philanthropic, cultural, athletic and other types of associations which all contribute to the communal, cultural and educational life of the Armenians in Tehran.

As for religious affairs, we must state that, although Sunday is a work day in Iran, Holy Mass is conducted in our churches on Sundays, and the people attend those ceremonies.

Schools in Iran are free and teach the curriculum set by the government. The Armenian language is taught only in elementary schools and only 2 hours a week. As for the teaching of religion, at present talks are continuing with government officials to have religion taught in the Armenian language in Armenian schools. The Iranian Ministry of Education insists that religion be taught in Persian.

Two to three months ago, the Majles of the Islamic Republic held two meetings to discuss the issue of minority schools and the teaching of religion. It is evident that the issue concerns only the Armenians because it is only the Armenians who wish to teach religion in their own language.

The Majles voted on and passed the following resolution (which also has the power of law): "Religious leaders have the right to prepare textbooks and to teach classes in accordance with their religion, traditions, customs and holy script after receiving the government's approval." We are certain that this resolution which has the power of law will be implemented soon and religion will be taught to our students as it should be.

Other than some problems regarding educational affairs, we do not have any difficulties. There is great respect for religious ceremonies and rituals; the government does not interfere with them. I can also state that the Prelacy is able to carry out its work smoothly and that it has its own autonomy. Unlike the rest of Armenian prelacies in the Diaspora, all issues of inheritance, divorce and similar issues are settled fully by the Prelacy alone and in

accordance with our laws. The Prelacy is also authorized to certify civil and religious marriages and divorces. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the prelacies have assumed more importance and a larger role in governing our community's social life.

We must state that we are also free to organize cultural events, but we must inform pertinent government authorities before organizing any event about the nature and content of the event. We organize concerts, plays and so forth. It was significant that we were allowed to stage a march on the occasion of the 24 April Martyrs' Day. Nearly 50,000 Armenians took part in the march. We were also allowed to organize the all-Armenian athletic games which attracted more than 20,000 spectators.

The Iranian Revolution had, in a way, a positive impact on our community's social life. The people began to take a keener interest in their own culture, to attend the events that are organized and to congregate around their cultural and athletic organizations and the church.

I must also mention a significant phenomenon. This year, when the Prime Minister sent a circular to the schools to inform them of the official holidays, he had included in addition to the religious holidays Armenian days of remembrance such as Vartanank, 24 April (as Martyrs' Day), the Holy Interpreters' Day and the St. Thadeus pilgrimage day. [passage omitted]

**Changes Seen in Soviet Attitude Toward Dashnak Party**

*46050007b Athens DROSHAK in Armenian*  
*12-26 Oct 88 pp 4, 11*

[Article by N. B.: "Official Thinking in the Motherland and the Encouraging Course of Reconstruction"]

[Excerpts] Because of the bloody incidents in Artsakh on 18 September and the subsequent mass demonstrations and strikes in Stepanakert and Yerevan, which created an extremely tense situation in the region, the Armenians of the Diaspora understandably failed to fully appreciate the importance of the 13 September "plenum" of the Armenian Communist Party's Central Committee which was otherwise marked with welcome changes of attitude.

The said meeting was one of the most important of its kind. Firstly, it was the first meeting since the advent of the Artsakh movement which brought together the entire party and government leadership of Armenia to examine "the problems of party organizations in overcoming the phenomenon of stagnation in the economic and social domains and to invigorate the ideological atmosphere in the Republic." Additionally, the discussion of such a historically important agenda was carried out against the background of the campaign declared against the so-called Demirchyan leadership and with the purpose of

ending the reviled practices inherited from the previous period and demanding a reckoning from officials who are continuing on their former course.

It is enough to read the reports carried by Soviet Armenian media on this issue and the speech made by First Secretary S. Harutyunyan, the premier spokesman of the plenum, to assert that the 13 September meeting truly fulfilled what was expected from it—at least in the sense of taking first steps in a positive direction.

The speeches of leading figures in the minutes of the meeting, as well as the entire speech of S. Harutyunyan are marked with the Gorbachevian “renewal” spirit in general and the bold postures inspired by the Artsakh movement in particular. As such and taken as a whole, they outline a course which the government of the Motherland will pursue under its present leadership. [passage omitted]

#### A First Step

It is essential to note that the present representative of Soviet Armenia wishes to shed his predecessors’ so-called “anti-Dashnak complex” which had assumed sickening proportions during K. Demirchyan’s tenure. Harutyunyan is the first top Soviet Armenian leader who has not felt the need to call for a battle against the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [Dashnak Party] at all costs in a speech that broached numerous fundamental issues at such an important plenum.

Traditionally, in the “ideological” section of such speeches the familiar ghost of anti-Dashnak slanders and allegations would always surface from corner or another. It was virtually impossible to talk about the Diaspora Armenians and to call for the strengthening of ties between the Motherland and the Diaspora without paying tribute to the tired slogan of waging an anti-Dashnak battle.

Harutyunyan has attempted to discontinue this absurd “tradition” by including in his speech a paragraph entitled: “The radical reformation of the ideological reality is the most important object of ideological work.” In that segment, Harutyunyan examines not just the relevant problems that affect the Communist Party in a narrow sense, but the fundamental issues that concern the present and the future of the entire Armenian nation—issues which are worthy of examination one by one. The review of those issues includes references—reconstructionist references—to the Diaspora and the need to improve relations between the Diaspora and the Motherland. In all that, the First Secretary of the Armenian Communist Party does not utter a single sentence or word which is inspired by the “anti-Dashnak complex.” It is this approach which can be considered as the first step in ridding the Armenian political mind of internal parasites. [passage omitted]

#### Green Light

Taken as a whole, Harutyunyan’s speech turns on the green light for the radical reconstruction of political thinking in the Motherland.

As the reader realizes, the present premier representative of the Soviet Armenian leadership is prepared to take a sound approach to problems, and his approaches are largely free of the prejudices and the tired slogans of the past.

Harutyunyan’s speech is addressed to all the problems that concern the Armenian reality, in particular the Armenians of the Motherland, and must therefore be evaluated as such by all Armenian political parties and ideological currents. That same frame of reference must also be used in evaluating his future deeds as the leader of the government and the party in Soviet Armenia.

These conclusions are important because the 13 September plenum and the Harutyunyan speech that forms its central theme open a hope-inspiring page for the future of the entire Armenian nation in the most positive sense of the word. For the first time, the issues that are presented to all segments of the Armenian nation in the Diaspora and the Motherland, the bold thoughts that are expressed and the brave postures that are taken are such that they subject many accepted false premises and approaches to reexamination in form and substance.

The Dashnak press, in particular, has much evidence to welcome this meeting and these speeches which promise a change of attitude; to expect that the spirit of reconstruction does not remain in words alone; to hope that in time all approaches which still smack of prejudice and reservation are discarded; and to ensure, in particular, that any likelihood of a reversion to the practices of the past be eliminated and that the Armenians of the Motherland who have found the path of renaissance with February 1988 march toward their reconstruction of the future with determined steps.

A similar degree of determination is expected from S. Harutyunyan and the Soviet Armenian authorities on whose stand much depends, so that this healthy and hope-inspiring first step taken on 13 September does not become an orphaned specimen of its kind.

#### Azeris Accused of Premeditated ‘Genocide’ 46050009 Beirut ARARAT in Armenian 3 Nov 88 p 2

[Excerpt from interview with Soviet Armenian journalist Zori Balayan originally published in THE CALIFORNIA COURIER; date and place not given]

[Text] [THE CALIFORNIA COURIER] It is hard to believe that a massacre of such proportions can take place in a country where such strict security measures are in place. Was it instigated or did the Azerbaijani government abate it?

[Balayan] What do you expect me to say? The Armenians know by experience that the Turks, as a people and nation, have not harmed the Armenians as long as the Talats, the Envers and other leaders did not instruct them to attack the Armenians. The situation is the same here: There would have not been a Sumgait without the consent of the Azerbaijani government.

[THE CALIFORNIA COURIER] The murderers of Sumgait were tried. One of them was sentenced to 15 years in prison for killing and burning an Armenian. But he escaped before he was sentenced. How should the central government have treated these murderers?

[Balayan] The Soviet press reported that 32 people were killed in Sumgait. I do not understand, because we already have the names, the dates of death and the addresses of more than 32 people. Six Azerbaijanis were killed in an automobile accident, not by the Armenians. Perhaps we will discover that a greater number of people were killed. There is a difference between the truth and the official press reports. We must think about what happened in Sumgait during those 3 days. It is an indisputable fact that a genocide was committed. We must not only know the names and the number of the people killed but also how they were killed. Imagine entering a house in which a five-member family lives. Imagine that they are savagely killed and their house is burned together with their corpses. When the situation assumes such proportions, the numbers are not that important. Those 5 people represent 5,000 for us. Numerous similar incidents occurred. That is why I say that what happened in Sumgait is equivalent to the 1915 genocide, because it was committed in the same manner.

[THE CALIFORNIA COURIER] Was that the first clash between the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians, or have there been similar incidents in the past?

[Balayan] The Sumgait incidents did not surprise the Armenians or open their eyes. That was the continuation of events that have occurred all the time, but this last one was very well organized. It occurred as a consequence of the Karabakh issue. They tried to show us what can happen if we persist with our demanding attitude. If the Soviet government is a true government—and I am convinced that it is because it has proven that on several occasions—then we can resolve the problem very rapidly. I do not speak in favor of regaining the territories of a "sea-to-sea" historic Armenia. I would like to have that, but I do not believe in extremism. However, there are moments in life when the issue rests on whether we will have all of it or nothing. It is appropriate to say that what happened in Sumgait made the geographical conditions we live in more evident. We do not have any place to flee or any neighbors who can come to our aid. Our neighbors are Turkey, Iran and Azerbaijan. The borders drawn by Stalin constitute the greatest injustice

perpetrated against the Armenian people and are equivalent to the genocide committed by Talat. We are helpless at the present time. We must win this battle or our entire population of 3 million will be victimized.

[THE CALIFORNIA COURIER] How do you see the future?

[Balayan] Our people are not too interested in food or fashion. We are a different people. We cannot retreat. We have other concerns. We earned this right thanks to glasnost and perestroika. I am worried that our method of operation may yield negative results and block the implementation of reforms in our country. However, those who are not aware of our situation may criticize us for our way of thinking and demands. We cannot and will not forget Sumgait. We demand justice for what happened in Sumgait in the last few months. The blood that has been spilled in Sumgait makes us think differently. I know that we cannot respond to Sumgait with another Sumgait, that is with killing, because Armenians are not murderers; on the other hand we are not chickens ready to be killed. We can demonstrate our bravery with our method of operation. We cannot be like the Turks.

[THE CALIFORNIA COURIER] What solution would be acceptable?

[Balayan] As an individual who respects this government, I think that the government must find a civilized solution because if we are not concerned about our compatriots as a people then we cannot be concerned about the world. There is one solution—an interim solution—which is as follows: Karabakh must be administratively affiliated with the central government until an agreement is reached. This would not be a reason to end the demonstrations because the Sumgait issue is still alive. Our next step will be whatever circumstances dictate. I believe that the Soviet press must publish the names of the victims of Sumgait and that we must erect a monument inscribed with those names. However, what is most important is that we must search and find the organizers of those massacres and we must punish them. Sumgait must become a historic issue—an event about which the entire world must know. Only then can we be sure that another Sumgait will not happen.

#### **New Publication Presents Methods for Karabakh Issue**

*46050007a Beirut AZTAG in Armenian 15 Oct 88 p 4*

[Excerpts] A small group of Armenians headed by Igor Muratyan, a former member of the Karabakh Committee and an active participant in the Artsakh movement, has begun publishing a newsletter in Yerevan called ARTSAKHI DZAYN [Voice of Artsakh]. The newsletter examines current issues and suggests courses which the movement working for the reunification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia can pursue.

The newsletter's unbiased method of analysis and its realism and maturity are remarkable.

The publication HAY DAT reproduces in its fourth issue the following article from the said newsletter.

First Issue [of ARTSAKHI DZAYN]: The realities have shown that one of the weakest points of the Artsakh movement is its lack of impartiality. The absence of the diversity essential for the methods and direction of the movement make it vulnerable to criticism and lead it into impasses.

With the publication of ARTSAKHI DZAYN we attempt to present to the public the most important directions and methods.

Severe crimes have been committed in Azerbaijan during the Soviet period, and the greatest one of them is the genocide of the Armenians.

Officials arriving from Moscow are often heard acknowledging that mistakes have been allowed with respect to the Armenians in Azerbaijan. Is it fair to describe as mistakes the deliberate scuttling of the economic development of Armenian regions in Azerbaijan, the barbaric destruction of historic monuments, the fanatic nationalist policies at the state level and numerous murders committed in Armenian areas?

There can be no safeguards for Armenian national life in Azerbaijan.

We find it hard to comment on the way the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has responded in the past several decades to our demands for the restoration of basic justice; we do not expect from Moscow anything more than the contemptuous responses and the superficial treatment they have given to our pleas in the last 3 years.

As is known, the struggle of the Diaspora Armenians is rooted in proving the reality of the genocide of 1915 and to win international recognition for it.

The recognition of the genocide by the European Parliament has, in some measure, served as a warning to Turkey.

If the European Parliament can discuss and recognize the genocide of 1915, then why can the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR not do the same? Why can the Armenian Supreme Soviet not discuss and recognize the genocide of the Armenians all over Azerbaijan and submit the necessary documents to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR?

We must ask our deputies to raise this issue before the Presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

Seventh Issue [of ARTSAKHI DZAYN]: Have the constitutional avenues of resolving the Artsakh issue been exhausted?

As is known the issue of modifying the Soviet Constitution is currently being discussed at various levels. Should not our Republic play an active role in those discussions? What are the rights of the Republic in issues regarding the modification of the Constitution? [passage omitted]

With its right of initiating legislative action, the Armenian Supreme Soviet can insert into the USSR Constitution the following formulation: "An autonomous region reserves the right to choose freely to secede from the administrative structure of one union republic and join that of another union republic subject to the consent of the latter and the approval of the USSR Supreme Soviet. An autonomous region also reserves the right to secede from the administrative structure of a union republic and to make itself administratively subject to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers subject to the approval of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The decision to secede from the administrative structure of the union republic must be approved by the autonomous region's soviet of people's deputies or a public referendum." [passage omitted]

## REGIONAL

### **Syria May Fight To Prevent Palestinian State** *44230018 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 16 Oct 88 p 16*

[Article by Yosi Melman]

[Text] Air Force Commander General Aviyahu Ben-Nun estimated 2 weeks ago that "the summer will pass peacefully." Summer has not yet come to an end, but even if his evaluation should prove correct, the next war might still break out in the spring of 1989. This assessment, without assigning it one degree of probability or another—"low probability" has become a derogatory term since the Yom Kippur War—is at least logical. That is, there are few generals in the IDF, military analysts, or strategic specialists, who would be prepared to hazard a clear assertion that war still will not break out next spring. They are nearly unanimous that if Israel indeed is involved in a war, it would first of all be with Syria.

The Syrian Ba'th regime, they explain, has been readying itself for war since 1973 and especially since the partial confrontation between its army and the IDF in Lebanon in 1982. Even if there is no one, besides Hafiz al-Asad alone, who knows what exactly he means when he speaks of "strategic balance," there is no doubt that Syria is looking for a military showdown with Israel, sooner or later. Accordingly, Syria is outfitting itself with the most modern Soviet equipment and mobilizing to the maximum its dwindling economic resources.

Another commonly held assumption on this subject: If Syria goes to war, it will do so to regain the Golan Heights, or parts of them, that it lost in June, 1967. Those who hold this opinion find support for it in, among other things, the reasonable lessons that President al-Asad drew from his participation in the Yom Kippur War. In their opinion, Clausewitz' principle that war is a continuation of diplomacy by other means and is subordinate to political goals, applies to President al-Asad to President al-Asad and his military leadership. In other words, President al-Asad will go to war, if he goes at all, to speed up the political-diplomatic process to compel Israel, through military force integrated with international diplomatic pressure, to agree to give up the Golan Heights. This means that Syria is really interested in achieving a "positive" goal.

But beneath the surface of all these analyses is a certain error in calculation. They do not consider that Syria is liable to go to war for "negative" reasons. Not to achieve "something" but to avoid something else, and that something else just may be a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. Perhaps more so even than Israel, Syria vehemently opposes creation of a Palestinian state, and that, in fact, is the background for its stubborn opposition to Yasir 'Arafat and the PLO.

It is not personal hostility that accounts for al-Asad's hatred for 'Arafat, but abhorrence of the independent policy of the head of the PLO. To frustrate 'Arafat's unceasing efforts for freedom of action and independence throughout the 30 year history of the Fatah organization, al-Asad has supported any Palestinian organization opposed to 'Arafat. The Syrian president's objective is to widen the division between the Palestinian factions. Palestinian unity, in his view, brings them closer to a state of their own. For similar reasons, Syria opposes the dialogue between Jordan and the PLO. Al-Asad has also put pressure on King Husayn to renege on the agreement he reached in April with Shim'on Peres in London. He did this less out of fear that a Jordanian-Israeli agreement, following the peace of Camp David, would isolate Damascus still more and leave it alone on the confrontation line with the "zionist enemy," than out of fear that such a settlement, with the participation of the Palestinians, would increase the chances for creation of a Palestinian state in the future.

From an ideological perspective, Syria sees the land of Palestine as a southern part of its country, part of "greater Syria." But more than this, Syria's opposition to a Palestinian state is based on political, strategic, and economic considerations.

Thus, Syria and Israel have a clear common interest: opposition to creation of a Palestinian state. That is not the only common interest between the two states. The de facto partition of Lebanon is also very satisfactory to the Syrian Government. It had already materialized in April 1976. At that time, when the Syrian Army first entered Lebanon, President al-Asad took pains to send an urgent message to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin. This was a conciliatory message, designed to explain that Syria recognized Israel's security interests in South Lebanon and that, accordingly, Israel was not to see the entry of the Syrian Army as a threat to these interests. President al-Asad promised in the message that his army would not turn south towards the Israeli border. The message was delivered by King Husayn, who went to London specifically for that reason and met there with Israel's ambassador to Britain, Gid'on Rafa'el, for 3 hours of talks. Ambassador Rafa'el rushed to fly home on a private plane to provide Yitzhaq Rabin with a report on the conversation. After receiving this message, Israel formulated its "red lines" policy in Lebanon.

Now as then, Jordan is a partner in the Jerusalem-Damascus political axis. This time, it is not a partial partnership as a messenger only, but a full partnership based on opposition to a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip.

Nonetheless, the assessments recently heard in political circles in Washington speak of a growing feeling that the Syrian president no longer feels "sure" of Israel's cooperation. He fears that, in time, he will not be able to rely on Israel to remain steadfast in its opposition to a Palestinian state. He has interpreted as signs of weakness



both Israel's reaction to the rebellion in the territories and the growing readiness of central figures in the Labor Party, although not said in public or spoken out loud, to reach a political settlement with the PLO.

It is possible—and this possibility is not unreasonable—that after the elections in the United States the process of Soviet-American rapprochement will be renewed with solutions to local problems and a cooling of international tensions. After agreements between Washington and Moscow on reductions of nuclear weapons, after the scrapping of the "Star Wars" program, the Soviet Army's withdrawal from Afghanistan, the settlement in Namibia, and the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, it may be the turn of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. This political process could begin as early as the spring of 1989.

Syria will make a major effort to prevent such a settlement. It would be very difficult for Syria to undertake a military confrontation without Soviet support, but why should all the assessments in Israel, indicating that Syria is likely to be enticed into war even without Soviet backing, not prove correct for this scenario? If decision-makers in Israel believe that Syria is likely to go to war to regain the Golan Heights, they would do well to take into account the firmness of Damascus' decision to prevent, at almost any price, the creation of a Palestinian entity or a state.

#### **New Initiatives in Gulf Advised Following Cease-Fire**

44040109 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 3 Nov 88 p 16

[Article: "Symposium Entitled 'What After the Iraq-Iran War?'" ]

[Excerpts] The well-known economist, Jasim al-Sa'dun, warned that the countries of the region would pay a high price if they did not seize the reins of a comprehensive economic and political initiative to control post-war changes. At a symposium held at the business faculty of Kuwait University yesterday under the title, "What After the Iraq-Iran War?" al-Sa'dun called for a complete and comprehensive review of the laws and regulations that the state of war had imposed.

Isma'il al-Shatti, editor in chief of the magazine AL-MUJTAMA', said that the struggle of the two superpowers over the region would become less intense.

He predicted that the two adversaries (America and the Soviet Union) would become partners, dividing among themselves the profits and interests existing in the region.

The complete text of Jasim al-Sa'dun's lecture follows, along with the most important points that Isma'il al-Shatti covered.

In the introduction to his speech, Jasim al-Sa'dun said that the title of the lecture "assumes that we are talking about the postwar period, but I am not completely sure that this is the only available scenario. The history of the Shatt al-'Arab recounts a state of continuous conflict lasting centuries. No reason leads me to believe that this struggle will be the last. Nevertheless, we will forget the scenario of a possible renewal of the conflict and the no-war/no-peace scenario and concentrate on the scenario of security. When we speak about its economic dimensions, we will try to cover what strengthens it.

"In talking about what comes after the war, the assumption is that we are talking about the future and that this future is tied mainly to the price of oil, its production, and its relative importance as energy. While it is possible to make a quantitative computation of the importance of oil in a calm time, many circumstances and variables make prophecy a difficult task. Whether we like it or not, predictions, however careful, are subject to sudden alterations.

"When we talk about future scenarios, we assume that logic, interest, and destiny will control us. These are matters subject to man's interpretation, and in most cases this is political. One of the ironies of fate is that until a few months ago achievement was measured by the number of dead and the amount of destruction in the two warring countries or even in neighboring countries. Now we are trying to assume a completely opposite logic: the implanting of life into man and for man, and the building and rebuilding of societies and economies. Our interpretations do not necessarily agree with those of others. One may declare our interpretation invalid, not understand it, or not agree with it.

"The lecture will therefore pass quickly over the history of the region of the conflict and then review the economic results of the war. Afterwards, we will review the outlines of ways to increase revenue at the lowest cost in order to confront the post-war period. Then we will review the negative aspects of the situation, even if we do not work to increase its revenue. [passage omitted]

"Despite America's alliance with and leadership of Europe and Japan, the report [of the American Senate Foreign Relations Committee] approves their undertaking the role in accordance with those interests. Although the report later corrects itself and mentions that the concentration of oil in the Gulf and its depletion in other regions of the world will increase America's need for it, we who are gathered in the region should realize an important fact: Our importance in the judgment of the two blocs comes not from a humanitarian motive or from a motive of principles, but from a pile of barrels of bulk oil and from the importance of that oil.

"Our importance is determined even by the means by which the oil is carried—whether it is carried in pipes or over the sea by tankers, for this determines the mode of cooperation with us. By this introduction, I have desired to emphasize the following facts:

1. There is a strong link between the regions's economic importance and its degree of stability.
2. The decision of war or peace, of stability or its lack, is not a decision made only in the region; it depends on how the great powers see their interests.
3. History sometimes repeats itself, and such possibilities increase in direct proportion to the fragmentation and weakness of the prevailing level of consciousness.

#### Consequences Resulting From the War

"In order to talk about the kinds of change required in the postwar period, we must first mention the types of effect the war caused, so that we can adjust to them in our view of the future. We can sum up these consequences as follows:

"1. The war left behind tremendous human loss in the form of people killed (some have estimated them as 1 million dead), wounded, handicapped, or deprived of shelter and other basic necessities. This may be a time bomb and must be dealt with with humanity and foresight. Part of the solution of the problem lies in economic compensation, with expenditures for rebuilding and a serious consideration of the distribution of oil production allotments so as to serve this approach. The need encompasses the two countries—helping them turn their societies from military to civilian, with the required creation of appropriate work opportunities.

"2. In a lecture at the Association of Economists, Dr Rodney Wilson mentioned that the direct military costs of the war amounted to about \$170 billion, which is most of the yield of oil exports in the two countries, in addition to a direct part of those of the neighboring countries, which he estimated at about \$30 billion. The war's total costs were much greater. They included increased military expenditures in neighboring countries, expenditures which were consuming approximately one-third of their general expenditures. The war had also destroyed many economic and civil installations that would require a great deal of money to rebuild. This would certainly raise costs of production in the two countries, temporarily lowering the profit margin in the selling price of a barrel of oil.

"3. As a result of conflict between two countries representing the human weight on the world's largest oil reserve (63 percent), the will of producers was weakened. In addition to the waste of oil revenues and the change in oil distribution methods from tankers to pipelines carrying oil outside the Gulf, with the expenses this meant, the conflict contributed to disunion and created a pressing need for production to finance the war.

"This led to the abuse of oil—the waste of a resources through depletion, on the one hand, and its cheapness, on the other hand. The result was that this partly contributed to oil's being sold at cash prices around \$10

a barrel, as in October 1988. This was 30 percent of prices prevailing at the beginning of 1981, and probably around the real value of prices prevailing before the October 1973 War.

"4. Because of the war and its changes, regulations and laws became more complex for security reasons. There was general weakness in the economies of the warring and producing countries. This affected, and still affects, their currencies. An unfavorable investment climate ensued, increasing the shortage of resources available to fund development in the region.

"5. The war invalidated the concept of national security and strength by means of stockpiling expensive weapons. Had it developed differently, its consequences would have impacted the Gulf countries very seriously. Its consequences—the changed view of the concept of national or regional security—may prevent its recurrence.

#### Conjectured Changes After the War

"It is not easy to try to ascertain the extent of change to be expected, although one can ascertain its directions. This is because the extent of change depends on the extent of man's role in dealing with those changes, whether in prescribing general policy or in his ability to deal with changes. The conjectured changes have consequences with a general dimension and long range, as well as consequences with a specific dimension and short range.

#### I. Conjectured Consequences of a General Nature

"To begin, we must acknowledge a fact and try to change it—namely, that the countries of the Gulf and Arab region, individually and collectively, do not believe in long-range thinking, strategic order, and waiting for the components of the detailed picture to come together with the passage of time. The first increase in oil prices took us by surprise, and we behaved incorrectly. The second increase in oil prices surprised us; believing it would last, we behaved incorrectly. The drop in oil prices and production surprised us; having reached a stage of suffocation, we behaved incorrectly, preserving high and unnecessary expenditures inherited from the time of surfeit, and covering them by excess production of oil that made prices reach the level they reached. The case was the same with the Iraq-Iran War: Its outbreak took us by surprise. We showed no fear, until its threat extended to Basrah, then to everything in the Gulf. Its end also took us by surprise.

"This kind of thinking will lead us to try to alleviate the reasons for a renewal of a bloody conflict whose costs in all their forms would be much greater than the costs of a program to avoid conflict. One of the things required may be a positive and collective political effort to defray the costs of rebuilding the two countries and participants. It will require calling on others from within the

region to contribute requisite goods and services and to contribute money if necessary. This contribution could take an indirect form, through the division of quotas within OPEC to partially offset the loss in reconstruction expenses and rebuilding a peacetime economy. Naturally, this will not pass without real opposition from parties that see it as harming their interests. But with some consciousness and insistence, it may turn into a commitment to interests, increasing the possibilities of mutual understanding and joint rebuilding.

"This may reflect itself in a better situation, leading to increased possibilities for agreement within OPEC to offset any minor concessions for reconstruction and economic rebuilding. Based on short-term historical experience, one can say that oil prices ranged between \$10 and \$20 a barrel when the first signs of overstepping or disregarding the OPEC agreements appeared. This will apparently remain true for the coming period, if oil retains the same importance. One can also say, as a realistic assumption, that the region contained about 63 percent of the world's proven oil reserve in 1987, while its share of world production did not exceed 22 percent. If this situation continues, the concentration of reserves in the area could reach 90 percent at the beginning of the next century. Consequently, the countries of the region will be the first to benefit from establishing a strategy of protecting oil and deriving the greatest profit from it. With some mutual understanding, those countries could raise their revenues in the next 10 years by 60 percent. If we assume realistic hypotheses—e.g., that the region will not export more than 10 million barrels a day on the average during the next 10 years, and that the margin of difference of net prices obtained (depending on the disunion or cohesion of producing countries) will remain around \$10 a barrel, or between \$15 and \$25 a barrel—receipts from oil income could range around \$55 billion in the first case, and around \$90 billion a year in the second case. Any price exceeding the minimum and resulting from better mutual understanding will mean surplus income not otherwise obtainable.

"Finally, successful alleviation of the weight of suffering and pain, postwar reconstruction, and agreement on a joint understanding preserving the value of the only nonhuman resource in the region could lead to creation of a nucleus for general Arab understanding with neighboring countries. The balance of this would represent a suitable climate and larger quantity of available capital. This understanding could help break the impasse of national development, which I see no hope of being realized, and break the impasse of dependency upon the advanced countries which impose all their conditions on any attempts at change. This bloc could find its opportunity in time, like the countries of Southeast Asia, as long as it continues to possess the necessary elements or raw materials.

## II. The Particular Dimension: Internal or Short-Range

"What applies to absence of the long-range dimension or strategic thinking in the region applies to the local administration in Kuwait in a slightly different form.

The local administration is an administration by reactions and after the passage of a period of time, not an administration of action. This means that there are usually two temporal dimensions that actually leave their shadows on conduct in many matters, economy not excepted. The first dimension is that of the time preceding the determination of a certain matter or the determination of matters with regard to an expected scenario. In most cases this is absent. The second dimension is immediate action when the event occurs. In my opinion, this occurs only after the problem has turned into a general one, after it has become more complicated to deal with, and perhaps when it is already too late.

"This holds true in general for the problem of the Iraq-Iran War and the postwar period. During the war, the possibility of its end existed in some way, although our individual judgments of its probability differed. The problem of dealing with its realities should have been within the calculations of the institution—the state. After the cease-fire, the possibility, with the essential changes it raised, became a reality. The least one can believe is that accounts would be quickly prepared to confront its realities. The truth is that neither the former nor the latter occurred. Even as the war was a surprise, so was its end a surprise. When the war stopped, the government finished its normal long summer vacation. This does not mean that its end did not leave signs of joy here and there and a traditional rise in the price of assets such as stocks and real estate, as was the case when stocks split or when companies were allowed to buy 10 percent of their stocks.

"If I am allowed to define guideposts for confronting the problem of dealing with postwar conditions over the short term, I would propose the following:

### 1. Defining the Changes:

A. Study and proposal of a new view of the concept of security in its military, political, social, and economic dimensions.

B. Study of the laws and regulations imposed by wartime conditions—from a general perspective, not in all its specialization.

C. Definition of the difficulties that must be confronted—financing, commercial dangers, political dangers, etc.—and study of how they should be dealt with.

D. Enumerating local and regional resources suitable for forming the material for cooperation and study of their competitive circumstances.

### 2. Estimating the Size of the Change

A. Oil revenues of the two countries that were at war will range between \$220 billion and \$320 billion during the coming 10 years, assuming that they produce 40 percent of possible Gulf area production. Total volume of the

region's revenues, including the two countries that were at war, will be between \$550 billion and \$900 billion during the same period, in accordance with changes in oil prices.

B. Under conditions of peace, one can assume that military expenditures will decrease. At certain times these reached 150 percent of Iraq's total oil revenues, 80 percent of Iran's, and 50 percent of Saudi Arabia's. We ought to make these revenues circulate as much as possible in the region by studying their new channels.

#### Defining the Means

"This should come after defining the new understanding and determining possible difficulties. No individual and no group of individuals and institutions with can confront the problem their own abilities. Rather, the problem of real support will come by providing it as a public service. I think the means of confrontation will be reducible to the manner of confronting the following difficulties:

##### A. Information

"A great quantity of information about mutual needs must be provided. This requires a system to collect, classify, update, and display information on an organized basis. It requires a similar enumeration of available resources by the same method and creation of channels of contact between need and resource.

##### B. Financing and Insurance

"The problem of financing should be considered within a system of examining the total interaction between two countries for anyone who wants that. Although this is a difficult procedure, it is not a complicated one. I think it is a necessary procedure, if one is to encourage and develop rates of exchange between the two countries. A system of insurance should be developed against dangers, providing a measure of security that would help encourage mutual investment.

##### C. Movement of Means of Production

"Without a doubt, the war led to financial and security difficulties from which followed economic policies that were expansionist on the one hand (monetary policies), and harsh on the other hand (restrictions on currency movement in and out). These difficulties also caused severe restrictions on the movement of other means of production, such as human beings. If rapid rebuilding of these economies is the goal, there must be an attempt to show mutual flexibility in order to lay new foundations and bases for the movement of capital and people. This will lead to the facilitation of mutual investment. The reality is that the impasse of national development, which has proved to have failed over the past 40 years, despite huge oil revenues, cannot be overcome unless peoples' interests are linked to each other through direct

cooperation. My belief is that this cannot occur out of political considerations or top-level interests that have no connection with the future of the development of the peoples.

#### Effect of the War's Having Ended Without Deliberate Intervention

"The end of the war will doubtlessly lead to a positive economic transformation, even if the changes are left to will work their effect haphazardly. This will take impulse from the following probabilities:

A. Ending of the war will lead to reducing of its expenses and will leave a margin for other areas of expenditure. This will occur even if oil revenues are at their lowest levels, assuming that the various parties do not cooperate to increase their yield.

B. Part of those revenues will have to cover consumer needs, to offset wartime deprivation. Part of those needs will have to come through neighboring channels, i.e., through neighboring markets.

C. Building or rebuilding will inevitably consume part of the revenues for required goods and services, and some of these will have to be provided through the same channels.

D. It will be necessary to use a developed financial sector, and this will come in part from the same channels.

E. Additional monetary assets will be available due to the addition of the element of political stability to the aspect of investment in the region, whereas it used to be counted against it. Conversely, there is a possibility that commercial and political dangers abroad may increase.

"This will automatically produce better business conditions, compared with the recent past, for the sectors of commerce, contracting, and financial services (banks, insurance companies, and investment companies), and this will automatically apply to other sectors.

"The principals of the human sciences say that logic motivates man, whether as an individual or as part of a company, to try to maximize return with the lowest possible costs. This is happening in regard to the postwar scenario on the part of individuals and companies located around the world.

"When one talks about institutions—states—the matter is not just a logical choice, but a duty relating to destiny and survival. It is certainly not permissible to wait for circumstances to be generous, on the chance that they will provide what is sufficient. If it happens, it will be at the cost of many expenses, and these may impact negatively even upon the mutual relations of peoples. I

therefore see no alternative to our seizing the initiative in an organized manner and thinking in advance about preparing the circumstances that will serve our destiny and future."

**Isma'il al-Shatti**

Isma'il al-Shatti said that the Eastern camp, represented by Russia, wanted the following from the region:

1. Weakening of Western influence, and prevention of the Gulf lake from being penetrated.
2. Securing of the long border between Iran and Russia, and preventing Iran from entering into military pacts or treaties with Western countries.
3. Halting the danger of the spread of Islamic ideology in the Islamic areas colonized by the Russians.
4. Creation of Russian influence in the Gulf in order to influence the distribution of oil production in markets, for the benefit of the socialist bloc, and to define suitable conditions for its importation.

To attain its goals, Russia has exploited some of the advantages it enjoys as an Asian country sharing borders with a Gulf country and its ability to mobilize militarily and reach the area more quickly than America. It has also used liberation movements working in the region for its own influence.

But will this conflict continue?

The annual report of the Survey of Future Studies for 1987 prepared by Michel (Maryin) defines ten hopes and ten fears for the future. Foremost among the hopes on which most students of the future agree he places improved relations between the Western and Eastern camps and the melting away of the cold war between them. These students predict that this improvement will lead to a reduction of the arms race and of high military expenditures. Wolf Leonard (department of history, Yale University), in his 1986 book, "The Kremlin and the West," predicts six scenarios for the future of Russia. He considers the scenario of political liberalism most probable. Under it, economic modernization will take place; there will be a tendency toward the commerce of private institutions; and the terror apparatus will break up and be transformed into democracy appropriate to the system. He says that the opening up of Soviet society will not only benefit the Soviet bloc, but will prepare the way for real improvements in relations between East and West and form the basis for lasting peace.

In his July 1986 article, "Pillars of Peace," published in VITAL magazine, Richard Nixon holds that the most important positive development in the last 40 years is that the Soviet Union has lost its ideological battle in the world. It can no longer expand through ideology, but rather through its arms. Charles Taylor, in his report that

I mentioned earlier, thinks that the Soviet Union under the new leadership will turn its attention to internal economic developments and will become less competitive and adventurous on the international stage. In his previously mentioned article, Nixon enumerates eight pillars of peace, embodying the new future form of the struggle:

1. A policy resting on the difficult reality of mutual respect for interests.
2. Honest recognition of differences, with their solution if possible, or the creation of formulas for living with them.
3. We will not aim at imposing our system upon the Soviets, and will resist the imposition of their system upon us.
4. We will not aim at strategic superiority for ourselves, but we will prevent it for them.
5. We will help our friends in the Third World, as the Soviets help theirs.
6. We welcome increased trade with the Soviet Union, but not trade that causes our destruction.
7. Although we are rivals politically, we have a single enemy—international terrorism.
8. The old concepts of containment are no longer valid. We must create a new ground for mutual competition and coexistence.

It becomes clear from all this that the international struggle for the region will become less intense. The adversaries will turn into partners, dividing interests between them. The ideological mobilization that the Russians used to employ in the region will wither. The matter of the difficult balance between Moscow's support of liberation movements and their communist parties and the establishment of relations with the regimes against which the liberation movements are fighting will be settled in favor of the regimes. Moscow will establish diplomatic relations with all regimes of the area. Moscow and its allies will have a share in the enormous oil wealth of the Gulf region. Limited commercial and economic relations will therefore develop between Russia and the region. The matter of structural decisions for the region will become a Western concern. Disagreements may possibly arise between America and its ally, a united Europe, over certain interests in the region.

### **Taba Arbitration May Be Linked to Ra's al-Burqah**

440000182 Jerusalem *THE JERUSALEM POST* in English 7 Dec 88 p 1

[Article by Menachem Shalev]

[Text] Government officials are seriously considering a demand that Israel link its implementation of the Taba arbitration award with Egypt's paying compensation to the families of the victims of the Ra's al-Burqah massacre.

The proposal was raised by the families of the victims and their lawyers, who yesterday complained bitterly about Egyptian procrastination in paying compensation at a meeting with Yosi Ben-Aharon, the director-general of the Prime Minister's Office.

A lone Egyptian gunman killed seven Israelis on the beach at Ra's al-Burqah on October 5, 1985. Although Egypt acknowledged responsibility for the incident more than two years ago, officials here agree with the families' assessment that Egypt has been footdragging on compensation.

An Egyptian tribunal set up to deal with the compensation is scheduled to meet on December 18 in Cairo. In the past, many of its meetings have been postponed.

On Monday, the military liaison committees of both countries are slated to meet to begin marking the border pillars as located by the Taba arbitrators.

The two countries are also due to meet in January to discuss the delineation of the border in Taba near the Sonesta Hotel and the arrangements which will be in force there following the expected Israeli withdrawal.

"Egypt must realize that the resolution of the Taba issue must coincide with a new starting point on other issues, not least of which is the Ra's al-Burqah matter," said a well-placed source last night.

### **Al-Asad Invites Iraqi Opposition to Meetings**

44040106 Tehran *KEYHAN AL-'ARABI* in Arabic 27 Oct 88 p 4

[Text] His Eminence Hujjat al-Islam wa-al-Muslimin Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, president of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and the accompanying delegation returned to the Islamic Republic of Iran Saturday evening, 10 Rabi' I [22 October], after a visit to the Syrian Arab Republic at the invitation of President Hafiz al-Asad. His Eminence was met by brother officials in the Islamic Republic, Mr 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Hakim, member of the Central Shura in the Supreme Council, and the Syrian ambassador and his assistant in Tehran. He was also met by crowds of Iraqi Muslims at Mehrabad Airport in Tehran.

At the Mehrabad Airport reception hall, Sayyid al-Hakim made the following statement about the activities that had taken place in Syria and whether the trip had achieved its goals: "Activities during the trip included meetings with Syrian brothers in the Syrian Arab Republic, foremost among them its leader, President Hafiz al-Asad. There were also meetings with brothers who are adherents of the Iraqi opposition and general meetings with the masses of Iraqi brothers in Syria who are receiving good care from the Syrian government. In addition, there were meetings with some academicians who gathered in al-Asad Hall. We spoke to them on the occasion of the 600th anniversary of the birth of the famous Sufi poet Hafez of Shiraz. There was also a meeting with a large crowd of Syrian brothers in a Damascus mosque. Furthermore, there were meetings with Lebanese brothers from various fields, with religious scholars and Islamic and non-Islamic politicians, to study together the state and condition of Lebanon. The general evaluation of the visit was that it was a successful one and was able to achieve the goals set out for it. At the beginning of this visit, we laid down a comprehensive program. We were able to apply all of its points—praise be to God, the Lord of all Being!—as well as new points that were added there. We encountered care, affection, and cooperation from the Syrian brothers in particular."

In response to another question about news of an intention to open a Damascus branch of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, al-Hakim said: "This was one of the requests we presented in Syria to the Syrian brothers. Their position was positive."

In response to the question of whether the council intends to move the opposition and its activities to Syria, His Eminence said: "The meeting that took place at first with the Iraqi opposition was a general and comprehensive meeting. We were carrying an initiative about a general framework for joint action with adherents of the Iraqi opposition. We raised this initiative in this general meeting. Afterwards, meetings were scheduled to discuss the dynamics of action to reach this goal—namely, a joint common framework—based on Syria's very important geographic and strategic position vis-a-vis the region in general and the Iraqi problem in particular and on the firmness that Syrian leaders in particular have shown in their strategic positions toward community issues that concern the Islamic world, and especially toward our cause. Thus, we think that whenever the opportunity presents itself, there should be room for activity of the [Iraqi] opposition in Syria. We seriously believe that there should be broader movement through Syria, bearing in mind that Syrian brothers have from the beginning opened their hearts and doors to support the Muslim Iraqi people in their cause. Iraqis and the Iraqi opposition have been present in Syria from the beginning. This position is not a new one on the part of Syria."

The final question concerned His Eminence Sayyid al-Hakim's opinion of the condition of Iraqi brothers in Syria, and whether the future of Iraqis in Syria, Iran, or

other countries of emigration had been discussed. His Eminence answered: "The Iraqi masses in Syria are masses that in any case have been subjected to injury, prosecution, and suffering at the hands of the ruling regime in Baghdad. They have found a refuge in Syria. Naturally, during the meeting with these masses, we found them optimistic at the emotional level. We tried to explain to them the strategic picture and the lines that the Supreme Council is adopting at this stage. Among the issues we brought up with Syrian brothers were those connected with the condition of Iraqi brothers—their social, health, and educational needs in their country, Syria, inasmuch as it is the second country of these Iraqi brothers. We drew attention to the fact that greater care for these Iraqi brothers represents the best way to guard against their dissolving into corrupt Western societies, toward which problems and damage might drive them to turn."

About the future of the Iraqis in Iran, al-Hakim said: "Officials in the Islamic Republic of Iran have announced that Iran is the support of all who have been deprived. They have stated that they will attend to the issue of caring for Iraqis, even as they care for Iranians."

#### **Jordan and Libya Agree To Boost Health Services Cooperation**

44000156 Amman JORDAN TIMES in English  
13 Nov 88 p 3

[Text] Amman (Petra)—Jordan and Libya have agreed to boost bilateral cooperation in the field of health in such a way that serves their common interests.

Health Minister Zayd Hamzah who concluded an official visit to Libya, signed the minutes of a health agreement with his Libyan counterpart Dr Mustafa al-Zaydi.

The minutes of the agreement define spheres of mutual cooperation and covers basic medical health.

It also deals with exchange of expertise, and sets the basis for cooperation and for benefitting from technical cooperation between the two countries. It also deals with exchange of information on the laws and regulations pertaining to various medical spheres.

Hamzah said that during his 5-day visit to Libya, he met with a number of Jordanian doctors working there. He said the Libyan officials spoke highly of the Jordanian doctors' high standard and reputation.

There are 72 Jordanian doctors currently working in Libya in addition to 59 other doctors who recently signed contracts to work there.

## **PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS**

**Israeli Arabs, Islamic Movement Seek Unity**  
44000183 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in  
English 7 Dec 88 p 7

[Article by Marda Dunskey]

[Text] In the run-up to last month's elections, the Islamic movement in Israel issued a call to Muslim Arab voters to go to the polls and vote for the candidates of their choice. And among those parties vying for Arab support, the progressive List for Peace was especially active in courting the religious voter.

Yet the results fell short of the expectation that the Arab vote could make a crucial difference. Nearly a quarter of the 320,000 eligible Arab voters stayed away from the polls, translating into three to four lost mandates. And one of the losers was the Progressive List, whose representation in the Knesset dropped from two seats to one in the process.

Now, in the wake of these failures, one of the Islamic movement's chief figures, Shaykh 'Abdallah Darwish—who put his name to the declaration encouraging Muslims to vote—says he plans to assemble the leaders of all Arab political parties and movements within Israel for discussions on the formation of a united "Arab peace camp."

"Soon I will call for all the Arab leaders in the State of Israel to sit together to discuss and agree on the minimum that will unify them," Darwish said in a recent interview at his home in Kafr Qasim.

"I will call all of them to sit together, all the political streams in the Arab sector—the Progressive List, the Democratic Front, al-Nakbah, the Sons of the Village—because I see that everyone supports the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and everyone agrees on achieving peace.

"The extent to which Darwish can serve as a unifying factor, however, is complicated by the fact that the Islamic movement, like the Arab sector of which it is a part, is not monolithic but rather divided into different streams, according to Joseph Ginat, deputy adviser to Shim'on Peres on Israeli Arab affairs.

The Arab sector as a whole can be viewed as having three ideological components—with those promoting what he calls "Israeli-Arab nationalism" comprising the largest faction, and those advocating hardline Palestinian nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism comprising two smaller factions. Similarly, the Islamic movement itself is divided among those advocating Palestinian nationalism, so-called "returnees" to the faith more concerned with Islam as a way of life and a much smaller segment of Sufis, Ginat said.

Further, not only do its leaders and experts like Ginat decline to attach numbers to the movement (although it is believed to have followers in the tens of thousands), it is acknowledged that no central unifying leadership exists within the movement itself.

"Each village and each town has its own leadership," said Shaykh Hashim al-Mahajnah, one of the leaders of the Islamic movement in Umm el-Fahm, adding that other main centres of the movement are Nazareth, al-Tayyibah, al-Tirah, Kfar Kana and Kafr Qasim.

The absence of central leadership and consensus were apparent in the contrast between al-Mahajnah's and Darwish's readiness to talk about the issue of an independent Palestinian state. While Darwish talked about Palestinian independence at length, al-Mahajnah declined to comment on the issue. "We have no position to state right now," he said. "We'll have to wait and see what happens.

"Just why so many Arab voters stayed away from the election is also a matter open to interpretation. While Ginat said that some local shaykhs told their followers not to vote, al-Mahajnah maintained that no specific boycott directives were issued in the name of the movement. "Some voted and some didn't—that's only natural," he said, adding that the approximate 75 per cent turnout rate among Arab voters was consistent with past years.

Darwish, however, had his own ideas. "To the sorrow of many, most of the Muslims didn't find a single political body in Israel that advances the interest of peace, that advances the legitimate rights of the Palestinians," he said.

Coupled with a sense of despair and lack of faith in politicians, he noted, was also the fact that the declaration he signed in the name of the movement did not specify one party over another. "They had the freedom of do what they wanted, but they didn't go," he said.

Looking ahead to his impending call for an Arab peace camp, Darwish said he hoped its formation would "unify the Arab strength in Israel" while at the same time encourage the Jewish peace camp to coalesce. Darwish contended that the Islamic movement intends to serve as a unifying force rather than seek political legitimacy in its own right, despite the fact that it announced in its declaration to Muslim voters that it will seek to contest the municipal elections in the spring.

"We in the Islamic movement will be a force," in such an effort toward unification, he said, "but we don't seek one Knesset seat. "We only want to move forward," he said, saying his job will be to try to get Arab leaders in Israel to agree on the minimum, to stop looking at the past and start looking at the future. "Our existence as Palestinians in Israel depends on our unity," he said.

#### **'Uprising Leadership' Calls for Open Schools** 44040111 Nicosia FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 6 Nov 88 p 7

[Text] In its response to the demands of each stage and the demands of each one of the occupied areas, the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising demonstrated that it understands what is happening around it. The command thinks it is important to take advantage of the fact that schools in Jerusalem stay open.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate, an appeal... an appeal... an appeal. No voice shall be heard over that of the uprising, the voice of the people of Palestine, the people of the PLO.

#### **O People of Our Great Nation:**

At a time when our brave people are engaged in a fierce struggle to gain freedom and independence, the occupation authorities are trying to sow dissension in the citizens' ranks and create confusion and internal conflict by a variety of direct and crooked ways. Having tried all methods of oppression and brutal maltreatment and failed to put out this mighty national furor, they are hoping the uprising will wither away and die.

In this regard schemers and those who do not understand what is happening are trying to create confusion and chaos in Jerusalem schools which have been reopened by authorities. Their attempts involve suspect messages they send to the principals of private schools in Jerusalem, warning them and calling upon them to close the schools in what they claim would be a show of solidarity with the remaining schools on the West Bank. These people are also involved in the disturbances which occur in school playgrounds during official school hours. It is these disturbances which give the authorities the excuse they need to attack all the institutions of learning on our sacred land.

#### **O Fellow Countrymen of Our Brave Nation, Fellow Countrymen of the Tempestuous Uprising:**

Our popular revolt is a rebellion against injustice and oppression. It is a rebellion against the occupation authorities and their machinery. It is a rebellion for freedom and independence. We do not want to destroy ourselves or place obstacles to our own development. That is not the aim of our rebellion. Nor is it our aim to help the enemy place more obstacles in our way.

Knowledge is our people's foremost and strongest weapon. It is thus a natural target for repression by the occupation authorities. That is why your leaders, the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, have been calling for all schools, institutes, and universities to be open. In appealing for open schools and institutes, our appeal is based on the notion that the people have a fundamental right to education. Education is a principal weapon which gives our people the awareness they need



in their long struggle. It would be unreasonable for us to allow ourselves to become instrumental in closing our open institutes and schools, even if we did that under the pretext of showing solidarity with our colleagues in the remaining schools in the West Bank.

In fact, the only way to fight the occupation authorities' policy against the education of our brave people is to pursue knowledge. That is why it is our duty to strengthen popular education in those areas which have been victimized by the enemy's tyranny: the areas where schools were closed. We have to intensify the course of study in those schools and institutes which the occupation authorities have allowed to reopen. We must do this during official school hours and days, as these are designated in official bulletins from the uprising. The National Command is calling upon all national student elements and forces to step up their involvement in opposing the occupation authorities after school hours and days. It also calls upon the principals of private schools in Jerusalem to show their solidarity with private schools in the West Bank by complying with their demands and not allowing the educational problem of a few West Bank students to be dealt with on an individual basis. The command is asking the principals of private schools in Jerusalem not to allow those students to enroll in Jerusalem's private schools.

O Fellow Countrymen of Our Brave Nation: Our Brave Merchants in Steadfast Jerusalem:

Saturday, 29 October 1988 is the anniversary of the Kafr Qasim massacre. On this occasion the Unified National Leadership for Jerusalem appeals to you, in response to a suggestion issued by the Unified National Leadership for the Uprising, to declare a general strike to commemorate those who lost their lives in that Fascist massacre.

Long live the popular uprising as an everlasting flame, burning under the enemy's feet.

Glory and immortality for our dutiful martyrs.

We shall be victorious.

The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, Jerusalem

## EGYPT

### Industry Minister Discusses Third World Industrial Problems

45040055 Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic  
30 Sep 88 p 31

[Interview by Raji 'Anayit with Minister of Industry Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab; place and date not given]

[Text] ['Anayit] Why do you call our endeavor to catch up with the industrial boom an impossible dream, even though some Third World countries, like South Korea, Singapore, Brazil, and Mexico, are busy trying to achieve just that?

['Abd-al-Wahhab] When we in Egypt talk about industry, we mean traditional industries on which the industrial community has rested for the last three centuries. These industries are on their way out. Why? Because they have polluted the earth's atmosphere to the point where it cannot endure the damage they bring any more, something that can no longer be overlooked, given the worldwide growth of the environmental protection movement, and because these industries—with the energy they consume—used to rely on nonrenewable sources of energy (coal, gas, oil) and the world stock of these sources is running out. More important, the nature of work in these industries is based on principles and beliefs that can no longer be embraced from a humanistic point of view.

The big industrialized powers have begun to realize these facts, and therein lies the reason why they have started to export these industries to Third World and developing countries. We must not be fooled by what we hear nowadays about conditions in South Korea or Brazil. We must look beyond this momentary success. You must determine whether their economic growth has been built at the expense of the Korean people's human development and Korea's near, rather than distant, future.

['Anayit] Are you asking us to shut down the factories we worked so hard to build?

['Abd-al-Wahhab] No, this is not what I am asking. However, I would like our policymakers to understand the true situation before acceding to the designs of the big industrialized powers. I would like the policymakers to be fully aware of the dimensions of the choices they make. I would like the people not to be carried away by pompous slogans such as "catching up with the advanced industrialized countries." The world is undergoing a period of putting the international economic house in order and if we are unable to act now, the least we can do is to persist in our efforts to understand, in the hope that such understanding will evolve into a more mature action when we regain our ability to act.

['Anayit] I would like to understand precisely what you would have us do.

['Abd-al-Wahhab] I would like us to proceed while realizing the following:

- 1. That the traditional industries on which the industrial community was built will not continue in their present form, except in backward countries that allow themselves to be put in this situation;
- 2. That any vestiges that may remain in the advanced countries will not keep their familiar form, but rather will undergo a radical change that employs self-direction based on robots and electronic control and on a solid waste management system aimed at stopping industrial pollution;

- 3. That the advanced countries are shifting their weight to emerging industries, the industries of the future;
- 4. That in the age of the current drastic shift, Third World countries must adopt a long-term plan for amassing know-how and information and a job-training program so that they may switch to the industries of the future, thus securing for themselves a reasonable place among the countries of the world when the role of the old traditional industries comes to an end;
- 5. That in Egypt, we most urgently need to reexamine our industrial activities and come up with a new logic for industrial growth that takes into consideration all the elements of transition I have already mentioned, in particular the management style of big industrial firms;
- 6. That we must give up once and for all the dream of setting up new big industries and must institute industrial projects, small in size and big in number and spread over our geographic expanse, projects that rely on small renewable and diversified sources of energy in conformity with the sites on which such projects are set up;
- 7. That in adopting technological innovations, we must be more prudent in picking those things that can help our industry to achieve geographic expansion and can help us to absorb our country's enormous demographic power, thereby turning population growth into a blessing rather than a curse;
- 8. And finally, in translating into action the slogan of shifting to a world economy, we must establish an Arab economic system built on the principle of networking that stresses mutual economic reliance among Arab countries. This is the only available truly effective alternative to the Arab unity appeal we used to sound. Such a network organization can connect its lines to other network organizations in Third World countries so that we may achieve the necessary balance in our economic relations with the big and advanced powers.

[ʿAnayit] And do you believe this is possible under our present circumstances?

[ʿAbd-al-Wahhab] It is possible but difficult. It is easier, however, to submit to what the big powers have planned for us which renders our progress impossible, indeed out of the question. I know it is difficult because it requires a strong and free leadership able to stand up to big power intervention and pressures. It is not enough for the Minister of Industry to understand Egypt's industrial interests; he must also be able to stand up to the pressures, be they coming from America, Germany, or Japan. The leadership's freedom and power can only be achieved through greater democracy in its true sense, or greater opportunities for the people to take part in the decisionmaking process. For the people who choose and take part in decisionmaking are active people who help their leadership to stand up to any possible pressure from the outside, and who endure sacrifices willingly so long as they share one strategic vision with the national leadership.

[ʿAnayit] Now you have raised another subject!

[ʿAbd-al-Wahhab] What I am saying involves only one subject. It is an interactive net of factors that must be dealt with as a whole. The important thing is that the difficult road I am talking about will become less difficult as the days pass, owing to the severe evolution the big industrialized countries are experiencing in their daily lives at this particular stage of putting the world economic house in order. I alluded to that when I talked about what I called the cultural cutting edge, explaining that this is the time to move before we lose our chance. America's ability, at this stage, to dominate the world economically and politically will diminish day by day as new forces rise and other strong countries emerge, forcing it to relinquish its old role as the power dominating the world. American author John Nesbitt says in this regard: "Now that developing countries are beginning to sense the extent of the shift in the world balance of power, America and other industrialized countries must renounce their old attitudes that view every political decision as 'terrorist' and every economic stance as 'blackmail.' Such attitudes were conceivable when America ruled the world. The problem now is that it no longer does."

#### **Islamic Leader Criticizes Government for Role in Weakening Al-Azhar**

45040102 Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 23 Nov 88 p 4

[Interview with Dr ʿAbd-al-Jalil Shalabi; date and place not given]

[Text] Dr ʿAbd-al-Jalil Shalabi is one of the leaders of Islamic action and Islamic missionary activity both in Egypt and abroad. In Egypt he was professor at al-Azhar University and served as general secretary of the Islamic Research Academy for many years. Abroad, he assumed a position of religious leadership when he served as director of the Islamic Center in the United States. He still serves as professor of comparative religions and of the principles of Islamic missionary activity in Egyptian, Arab, Islamic and foreign universities. Accordingly, talking with him about events of the hour becomes a must.

I went to Dr Shalabi with questions which are now looming on the Islamic scene. He was open-minded, and he answered the questions quite candidly.

I started my interview with his eminence by asking him the following question: "Do you believe that al-Azhar has failed to lead Islamic missionary activity?"

[Shalabi] I believe quite frankly and unequivocally that al-Azhar has not taken positive action, not to mention any act of leadership, in Islamic missionary activity for a long time.

Al-Azhar had a major role to play, and it set the course for Islamic activity when its men steered the government and guided it on a proper Islamic course. Al-Azhar was

truly the leading religious institution it was meant to be when its shaykh would order a general strike and all shops would close their doors. It was truly the leading religious institution when the ruler would comply with a demand made by the shaykh of al-Azhar. But al-Azhar lost its authority after and since bowing to government and praising it. And now al-Azhar is subordinate to government which does with it what it will and steers it in any direction it wishes.

#### **Al-Azhar's Men Savored the Misfortunes of Muslim Brothers**

I recall that it was al-Azhar's men who took the most pleasure in the misfortunes of the Muslim Brothers when 'Abd-al-Nasir had them arrested and hanged. At that time not a single official from al-Azhar stepped forward to offer the Muslim Brothers assistance. Had there been a real shaykh of al-Azhar then, he would have told 'Abd-al-Nasir to stop all that.

[AL-NUR] Dr Shalabi added that al-Azhar's subordination to successive governments degraded the institution and humiliated its men. An instructor in al-Azhar is ranked as a grade four, whereas his counterpart who graduated from other universities is ranked as a grade one.

[Shalabi] Nothing is being taught in al-Azhar now after a development system was introduced into that institution. In fact, I can say that courses and instruction in Islamic conduct are needed in al-Azhar. Now, all examinations there are based on cheating, and most of al-Azhar's students do not memorize the Koran. In fact, they cannot even read it.

Today, a student at al-Azhar assumes a neutral position. His only concern is to graduate and get a job. These students are neither advocates of religion nor scholars. What al-Azhar needs now is someone who can reform it.

#### **Reforming al-Azhar Would Restore It to Its Glory**

[AL-NUR] How can al-Azhar be restored to its glory?

[Shalabi] There are fundamental matters which are quite clear. First of all, al-Azhar must be relieved of its subordination to governments. It must have its independent budget and its independent bylaws, and it must select its leaders independently of government. I believe this is the heart of the matter. Everything else is secondary. In addition, religious trusts must be restored to al-Azhar, and [returns from them] must be designated for the institution and its organizations. Then there are matters within al-Azhar which should be reformed, such as attention should be given to memorizing the Holy Koran.

Doing that requires the restoration of religious schools for children and youngsters. That is where major scholars and thinkers got their education.

I appeal to the government to act promptly to reform al-Azhar to save Egypt's dignity and rescue Islamic missionary activity. I appeal to the government to act promptly to save this ancient institution which Muslims from all over the world turn to.

#### **An Elected Shaykh of al-Azhar**

[AL-NUR] Do you believe that electing a shaykh of al-Azhar would move the institution away from a position of subordination?

[Shalabi] Undoubtedly. Adopting a system in which the shaykh of al-Azhar would be elected instead of appointed would restore al-Azhar to its prestige and move it away from subordination.

In the past the shaykh of al-Azhar was elected by a body of senior scholars, but that body of senior scholars, which is now defunct, has been replaced by the Academy for Islamic Research. That is why I am calling upon this academy to elect one of its scholars shaykh of al-Azhar. But no one should declare himself a candidate for that position until qualifying scholarly documents are submitted. Such a candidate must show what books he authored and what independent opinions in Islamic jurisprudence he offered.

#### **Radicalism**

[AL-NUR] Every now and then some security agencies come out with allegations about young Muslims and accuse them of being radical. Are our young people radical?

[Shalabi] It is a fact that everyone under the sun has talked about radicalism and defined it. But after talking about it, they let security agencies make judgments about young people. It is these security agencies that classify young people as radical, moderate, terrorist, and so on. But I think it is a mistake to call young people who are pious and who pray to God radical.

In saying this I seek nothing but the truth. Most of our young people are not radical at all. They are missionaries for Islam.

Although there are a few young people who confront the government with violence, the truth is that it is government which forced their hand because it confronted them with violence and force. It was normal then for young people to use violence to ward off violence.

And as we know, to every action there is a reaction.

#### **Storming Mosques**

[AL-NUR] What do you think about the incidents which occurred in 'Ayn Shams? What do you think about policemen storming the mosque and firing their weapons at young people?

[Shalabi] That is the wrong approach. It is the wrong way of dealing with the situation. This is the story of a group of young people who meet in the mosque. That meeting is nothing more than a learning session or a gathering to read the Koran or perform prayer services. Policemen then stormed the mosque, beat the young people, and fired their weapons at the young people and at area residents. It would have been better for the government to try engaging these young people in a dialogue. The government should have talked with them about their demands. Everyone would do what was proper, and young people would be persuaded to stay away from what was not proper.

Let me tell police agencies, policemen and police chiefs that storming mosques is legally forbidden. Each one of them will have to answer to God for that on the Day of Judgment.

#### Changing What Is Reprehensible

[AL-NUR] Does an individual have the right to act single-handedly to change what is reprehensible?

[Shalabi] I think that scholars and enlightened members of the population have the right to act single-handedly to change what is reprehensible, provided their own safety is assured. If they are not assured of their own safety, they must advocate change verbally. This is in keeping with God Almighty's dictum, "Call men to the path of your Lord with wisdom and kindly exhortation" [al-Nahl: 125].

I recall that it was during the thirties of this century that a group of young people from Misr al-Fatah [Young Egypt] Society was organized to storm taverns and bars and destroy bottles of liquor as well as anything which would displease God. Taverns were actually destroyed, and the government went so far as to designate a security guard to guard every tavern. But the young people overcame that and achieved what they had hoped to achieve. They ensured their own safety, and they were not subjected to any harm.

#### The People's Assembly

[AL-NUR] Did Muslims do their duty in the People's Assembly?

[Shalabi] I discussed this point with Judge Ma'mum al-Hudaybi, and I wrote about it in your illustrious newspaper.

Judge al-Hudaybi told me among other things that we have much to say in the People's Assembly. However, what we say is not published and is kept from the people. This is done to give people a distorted image of the Islamic tendency in the People's Assembly.

So far Muslims in the People's Assembly have not been credited for any concrete action, but that does not mean that they are weak and have nothing to offer. The reason for that is due to the fact that they are few in number. They are a minority in the People's Assembly. We hope that future assemblies will have more and more of them so they can speak with a strong voice and offer people what they promised us they would offer.

[AL-NUR] The Islamic tendency in the People's Assembly had promised us that the canonical laws of Islam would be applied. But nothing has been done about that question. Do you think that admission of these Muslims into the People's Assembly has been useless?

[Shalabi] Who said that? They are the people who are concerned the most about applying the canonical laws of Islam. But what can they do when they are a minority? We have not [yet] given them an opportunity to do anything. It would therefore be unfair to conclude that they failed in realizing our hopes. The day they become a majority, the canonical laws of Islam will be applied.

#### The Government's Responsibility

[AL-NUR] When we demand the application of the canonical laws of Islam, government declares that Islamic laws would be applied after people become informed about them. Do you think that informing the people is the reason why Islamic law has not yet been applied, or is the government dragging its feet?

[Shalabi] The government is chiefly responsible for the fact that the canonical laws of Islam are not being applied. This is because government has been dragging its feet; it has been stubborn about this matter, and has been putting obstacles in front of the canonical laws of Islam.

Government claims that people are not informed about Islam and about Islamic laws. But let me say this to the government: Are people informed about the provisions of man-made laws? If the general populace were informed about the laws, all the people would have been judges or attorneys. Laws are imposed on people to establish order and control on life. Scholars are to tell people the facts about Islam, and it is up to the government to act promptly to adopt Islamic laws.

#### The Secularists' Position

[AL-NUR] If we [examine] the government's position, we would find secularists clamoring about how application of the canonical laws of Islam will turn all of Egypt into a place where executions and bloodshed would be everywhere. What do you think about that?

[Shalabi] Those biased people are being shortsighted and narrow minded in their discussions. To them Islamic law consists merely of punishments: hands are cut off and people are stoned to death. It is a fact that such punishments are only one aspect of the many and broad aspects of Islamic jurisprudence.

I ask those people: why do they fear for a thief whose hand could be cut off? Why do they fear for an adulterer who could be stoned to death? Why do they not fear for the innocent who are tortured in prisons and who are killed without having committed any crime?

Let me ask those people, if they seek the country's security, to consider the experience of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. During the days of al-Sharif Husayn pilgrims could not perform the rituals of the pilgrimage without guards to protect them from highway robbers. But things changed when King 'Abd-al-'Aziz came to the throne and applied the canonical laws of Islam. Now when a person drops his wallet, no one touches it and he can find it in its place the next day.

Reports issued by security agencies in the world also affirm that the lowest crime rates in the world can be found in countries where the canonical laws of Islam are applied.

[AL-NUR] But those reports claim that the countries which applied the canonical laws of Islam did so to protect tyrants?

[Shalabi] When they say that, they are thinking of Sudan where Numayri applied the canonical laws of Islam because he wanted to strike at his aides. But Numayri is not an authoritative source for Islam, and yet, not everything which he did was harmful. Much of what he did was useful. Iran also distorted the application of Islamic laws with the fierce war which concealed its experience from the world.

Pakistan, on the other hand, did apply the canonical laws of Islam quite sincerely. This was done by a man who believes in God, a man who is extremely pious and modest, the late Zia-ul-Haq. I can certify that that man was a strong supporter of Islam who presented an honorable image of Islam in the modern age.

#### Non-Muslims

[AL-NUR] One last question about the status of non-Muslim minorities under Islamic law.

[Shalabi] Worshipers of other religions had never complained about the application of Islamic law until recently. Christians used to live under Islamic law, which was applied to them just as it was applied to Muslims. They had their own personal affairs courts, and they sought the judgment of their own clergymen. In public affairs, however, they were treated just like Muslims.

An Orientalist said, "If Islam persecuted Christianity, not a single Christian church would have been left in Muslim countries."

#### 'Egypt's Revolution' Trial Resumes With Arrest of Suspect

45000065 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic  
7 Jan 89 p 10

[Text] The "Egypt's Revolution" case has resurfaced in Egypt after Shawqi 'Abd-al-Nasir, the nephew of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, was detained upon his arrival from abroad at Cairo airport, then released a few hours later on a 500-Egyptian-pound bond.

Egyptian sources have confirmed that Jamal Shawqi 'Abd-al-Nasir is the one who has given himself up to his country's security authorities. He is the last on the list of the 20 persons accused in the case. Jamal Shawqi 'Abd-al-Nasir arrived in Egypt 24 hours before the convening of the court session. Hence no one was missing in the defendant's box except Khalid Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, who is accused of financing the "Egypt's Revolution" organization.

At the session, attended by 100 lawyers for the defense of the "Egypt's Revolution" members, it was noticed that the chairman of the Lawyer's Syndicate in Jordan, Husayn Majalli, had come as a representative for all the lawyers in Jordan because of their belief in the "legitimacy of the actions of the 'Egypt's Revolution' members." Attorney Farid 'Abd-al-Karim asked for an end to the solitary confinement of the defendants.

Everyone who attended the trial noticed that the security men had placed Ahmad 'Isam-al-Din, the brother of the first defendant, Mahmud Nur-al-Din, by himself, away from the other defendants, who were noticeably in "good spirits," while Ahmad 'Isam-al-Din seemed "depressed and scared."

At the trial, eight former and current ministers, two ambassadors, a physician, three journalists, and three senior officers from the Egyptian Army were called upon to testify as defense witnesses. Also, witnesses from both the American and Israeli Embassies in Cairo were called upon to testify.

The session lasted 2 hours and was adjourned until 24 January 1989 .

#### Study Addresses Political Violence in Egypt

45040107 Beirut AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic  
November 1988 pp 26-59

[Study by Hasanayn Tawfiq Ibrahim, assistant instructor in the Political Science Section of Cairo University's Economics and Political Science College; "Political Violence Phenomenon in Egypt: Qualitative, Analytical, and Comparative Study, 1952-87"]

[Excerpts] Prelude:

This paper contains an analytical, quantitative study of the phenomenon of political violence in Egypt from 1952 to 1987 with a comparison of political violence under the political administrations of the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, of the late President Anwar Muhammad al-Sadat, and of President Husni Mubarak. The comparison makes it possible to determine the periods during which acts of political violence in Egypt escalated, the most widespread forms of political violence in Egypt, the identity of the forces which engaged in violence during each administration, the main reasons of the phenomenon during the three administrations, and the limits of continuity and of change in political violence in the Egyptian political system. There are several observations that form a general framework of the thinking on this issue. These observations include:

First, political violence is an international phenomenon experienced by all societies to a different degree, in various forms, and for various reasons. The main reasons for political violence are embodied in the difference between societies and in the presence or absence of effective instruments and methods to deal with this phenomenon. Consequently, political violence is not characteristic of a specific society or a specific people to the exclusion of others. Moreover, political violence is a complex phenomenon which assumes various forms and has intricate causes. This is why there are numerous theories and tendencies defining and interpreting the political violence phenomenon.

Second, political violence is not always a negative or morbid phenomenon. At times, it is a historical necessity. It is within this framework that one can understand major revolutionary transformations in human history which would not have happened had a degree of violence not been practiced. Thus, political violence continues to be one of the means, perhaps the sole means, of political and social change when effective, peaceful ways of change do not exist. Therefore, acceptance or rejection of political violence is not just a moral issue. It also depends on one's position and attitude toward the political system. If the state monopolizes the right to use force legitimately, then this right must be within the framework of the law and the constitution so that the state may not commit injustice against citizens' rights and liberties. The state, especially in the Third World countries, often violates these controls. This is why the rulers and official institutions and agencies reject and condemn political violence and view it as deviation from legitimacy whereas the forces opposed to the regime and aspiring for political and social change consider it a legitimate means to achieve the desired change. Political violence is also considered legitimate when used to achieve independence and liberation from a foreign colonist. Herein is embodied the difference between the struggle waged by national liberation movements against a colonist authority and some of the acts of violence which can be condemned morally and legally. In these

cases (an oppressive political system, severe economic and social problems, a foreign colonist), popular political violence is a reaction to another form of organized, structural, and material violence practiced by an oppressive government or a colonialist system.

Third, the political violence phenomenon in Egypt has not been studied in a direct and complete manner. It has been partially tackled by studies dealing with such issues as political stability and social change or by studies dealing with the role of some social forces in the Egyptian political movement, such as students, workers, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the communists. This phenomena also imposes itself semiseasonally on Egyptian political institutions and research and academic centers when acts of violence erupt for one reason or another. With the escalating violent activity of some Egyptian Islamic groups since the mid-1970's, research has, within the framework of analyzing the phenomenon of Islamic revival in Egypt<sup>1</sup>, focused its interest on the violence practiced by these groups.

Fourth, this paper employs the concept of political violence as an introduction to analyzing the Egyptian political system and to finding out the components and dimensions of its continuity and change. Through this concept, one can raise numerous questions concerning political ideology and the limits of its ability to create and strengthen general satisfaction and to mobilize the citizens behind the regime, questions concerning general policies and the extent of their response to the citizens' fundamental needs, and questions concerning political institutions and the extent of their effectiveness in settling political struggles and enabling the various political forces to express their opinions and interests effectively. What I mean is that this study is based on moving from analyzing the partial (the political violence phenomenon) to analyzing the whole (the political system in its entirety). Moreover, this study opens the door for pondering and re-examining some intellectual given facts concerning the national character of the Egyptians, especially concerning the negativism, capitulation, and submissiveness which numerous researchers assert are among the fundamental characteristics of the Egyptian people. This study proceeds on the basis of events and developments that have actually occurred and not the basis of preconceived intellectual abstractions and given facts. The analysis may conclude that some of the established theories are not accurate.

This paper deals with the phenomenon of political violence in a society which has not yet stabilized, though historically old. Egypt, like numerous Third World countries, is undergoing a transitional phase at a time when no general agreement exists on numerous pivotal issues, such as the issue of the relationship between church and state and the old and the new; of women's role in society; of the form of the political, economic, and social system; and so forth. The upheavals and dynamics of the transition process create suitable conditions for the emergence of acts of political violence.

Finally, this study analyzes and compares the political violence phenomenon under three political administrations (Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, Anwar al-Sadat, and Husni Mubarak). There are two ways to analyze and compare these three administrations: First, view the entire political administration as a complete administration with its particular qualities and characteristics regardless of the chronological differences between these administrations. This approach has its faults, including the fact that disregarding the chronological differences influences the final outcome concerning the dimensions of this phenomenon. The chronological difference between Mubarak's administration (the first term) and 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration is nearly 12 years, between 'Abd-al-Nasir's and al-Sadat's administrations is nearly 8 years and between al-Sadat's two terms is 4 years. The second way is to calculate the chronological differences proportionately (18-12-6) and to keep this in mind when analyzing and comparing. In view of some of the statistical and methodological problems connected with the second approach, the first approach has been adopted, with reference made, whenever possible, to the impact that may emanate from the chronological differences. [Passage omitted]

- A. The largest number of limited demonstrations and strikes and of assassination attempts were staged during Mubarak's administration, followed by al-Sadat's administration, and then by 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration, keeping in mind that the two assassination attempts staged during 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration were made against 'Abd-al-Nasir personally.
- B. President al-Sadat's administration witnessed the largest number of riots, limited rebellions, assassinations, and general riots, followed by President Mubarak's administration and then by 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration.
- C. Two coup attempts were made during 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration. They were marginal and posed no threat to the regime. One attempt was made during President al-Sadat's administration. The study sources have cited no attempts during President Mubarak's administration, keeping in mind that the attempt made during al-Sadat's administration was staged by a religious organization—the Islamic Liberation Party—or the Technical War College Group, as called by the media.
- D. It is to be noted that the study sources cite a single limited strike during 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration and three limited strikes during Mubarak's administration. The scarcity of strikes during 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration and their increased number during Mubarak's administration need to be explained. [Passage omitted]

A comprehensive look at the three administrations makes it possible to emphasize several points:

1. Students have been a main element in violent events throughout the three administrations, especially during the 1968-76 and 1984-87 periods. In these two periods,

students constituted the backbone of the political opposition in Egypt. In addition to expressing the interests that concerned them as a social segment, such as university costs, the independent formation of student unions, abolition of the university guard and so forth, the students often expressed general demands, such as democracy, freedom, getting the state ready to confront Israel, and protesting the regime's feeble position on some issues connected with the state's dignity, national independence, and Arab role. An example is found in the student demonstrations staged in reaction to the Sulayman Khatir incident, to the incident in which U.S. fighter planes forced an Egyptian airliner to land in Italy, and to Israel's raid against the PLO headquarters in Tunis. It can be thus said that in numerous cases, the students reflected the implicit and undeclared public opinion positions which could not be expressed directly and openly.<sup>27</sup>

The students' political role can be understood and explained within the framework of the historical experience of the students' role in the pre-July 1952 national movement for independence and within the framework of the psychological and emotional characteristics of youth which are embodied in utopianism and idealism, in rejecting reality, and in seeking renewal. Add to this the degree of political and social awareness students develop through the educational process and their freedom from the shackles of social responsibility. The students' role in incidents of violence can also be understood and explained within the framework of Egypt's social crisis which intensified in certain periods and which reflected on the youth negatively, thus generating a violent reaction among them. But students, though reflecting the opinions and viewpoints opposing the regime, cannot form an alternative to organized opposition.

2. Workers played a role in the acts of violence during al-Sadat's and Mubarak's administration but not 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration. This can be explained within the framework of the social transformations and changes which 'Abd-al-Nasir's regime tried to achieve for the broad popular groups, including the workers. Thus, the workers benefited from the economic and social policies of the Nasirist administration whereas the economic and social policies of al-Sadat's and Mubarak's administrations harmed the workers and the gains they had made under the Nasirist administration. This is because the open-door economic policy culminated with a number of devastating economic and social consequences. A number of national industries collapsed because of their inability to compete, not to mention the widened gap between the classes and the waves of escalating inflation. This condition reflected negatively on the living standards of society's various groups, including government and public sector workers. By virtue of the fact that the workers are concentrated in factories, that they possess a degree of political vigilance, and that they are aware of their role in the production process, certain groups of workers reacted more violently to the constant decline in



their living standard and to the constant erosion of their historical gains. Consequently, they staged numerous strikes and riots and participated in general riots. Factional demands and interests were the focus of the violent political activity of some labor groups.

3. 'Abd-al-Nasir's regime engaged in an extensive degree of official violence against the Muslim Brotherhood which was accused of plotting acts of violence against the regime and its leadership. But the more important reason is that the brotherhood offered an intellectual and political alternative to the 23 July revolution's regime. Consequently, confrontation was inevitable between a secular revolutionary regime which embraced religion as a source of political legitimacy and social mobilization and a group which advocated the Islamic religion as a comprehensive system that covers the various aspects of life. During al-Sadat's and Mubarak's administrations, development occurred at two levels:

First, the Muslim Brotherhood moved toward greater realism and joined the peaceful opposition to the regime, using *AL-DA'WAH* and *AL-I'TISAM* magazines as podiums to express its opinion on social issues and on the regime's domestic and foreign policies<sup>28</sup>. The brotherhood joined the system more closely, established an alliance with the neo-Wafd, waged the 1984 parliamentary elections and a number of its members were elected to the parliament. In the 1987 elections, the brotherhood joined an alliance of the Labor and Liberal Parties and a number of its members were elected to the parliament.

Second, some radical Islamic groups, such as the Islamic Liberation Party, called by the media the "Technical War College Group," the Muslims Group, called by the media the "Atonement and Emigration Group," and the Jihad Organization and other radical groups emerged. These groups' members were often the young and educated sectors belonging socially to the middle and lower classes. Their intellectual tendencies centered on charging the state with infidelity. Some groups charged both state and society with infidelity and called for seclusion and for refrainment from joining the state's and society's institutions. These groups also embraced a coup-oriented ideology based on building the Islamic society and state by using force to topple infidel regimes and to open the door for the faithful groups to apply God's law. These groups criticized Egypt's official religious institution—al-Azhar—and considered it an instrument used by the regime to justify its religious policies and practices. The groups also overstepped the Muslim Brotherhood's ideological and behavioral bounds, even though some of them had emerged from under the brotherhood's wings. The writings of al-Mawdawi and Sayyid Qutub represent the fundamental intellectual sources of these groups, even though some of the two men's ideas were misunderstood and misused. This is in addition to the writings and legal religious opinions of some of these groups' leaders, such as Salih Sariyah, 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj, and Dr 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman. These groups proceeded to practice organized political

violence against the regime (the Technical War College incident of 1974, the kidnapping and assassination of Shaykh al-Dhahabi in 1977, the al-Sadat assassination, and the Asyut rebellion in 1981). These groups thus posed a serious challenge to the regime.

With the escalating role of these groups in Egypt and in other Arab and Islamic countries, numerous Egyptian and foreign researchers proceeded to analyze this phenomenon and to study its causes. The phenomenon has been given a number of names, such as the Islamic revival, the Islamic resurgence, the Islamic awakening, the Islamic renaissance, religious radicalism, religious extremism and religious violence. The interpretations have also been numerous. Some have attributed the phenomenon to the socioeconomic changes which Egypt underwent in the 1970's and which culminated in a number of negative consequences that intensified the dimensions of society's contradictions and frustrations. Others have attributed it to the legitimate political channels which enable the various forces to speak their mind peacefully and which are inclined to blockade the religious current and to subject the Muslim Brothers to torture in jails. There are those who have interpreted this phenomenon as a cultural crisis and a crisis of identity in the Egyptian society connected with the Westernization wave, with society's shaken value system, with the failure of imported ideologies, and with turning to religion as a source of identity. There are some who have focused on the 1967 defeat as a main reason for the emergence of these groups. Some have attributed the phenomenon to the psychological imbalances from which some youth suffer and which push the youth toward extremism and radicalism. There are those who have attributed it to the vitality of Islam. Some have said that the Iranian revolution has boosted the revival movement.<sup>29</sup> All the above interpretations contain some correct aspects, and they do not negate each other. But the question that persists is: Why are the youth more inclined to join the rejectionist or struggle-oriented religious groups, as some people call them, than the leftist organizations when both kinds fly the banner of rejecting the regime's policies and practices? This can be interpreted on several bases: First, the phenomenon of piety which forms one of the characteristics of the Egyptian national character. Therefore, it is easy to attract the youth to the groups that fly the banner of religion as a comprehensive system of life. Second, the absence of an environment for the growth of the leftist currents in Egypt for reasons connected with Egyptian society itself, where the religious obstacle is very strong, and for reasons connected with the leftist currents themselves which espouse complex concepts, which import ready-made ideologies, and which do not have the ability to infiltrate the masses. This is why the leftist currents have continued to be confined to certain segments of intellectuals and students. Third, the failure of all previous ideologies and political experiments, be they liberal or socialist, and the heightened awareness,



particularly among the crushed factions and classes, that Islam is the salvation, especially since the religious sermon offers easy and simple answers to social problems.

But why are these groups inclined to engage in violence? One can think of answering this question within the framework of the following bases: Violence is not monopolized by the Islamic groups but has been practiced by other social forces and currents, such as students, workers, and the central security forces. Consequently, one must consider the general causes that create an environment conducive to the growth and practice of political violence. However, this does not prevent one from saying that there are inherent elements in the ideological and social structure of these groups which push them toward violence. The coup-oriented ideology in which some of these groups believe and which is connected with certain historical contexts and circumstances is considered an instigator of and an excuse for violence. Moreover, youth is the predominant element in the membership of these groups and this youth often belongs socially to the middle class whose hopes and aspirations have been frustrated by the regime's policies in the 1970's and 1980's. Geographically, the youth belong to the countryside and to peripheral and minor city quarters. Consequently, the youth have been faced by the political, economic, social, and moral reality of the major cities—a reality which intensified their frustrations and turned them into raw material for violent political action. [Passage omitted]

Under Mubarak's administration, some leftist forces have turned to opposing the regime peacefully by criticizing its domestic and foreign policies and practices. Some leftist factions waged the 1984 and 1987 parliamentary elections, the former within the framework of the Grouping Party and the latter within the framework of the Grouping Party and independently. But they failed to gain any parliamentary seats and this has given rise to numerous questions, even by leftist intellectuals, regarding the political and intellectual role of the Egyptian left.

5. The Egyptian Army has not constituted a source of political violence against the regime in any of the three administrations. Rather, it has acted as the ultimate shield protecting the regime. There are several interpretations in this connection:

A. The Army became the main source of recruitment for political positions during 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration. Consequently, power was concentrated in the hands of the military at the expense of the civilians. As a result, the military came to have a presence in the state's various institutions. [Passage omitted]

E. Mubarak's regime followed President al-Sadat's policies, tactics, and course of removing the Army from the political action balance. This is why the army was the ultimate bastion which protected the regime during the central security forces' rebellion (February 1986).

6. Some peripheral elements have taken part in popular acts of violence, such as demonstrations and riots. These elements are not involved in the production process; they live on the peripheries of society and suffer from abasing poverty. This is why they are ready to join the acts of political and social violence challenging the regime. Some people call these elements groups of scoundrels, loafers and mobs. They include vast numbers of unemployed and idlers who are not engaged in socially-productive activities. Others call these groups the "shabby proletariat." Some researchers have tried to explore the roots of this phenomenon in the Egyptian society.<sup>32</sup> But further study and documentation are needed to determine the dimensions and nature of participation by the peripheralized [al-muhammashin] in the acts of political violence and the motives behind their participation in these acts. However, there is nothing to stop one from emphasizing several concepts: The process of social peripheralization in Egypt intensified in the 1970's as a result of constant emigration from the countryside to the cities. The cities' production and service apparatus was unable to accommodate the newcomers. Thus, they lived on the peripheries of the cities and formed poverty belts. By virtue of the poor economic and social conditions under which the peripheralized live and of their heightened sense of isolation and alienation from society, they provide raw material for political action. This is why we find that the violent and rejectionist calls spring from these peripheral quarters.

To sum up, the fundamental forces which engaged in popular political violence in Egypt in the 1952-87 period are the students and workers, some religious groups and leftist elements, and some of the socially-peripheralized elements. It is noticed that the characteristics predominating these forces are youth, education, belonging to the middle and low class, and a sense of social alienation. Therefore, these forces are aware enough to criticize and correct, are extremely sensitive to the regime's policies and practices, and possess the ability to take the initiative and to react.

#### **6. Causes of Phenomenon of Political Violence Under Three Administrations**

A number of facts must be taken into consideration when analyzing the causes of political violence under the three administrations. First, the political violence phenomenon is a complex phenomenon incorporating numerous changing elements. Consequently, its causes are essentially numerous and intricate. Second, despite the presence of some general common characteristics between the three administrations, there have also been differences among them, especially differences pertaining to the nature of the political leadership, the ideological tendencies, the economic and social policies, and each administration's foreign ties. These differences were reflected in the political violence phenomenon in one form or another. Third, a clear distinction must be made between the immediate causes which are tantamount to the detonator that touches off the acts of

violence and the true and latent causes of violence. What concerns us is the second type of causes because there is no doubt that every act of violence has its immediate causes which can be understood only within the framework of broader and deeper causes. Fourth, the limitations of this paper do not permit [exploring] the quantitative empirical option concerning the relationship of political violence with independent changes, such as economic development, social justice, subservience to foreigners, and the degree of the political system's democracy.

By examining and analyzing the demands and slogans raised during the acts of popular violence on the one hand and by tracing the academic endeavors to interpret this phenomenon on the other, one can conclude the following: [Passage omitted]

C. The acts of popular and official political violence decreased during the first 3 years of President Mubarak's first term due to the presence of a popular wave of optimism regarding the personality of Mubarak who came to restore a degree of tranquillity to the Egyptian political arena. He started by releasing a number of political detainees gradually, by opening channels of communication with the opposition parties, and by including correction of the economic course and fighting corruption among his fundamental concerns. Moreover, he ended the campaigns of attack on the Arab countries and moved to restore Egypt's position in some regional organizations, such as the Nonaligned Movement and the OAU.

Consequently, features of reviving the national renaissance plan began to loom on the horizon. But what happened after 3 years of President Mubarak's rule? The national dream of development and independence began to dissipate, the ghost of the social crisis continued to prevail over Egyptian society, a number of economic and social problems, such as debts, inflation, unemployment, and decline in the living standard of broad sectors of citizens, intensified and the government apparatus' performance in the area of supplying the citizens' essential needs, such as housing, education, and transportation, continued to be poor. Some negative political features persisted despite the political leadership's assertion that entrenching democracy was one of its main objectives. The emergency law continued to be enacted despite the presence of general agreement between all the political forces and currents that there was nothing to necessitate the continued enactment of this law. The regime also continued to enforce the arsenal of ill-reputed laws which were issued during an extraordinary period of Egypt's history. The political institutions continued to ineffectively reflect the various influential political forces and currents in society. Egypt's subservience to the United States became crystal clear despite the leadership's emphasis on the need to restore balance to Egypt's foreign relations. Moreover, Egypt's policies vis-a-vis Israel on the one hand and the Arab countries on the other provoked some domestic political tensions.

What is more important than all this is the absence of a clear-cut ideological and political option on the part of the regime which has been trying to reconcile two administrations, each of which has its own characteristics and particular qualities. Therefore, it seems that there is some ambiguity in the domestic and foreign political movement. All the abovementioned factors have intensified the wave of frustration among broad segments of citizens. Because the youth segments, including students and workers, are more sensitive to social and national frustrations, they have engaged in acts of political violence against the regime's practices and policies. Thus, it seems that the climate currently prevailing in Egypt helps to produce acts of political violence, regardless of the partial interpretations offered for this or that act.

The gist is that the political violence phenomenon under the three administrations is tied to the ongoing social crisis which the regime has failed to tackle effectively and capably and to the contradictions and frustrations which have emanated from this crisis and have generated violent reactions.

#### **7. Pattern of Political Regime's Response to Political Violence Phenomenon**

How did the regime tackle the popular political violence phenomenon under 'Abd-al-Nasir's, Al-Sadat's, and Mubarak's administrations?

Several characteristics have distinguished the manner in which the political system under the three administrations tackled this phenomenon: First: Slighting and belittling the significance of the popular political violence incidents and failing to realize the phenomenon's natural dimensions in society. Here emerged some of the names given to the forces and elements which engaged in acts of political violence, names such as "a few trouble-makers," "a devious few," "a radical few," and so forth. Second: Stressing the theory of a domestic plot by saying that there are tendentious elements which do not want to see Egypt stable and which incite acts of violence. Here, the finger of accusation has often been pointed at the communists and the atheists who constitute the "elements inserted" into the students base or workers base and at some religiously-crazed youth. Third: The theory of a foreign plot which says that domestic acts of violence are stirred by foreign forces which have an interest in striking Egypt's stability and development. Here, the fingers of accusation were pointed during Al-Sadat's and Mubarak's administrations at Libya and Iran, and sometimes at Syria and the Soviet Union. Fourth: Moving after the incidents occur and the situation explodes. This exposes the failure of the political system under the three administrations to tackle the centers of trouble and tension within the system before they could explode. Fifth: Failure to profoundly analyze and understand the true and latent causes of the events and putting the emphasis instead on their immediate causes.

In light of the above observations, the political regime under 'Abd-al-Nasir's, Al-Sadat's, and Mubarak's administrations tended to deal with the political violence phenomenon by combining three courses by a varying degree:

A. The security-intelligence course in which the task of confronting the acts of popular political violence is entrusted to the security forces and in which a greater number of suppressive units are employed to deal with the acts of violence. Within this framework, it is possible to understand the campaigns of arrest and torture witnessed by the three administrations to varying degrees. Experience has proven that official violence generates popular violence, with society thus thrust into a vicious circle.

B. The legal course in which more laws are promulgated to incriminate and punish acts of violence. In this context, one can understand the arsenal of special laws which, in the final analysis, form shackles on the citizens' liberties and rights.

C. The socioeconomic-political course which is based on examining the social roots and economic-political causes of violence and on providing fundamental solutions to them. Even though this is the best course to deal with the phenomenon, it was not employed effectively under the three administrations even though 'Abd-al-Nasir's response to the riots which followed the 1967 defeat fall within this framework, considering that he moved to make the system more democratic and issued the 30 March declaration. But the post-1967 developments obstructed the achievement of this goal. The Al-Sadat regime's response to incidents of popular violence was often characterized by greater official violence (security and legal). In addition to employing official violence to counter popular violence, Mubarak's regime is moving with faltering steps to correct the socioeconomic conditions which act as inlets to political violence. But under the three administrations, the security-intelligence course and legal course are the basis on which the political regime dealt with the violence phenomenon.

#### **8. Violence Phenomenon and Limits of Continuity and Change in Egyptian Political System**

Through the above analysis, one can conclude that there are some aspects of continuity and change in the political violence phenomenon under the three administrations.

A most prominent feature of the phenomenon's continuity is that popular violence which takes the form of limited demonstrations and limited riots has continued to be the most widespread form of violence throughout the three administrations. The perpetration of this form of violence has often been linked to such gathering places as universities, factories, and so forth. Youth elements, including students and workers, are the main forces which have engaged in political violence under the three administrations because these elements represent

society's nerve centers. Consequently, their reaction capacity is greater. The prolonged social crisis has been the main cause of the violence phenomenon under the three administrations, regardless of some direct causes which touch off incidents of violence. It is also noticed that under the three administrations, political assassination and death sentences tied to political cases have not constituted common forms of dealing between the regime and the opposition forces, comparing Egypt's condition with conditions in other Arab countries, such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya. Throughout the three administrations, the Army has steered clear of engaging in domestic acts of violence against the regime. The Army has constituted the ultimate bastion providing the regime with protection.

The security approach and the legal approach have formed the basis for the political regime's dealings with the phenomenon throughout the three administrations.

Finally, the regime's view of acts of violence, its belittlement of such acts, its slighting of the weight of those engaged in them, and its interpretation of the acts as domestic or foreign plots has not changed under any of the three administrations.

The changing features are embodied in the fact that more acts of violence were committed under Al-Sadat's and Mubarak's administrations than under 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration. Moreover, new forces practicing violence emerged under Al-Sadat's and Mubarak's administrations whereas such forces had no clear presence under 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration. These forces are made up of extremist religious groups and organizations. The role of the socially peripheralized has also surfaced clearly in the acts of violence. This is because the phenomenon of social peripheralization crystallized in the 1970's as a result of the waves of emigration from the countryside to the city and of the failure of the production and service apparatus of the cities to accommodate the newcomers. It is noticed that the Muslim Brotherhood, which engaged in or was accused of engaging in some acts of domestic violence during 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration, moved during Al-Sadat's and Mubarak's administrations to join the peaceful political movement opposed to the regime. The brotherhood has often rejected and condemned the acts of violence perpetrated by some religious organizations. It is obvious that the change in the political violence phenomenon during the three administrations has fundamentally involved the phenomenon's dimensions and the nature of the forces practicing popular political violence.

The continuity in some of the features of political violence under the three administrations can be interpreted on the basis of the continuity of some of the features of the political system under these administrations. The most significant of these features are: Continuity of the phenomenon of exclusive power, because by virtue of the Constitution the powers of the head of state, who tops the political pyramid, are growing constantly;

the predominance of executive authority over legislative authority; the ineffectiveness of the middle organizations, such as the political parties (whether a single party or restricted party plurality), the unions, the associations, and the federations as channels of communication between the ruler and the ruled and their failure to strengthen political participation among the citizens; the growth of the state's role but not of its ability to meet the citizens' essential needs, such as housing, education and transportation.

Briefly, the changes which occurred in the domestic and foreign policies under Al-Sadat's administration and which have continued to certain degrees under Mubarak's administration have not reflected a fundamental change in the nature of the political system which is founded on the individualism of power and on foiling the efficacy of the middle organizations. The restricted party plurality experiment Egypt has been ongoing since 1976 has been surrounded by a wall of laws and regulations which have so devoided this experiment of its true content that they have motivated an intellectual to speak of democratic oppression in Egypt.<sup>36</sup>

The changes that occurred in the dimensions of the political violence phenomenon under Al-Sadat's and Mubarak's administration and in the nature of the forces that have engaged and that continue to engage in political violence reflect the traces of the transformations that occurred in Egypt's ideological, social, and political structure in the 1970's when all bases and principles of the national plan which had begun to crystallize under 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration were changed. Subservience replaced national independence, the open-door economy replaced planned development, and the regime threw its weight behind small social factions whose interests were tied to the outside world. The regime also turned toward peace with Israel at the expense of isolation from the Arab world and of departure from the circle of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Cultural distortion and Westernization replaced civilizational and cultural genuineness. Consequently, the national plan disappeared and the regime engaged in the practice of official violence. Some social forces engaged in counter political violence.

In the first 3 years of Mubarak's administration, it seemed that Mubarak proceeded to deal with the given facts of the two preceding administrations by reviving some of the bases and principles of the national plan which had crystallized under 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration and to correct the distortions and imbalances created under Al-Sadat's administration. Consequently, the acts of popular and official violence subsided. But when it seemed that progress on the path of reviving the national civilizational plan was vague and slow, acts of political violence began erupting in protest of the regime's inadequate performance at the domestic and foreign levels. [Passage omitted]

#### Footnotes

1. See, for example: Sa'd-al-Din Ibrahim, "Egypt Reexamines Itself," (Cairo, Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, Chapter One; Fu'ad Zakariya, "Islamic Current and Myth of Persecution," al-Hilal, (July 1987), pp 30-37; Muhammad Nur Farahat, "Three Circles of Violence in the Egyptian Society," al-Hilal, (July 1987), pp 38-43; Mahmud Isma'il, "Roots of Religious Radicalism, al-Hilal (July 1987), pp 50-54; 'Adil Hammudah, "Emigration to Violence: Religious Radicalism From June Defeat to October Assassination," (Cairo, Sina Publishing House, 1987); "Violence: What, Why and Where to," A Dossier Containing Opinions of Number of Thinkers on the Issue, AL-MAWQIF AL-'ARABI, 11th Year, No 90, (October 1987), pp 45-75; Ikram 'Abd-al-Qadir Badr-al-Din, "Phenomenon of Political Stability in Egypt: 1952-70," (a Ph.D. Thesis, Cairo University, Economics and Political Science College, 1981); Mustafa Kamil al-Sayyid, "Society and Policy in Egypt: Role of Interest Groups in Egyptian Political System, 1952-81," (Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1981). Cairo's National Center for Social and Criminal Studies organized several symposiums on the radical religious movements from 1979 to 1982. A number of studies on the intellectual sources, social bases and psychological makeup of the Egyptian religious movements were presented to those symposiums. [Passage omitted]

27. For further details, see: 'Abd-al-Latif Mahmud Muhammad, "Students' Role in Egyptian Policy," AL-YAQZAH AL-'ARABIYAH, No 5 (May 1986), pp 40-49; Hasanayn Tawfiq Ibrahim, "Student Phenomenon in Egypt: An Attempt at Interpretation," AL-YAQZAH AL-'ARABIYAH, No 4 (April 1986, pp 51-70); al-Sayyid, "Society and Policy in Egypt: Role of Interest Groups in Egyptian Political System, 1952-81," pp 23-24.

28. Ahlam Muhammad al-Sa'di Farhud, "Religious Current and Egyptian Policy Toward Israel: Analytical Study for Egyptian AL-DA'WAH Magazine (1977-81)," (M.A. Thesis, Cairo University, Economics and Political Science College, 1987).

29. For further details on the phenomenon of Islamic revival in Egypt, one of whose dimensions is the tendency of the religious groups to change the system by force, see: Gilles Kepel, *Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh*, translated by John Roth Schild (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1984; Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, "Religion or Opposition? Urban Protest Movement in Egypt," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 16, No 4 (November 1984), pp 541-552; Hamied N. Ansari, "The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (March 1984), pp 123-144; Nazih N. M. Ayubi, "The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (December 1980), pp 481-499; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Anatomy of Egypt's

Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (December 1980), pp 423-453; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Islamic Militancy as A Social Movement: The Case of Two Groups in Egypt," in; Ali E Hillal Dessouki, ed. *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982); Yusuf al-Qardawi, "Islamic Awakening Between Stagnation and Radicalism," *Kitab al-Ummah*, (Doha, Head Office of Shari'a Courts and Religious Affairs, 1402 of the Hegira); "Six Signs of Religious Radicalism," *AL-'ARABI*, No 278, (January 1982) and "Where Is the Flaw?" (Cairo: Dar al-Sahwah, 1985); Salim al-Bahnasawi, "Born Behind Bars," *AL-'ARABI*, No 278 (January 1982); Khalid Muhammad Khalid, "Four Causes of Terrorism," *AL-'ARABI*, No 278 (January 1982); Tariq al-Bishri, "Extremism Will Persist as Long as Alienation Continues," *AL-'ARABI*, No 278 (January 1982); Fu'ad Zakariya, "Truth and Fancy in Modern Islamic Movement" (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr for Studies, Publication and Distribution, 1976). [Passage omitted]

32. Muhammad Nur Farahat, "Political Violence and Peripheral Groups: A Study on Social History of Loafers and Scoundrels, Egyptian Model," a paper submitted to the Symposium on Violence and Policy in the Arab Homeland, Cairo, 27-28 February 1987; Mahmud 'Abd-al-Fadil, "Contours of Class Map in Arab Homeland: Comprehensive Critical View," in; Isma'il 'Abdullah [et al], "Studies on Arab Progressive Movement," (Beirut, Arab Unity Studies Center, 1987). [Passage omitted]

36. 'Ismat Sayf al-Dawlah, "Democratic Oppression," 2d Edition, (Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi, 1983).

### Study Examines Parties' Role in Making Foreign Policy

45000075 [Editorial Report] As part of a continuing series on academic research papers which were presented at the Political Sciences Center's second conference, the date of which was not given, Cairo *AL-JUMHURIYAH* in Arabic publishes on page 5 of its 7 December 1988 issue an essay by Dr Mustafa 'Alawi of the Faculty of Economics and Political Science at Cairo University entitled "The Parties and the Making of Egyptian Foreign Policy."

Referring mainly to the opposition parties throughout the essay, Dr 'Alawi asserts that the parties play a role in making foreign policy through their legislative authority and the establishment of national committees. However, he adds that this role is only effective if the legislative authority participates effectively in the decisionmaking process.

As for the parties' implementation of foreign policy, he writes that parties use "popular or party diplomacy, i.e., contacts with popular and party forces and organizations in foreign countries" to exert their influence. As an example of this, he says, "During the course of my study,

the political parties practiced popular diplomacy, implementing their foreign policy goals via contacts with other party, labor union, and popular forces and organizations in the Arab, African, and European countries. I was able to obtain communiques and written information about the diplomatic activities of the National Democratic Party [NDP] and National Progressive Unionist Grouping [NPUG]."

Dr 'Alawi further explains that, "Among the most prominent of the NDP's activities in the area of popular diplomacy is its strong concentration on diplomatic relations with the African parties and the social democratic parties in West Europe, though it does not neglect its ties with the American parties and the Soviet Communist Party. However, it is notable that there is a neglect of Asia and Latin America. The presence of the minister of foreign affairs (Dr Butrus Ghali) in the membership of the NDP's Secretariat General and his responsibility for the party's diplomacy is one of the most important reasons for its activeness in recent years, especially in Africa and West Europe."

Turning to the Socialist Labor Party (SLP), he says that "it has concentrated its popular diplomacy in the Arab region, especially in contacting Sudanese parties and forces to support the party's stated policy, especially regarding special relations with Sudan." Dr 'Alawi quotes the party leader as saying the SLP is concerned with continuing ties with Arab popular organizations, especially in those Arab nations whose official relations with Egypt are unfriendly.

As for the NPUG, Dr 'Alawi states that it concentrates its diplomatic activity in the Arab world and on ties with pan-Arab liberation parties, organizations, and its forces and in the non-Arab world on contacts with "progressive radical" forces.

In addition to this method of "popular" diplomacy, Dr 'Alawi explains that the party members also use whatever parliamentary oversight positions they may hold to participate in foreign policy implementation by influencing government officials. However, Dr 'Alawi notes that the role of parliamentary committees in making decisions, particularly those concerning treaties and agreements, is "extremely limited."

Dr 'Alawi lists other factors that restrict the parties' diplomatic activities and influence on foreign policy. The minister for foreign affairs informed him that a limited budget is the only reason Egypt does not include party representatives in its delegations to international organizations. Dr 'Alawi wonders how much the parties' diplomatic activity must be hindered if small budgets limit the official diplomatic work of the government to such an extent. In addition to this, he says that none of the Egyptian parties possesses an information and research department, and that this is a basic obstacle to party policymaking. Dr 'Alawi concludes that there is a lack of qualified manpower trained in "the skill of contacting other leading parties and organizations, on which party diplomatic activity depends."

**Hilmi Murad Discusses Opposition Parties,  
Peace, Debts**

45040087 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 11 Nov 88 p 15

[Text] The multi-party system will be 11 years old on the 16th of this month, the anniversary of a speech in which al-Sadat announced a transition from platforms within the Socialist Union to the multi-party system.

On that occasion, AL-QABAS interviewed prominent Egyptian politician Dr Muhammad Hilmi Murad, who retired from party activity at the beginning of this year. He was asked to assess the multiple party experiment, after 11 years, and the degree to which party activity has fulfilled the role entrusted to it.

Dr Hilmi Murad was the first to announce his rejection of the peace treaty with Israel during the 1976-1979 period when he was a delegate to the People's Assembly which was broken up as a result of opposition to the treaty by 14 delegates. He has held several official posts such as minister of education, chancellor of 'Ayn-Shams University, professor of economics, and head of the Union of Arab Economists. He was the first to raise the question of corruption in the petroleum sector in a series of articles in AL-SHA'B newspaper. He was secretary-general of the Labor Party but withdrew from party activity altogether earlier this year without abandoning political activity.

Dr Hilmi emphasized during the interview that the party experiment in Egypt fell short of its promise because of restrictions found in the Party Act which placed political parties under state control.

He said that he withdrew from party activity as a way of sounding an alarm to warn the ruling party that the multiplicity of parties is merely empty form and to induce opposition parties to change their style. He added that to form a new party in that climate would be unproductive.

He called for the abolition of restrictions on the formation of religious or sectarian parties as long as they are not incompatible with the general order of society.

He expects a victory by Shamir and ultraconservative religious parties in the Israeli elections to bring about solidarity among Arab countries, because such a government would resort to brutality in suppressing the Intifadah and to arrogance, boisterousness, and aggression in dealing with Arab countries.

He said he was not opposed to the declaration of a Palestinian state as long as that declaration is not based on Partition Resolution 181 of 1974. The interview with Dr Hilmi Murad proceeded as follows:

[AL-QABAS] Eleven years have passed since the beginning of political pluralism in Egypt. What is your evaluation of

this experiment, and do you believe that party activity has performed the role assigned to it?

[Murad] The party experiment has not lived up to expectations because of legislative restrictions occurring in the Political Party Act which restricts the formation of parties and subjects them to the approval of an administrative committee, the majority of whose members are ministers of the ruling party. This has prevented the creation of certain political parties expressive of intellectual currents which carry weight in the political arena.

The act also put political parties under state control, in that a party chairman is even held responsible for the alleged publishing offenses of party organs, even though they have editors-in-chief and it is in practice impossible for a party chairman to maintain detailed supervision of published items. The Act also gave the Central Accounting Office oversight over party finances and vested the administrative committee for party affairs with authority to suspend party activity and the power to request its dissolution by petitioning a special judicial court formulated not only of judges but also of an equal number of public figures selected by the government. The act also imposes other practical restrictions that hinder political party activity and prevent contact with the rank and file by invoking the law of emergencies which came to be perpetually in force. It also applies other freedom-restricting laws which have been on the books since the days of colonialism and despotism, and the public assembly act which prohibits parties from organizing peaceful demonstrations expressive of public opinion, forbids public meetings outside party headquarters, and stipulates the arrest of those who disseminate any communicate or publication even if devoid of attack or criticism punishable by law. Certain citizens were even arrested for distributing a flier urging citizens to register at the polls.

Political parties have been infiltrated by security agents, the movements of their members restricted, and their telephone calls monitored. Those who join political parties come to harm, be they employees, merchants, or students. Public elections are tampered with and the nation's will is therefore falsified, destroying the basis for party plurality. Such interference on the part of the authorities denies nonruling political parties the opportunity to win a majority, ascend to power, and implement their programs. This renders party activity worthless. Those who make sacrifices in the interest of their principles are unable to reap the fruit of their service to the public.

All this has discouraged citizens from participating in party work and consequently weakened political party influence, and hurt the party experiment.

[AL-QABAS] Did you give up party work because of "disgust" at the ineffectuality of party activity in Egypt, or because of conflict with the Labor Party itself?

[Murad] I abandoned party work, not political activity, to warn the ruling regime, on one hand, that party plurality is considered an empty shell incapable of realizing its purpose; and to call upon opposition parties, on the other hand, to change their style and modus operandi in order to surmount these obstacles placed in their way to curtail their activity, and compel the authorities to remove them. By the same token, my action was an alert to the people as a whole to understand the situation and move to correct it.

[AL-QABAS] Is it possible that Dr Hilmi Murad will organize a new party, and what will its contribution be to party activity in Egypt?

[Murad] Organizing a party in this climate is unlikely because any new party created in this atmosphere would be unproductive. This is a serious matter. Citizen reluctance under these conditions to join legitimate public political parties encourages underground activity and throws open the door to violence and unlawful acts in the perception of the futility of attempting reform through the democratic process.

[AL-QABAS] Political forces that operate outside the legal, constitutional, and party framework ... Could this situation give rise to possible undesirable consequences?

[Murad] The consequences already exist. Political and intellectual forces unable to organize into a legitimate political party are necessarily driven to function and operate by circumventing freedom-restricting public laws such as by allying themselves with already existing parties in order to operate through them, as is the case with the NPUG. Another example is to run in general elections on the ticket of an existing party, such as the alliance between the Labor Party and the Muslim Brotherhood.

The presence of such political forces outside the publicly organized party framework could lead to underground activity and resistance to authority, such as certain Islamic groups are doing to protest actions against them by security forces.

[AL-QABAS] Do you support the formation of parties in Egypt along religious or sectarian lines?

[Murad] There should be no restriction on the formation of parties, whether religious or sectarian, as long as they do not undermine the general order of society such as by advocating apostasy. The great democratic nations of Europe have parties formed along religious lines, called Christian parties, and there is no opposition to their existence. The crux here is the confidence of voters and the number of votes gained in public elections, provided the latter are fair and objective. We also find successful religious parties in Israel.

[AL-QABAS] The Party Affairs Committee rejected applications submitted for new parties because the platforms are too numerous and too similar to those of existing parties. Does this mean that existing parties meet all requirements of political life?

[Murad] The Party Affairs Committee is composed mainly of members of the ruling party. It is not proper that it be the arbiter in the formation of new parties, since the existence of competing parties is not in the interest of the ruling party. This committee generally argues in its rulings that no new party platform is differentiated enough.

As a member of the People's Council when it debated the political parties bill, I objected to that stipulation and said that party platforms might coincide but the leaderships could differ. In other words, the people might show confidence in one party and withhold it from another even though the platforms are similar. It is not enough that a party espouses a good platform. The citizens must also believe in the leadership's ability to carry it out. The draft bill caused such conflict within the council that the opposition of all groupings, had to withdraw. Only members of the ruling party were present when the bill was debated and passed. That was in 1977.

[AL-QABAS] You are a professor of economics. How can the Egyptian debt problem be solved?

[Murad] Ending the humiliation of external debt requires first of all to stop borrowing from foreign countries. When necessary, loans should be requested from Arab development funds. We must be self-reliant in solving our own problems and producing our own food, rather than taking the easy way out and borrowing. This is how our government has become indebted.

Deferment of existing debts by rescheduling payments and reducing interest payments requires a collective stand by all debtor nations of the Third World. These nations must band together in the face of the Paris Club bloc, formed by the rich creditor nations of Europe and America. They have encouraged the International Monetary Fund to speak in their name and pressure indebted governments into adopting policies that serve the interests of Fund-controlling nations even if they undermine the debtor's stability and security by ignoring the difficult social and living conditions of the majority of its citizens.

Unilateral confrontations based on the personal contacts of the chiefs of debtor nations are not very effective. Neither are pleas for rescheduling and grace periods. Creditor countries act only in their own interests and according to policies and strategies planned with no room for personal favors. We had gone that route in the past and ended up in a vicious cycle of compounding



debts and multiplying burdens brought about as interest accumulates as a result of rescheduling which is not to be differentiated from reduction of debt or forgiveness of interest.

[AL-QABAS] How do you envision the Arab-Israeli conflict in view of Shamir's victory?

[Murad] I believe the Arabs are now in need of assessing their position and reviewing their peace strategy and their method of dealing with the Israeli enemy. Victory by the Likud and ultraconservative religious parties in the latest Knesset elections, and the formation of a Shamir government that includes representatives of those parties—I expect that this will bring about solidarity among Arab countries because such a government will resort to brutality in suppressing the Intifadah and to arrogance, rowdiness, and aggression in dealing with Arab countries. This would dissipate the tremendous optimism afflicting certain aspirants to a just peace in the region through an accommodation with the racist and expansionist Israel which seeks to control the Middle East. This would also convince those who refuse to extend a hand to the rest of Arab countries that unity and solidarity are the most effective weapon against this Zionist tyranny.

[AL-QABAS] How do you view the current Arab status quo?

[Murad] I believe that the Arab breakup began with al-Sadat's signing of the Camp David accord. Some believe that peace with Israel is a mirage, while others believe it could be accomplished via an understanding with the United States and through its good offices.

I state that Israel does not desire peace, and that neither a Palestinian state, the PLO, a return to the 1967 borders or the division of 1947, nor an international conference will be useful or effective in securing a just peace no matter who is in power—Shamir or Peres. United States Secretary of State Schultz expressed the same reservations in a recent lecture at a strategic institute in Washington. Israel is America's ally and there is no use trying to reach an accommodation.

[AL-QABAS] The Palestine National Council is about to convene. What advice do you have for the Palestinian leadership?

[Murad] I do not object to the declaration of an independent Palestinian state provided it is not based on Resolution 181 of 1947 which mandates the division. This would mean recognizing the Israeli state when it does not recognize the Palestinian state and refuses to accept that division resolution by expanding beyond its stated borders and occupying by force certain internal regions of the Palestinian state, denying inhabitants their right to self-determination. The declaration of a (Palestinian) state must be based on the historic and natural rights of the Palestinian people and not based on the

division resolution since this would be regarded as acceptance by only one party of what is stipulated in the division resolution. Furthermore, the PLO should not turn into a temporary government of such a state, since that would deprive it of its combative character that seeks to liberate Palestinian land. A temporary government should be in addition to the PLO as representative of the Palestinian people.

[AL-QABAS] What are the most outstanding negative aspects of the al-Sadat era?

[Murad] The most outstanding was destroying the courage of the Egyptian citizen. This phenomenon will afflict us for years to come. Al-Sadat left us Israeli occupation where he wanted to liberate the land. Where he sought to establish justice he left a class that usurped and plundered. He aspired to economic renaissance but left the country in debt. Instead of the Arab unity he sought, he died leaving Arab dissension. He wanted true democracy but left the intelligence service scandals. His goals were frustrated by a despotic ruling style. But I am not in favor of discussing the negatives of past eras. We must look to the future and leave the past behind us because talking about it will accomplish nothing.

#### **Grand Mufti Discusses Islamic Legal Opinions** *45040106 Cairo MAYU in Arabic 21 Nov 88 p 12*

[Interview with Grand Mufti Dr Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi by Nabil Abazah; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] We had to go to the grand mufti.

There are scores of pressing religious questions and issues that come to mind and raise major questions in our minds. The grand mufti is the only one who can come up with firm and satisfactory answers to them.

The towering building where Dar al-Ifta' [Institute for Formal Legal Opinions on Islamic Law] is located is a picture of life's hustle and bustle. The narrow entrance to the building leading to the building's one and only very slow elevator is extremely crowded. And yet, the floor where Dar al-Ifta' is located is quiet and dignified. Entering the office of His Eminence the Grand Mufti stirs in one's heart countless feelings and thoughts—thoughts about life and death, good and evil, permissible and impermissible deeds, right and wrong, and heaven and hell. [passage omitted]

[MAYU] I asked Dr Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, "Your Eminence, can we say that the process of issuing formal legal opinions these days is keeping pace with changes in modern Egyptian society and remains consistent with Egyptian traditions and conventions?"



[Tantawi] There is no doubt that human life is constantly changing. We see this change in our lives with our own eyes. Prices change, and the material affairs of life change: buying, selling, eating, clothing, drinking, and other activities of life change. We see the changes in life quite clearly. [passage omitted]

Dar al-Ifta' follows this approach: it supports change which is consistent with proper beliefs and noble morals as well as change which is beneficial to individuals and groups. But if the change which is meant involves altering legal texts or making them depart from their proper interpretation, such a change, of course, is one that we would not approve of or condone. Instead, we ask that it be disavowed. [passage omitted]

[MAYU] What happens to these formal legal opinions after they are issued? Are they compiled somewhere where scholars and Muslims can make good use of them?

[Tantawi] Yes, there is an accurate record of all these formal legal opinions; all of them, especially those which we mail to people who had requested a legal opinion on a matter, are stored with the questions which evoked them along with the original copy of the reply. These formal legal opinions have been recorded ever since Dar al-Ifta' was established. [passage omitted]

[MAYU] Who may issue a formal legal opinion?

[Tantawi] Formal legal opinions may be issued by scholars who are very knowledgeable about the interpretation of the Koran and the preservation of the Prophet's tradition. Scholars who may issue formal legal opinions are those who are familiar with what other scholars said. They must be interested in studying the principles of jurisprudence and every aspect of the Arabic language: syntax, inflections, literature, and rhetoric. They must also be interested in the thorough study of other subjects they might need such as history and all the social sciences. [passage omitted]

[MAYU] Does Dar al-Ifta' monitor formal legal opinions which are issued by clergymen? What happens if a formal legal opinion were issued by a clergyman and Dar al-Ifta' has the evidence to show that it is not a sound legal opinion?

[Tantawi] When Dar al-Ifta' reads a formal legal opinion that violates a legal provision, counters statements made by a majority of scholars of jurisprudence, or contradicts what sound reason would require, it is its function to respond. It should expose the error in that opinion and show people what is right so they would not be influenced by an erroneous legal opinion.

[MAYU] How does Dar al-Ifta' safeguard young people against radicalism and ideas which depart from the spirit of Islam? How does it confront and eliminate such radical ideas?

[Tantawi] [Passage omitted] It is the function of Dar al-Ifta' to show people how tolerant the canonical law of Islam is and how tolerant is its approach and its code of conduct. It is the function of Dar al-Ifta' to use wisdom and sound advice to enlighten people about what God has decreed in His Book and what the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, has decreed for us in his tradition. Dar al-Ifta' responds to doubts about the laws of Almighty God which are raised by some people. It shows people what is proper and what is not, so that truth may prevail and falsehood can be vanquished.

[MAYU] What do you think about those young people who wear white jellabas, grow their beards, and say they are imitating the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation?

[Tantawi] Following in the Prophet's footsteps, may God bless him and grant him salvation, involves acting in accordance with what the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, decreed regarding beliefs, worship, treatment of others, and proper conduct. But regarding food, clothing, drink, or such matters of life which are considered superficial, differences may exist between one age and another and between one generation and another. As far as the canonical laws of Islam are concerned, wearing jellabas or flip-flops or any such matters is of no importance or consequence. This is because Almighty God does not look at our shapes or at our clothes. Instead, He looks in our hearts, and He considers our deeds. With regard to the beard, we support the opinion which states that growing a beard is a tradition of the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation. There is nothing to forbid a man from growing a beard. In fact, growing a beard is considered commendable, but a bearded man should not fault others, and a clean-shaven man should not fault a bearded one. Each should respect the other. What counts here are intentions. The Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, said, "It is people's intentions that count, and people will be rewarded according to their intentions."

[MAYU] What about the clothing used by women to cover themselves?

[Tantawi] Of course, a woman should wear clothing that covers all of her body except her face and her hands. That is her duty because the Holy Koran says, "Enjoin believing women to turn their eyes away from temptation and to preserve their chastity; to cover their adornments (except such as are normally displayed)..." [al-Nur: 31]. The consensus among scholars of jurisprudence is that "such as are normally displayed" means the face and the hands.

[MAYU] Some foreigners get confused, and they say that the fact that women are wearing clothing which covers up all their bodies means that radicalism is becoming widespread. What do you think about that?

[Tantawi] Wearing clothing which covers all the body should not be considered radical. It means that women or girls wear modest clothing which does not expose their bodies or outline their curves. That is a matter which is based on the canonical law of Islam. [passage omitted]

[MAYU] What about the item of clothing which a woman wears to cover her face?

[Tantawi] That is one of the virtues sought by women who wish to be more modest and to hide more of themselves. We would not chastise or blame such women. But if such a woman were attending a university, or if she were employed in a business or organization and she is asked to keep her face uncovered so that her identity can be known, she must obey such an order, and she must do so to protect the security of that institution or college. For a woman, covering the face is a virtuous practice, and a woman who does that is not to be blamed for doing so provided she does not claim that it is the duty of all women to cover their faces. Most scholars do not think that a woman's face is a part of the body which should be covered up. When necessity calls upon such a woman to expose her face, she must obey because he who gives such an order so that a woman's identity be known does not order her to do something which is forbidden.

[MAYU] Investment companies proclaimed Islam as a slogan and then used that slogan to deceive citizens. What do you have to say about that?

[Tantawi] We have to be specific when we talk about legal provisions. There are investment companies whose service to society has been established, and there are others whose corruption has been established. We support the companies which get their funds by licit means and spend it in licit activities. We support those companies which offer employment for workers, contribute a service to society, and pay their dues to the country. We support companies which pay their taxes and whose business dealings and conduct are proper in every respect. We do support such companies. [passage omitted]

[MAYU] These companies also claimed that interest paid by banks is not permissible, did they not?

[Tantawi] We now have banks that are completely and totally Islamic. We thank the state for opening the doors to such banks, like the Misr Bank for Islamic Transactions, the Nasir Social Bank, and the Suez Canal Bank for Islamic Transactions. These banks, which are owned by the state, conduct their business in a manner that is thoroughly Islamic because they do not set the interest to be paid according to a certain percentage calculated over a certain period of time. But banks where the interest paid is set according to a certain period of time and a fixed percentage of the amount of funds [are not Islamic]. In other words, giving a bank 1,000 pounds

which would be withdrawn in 1 year at 10 percent fixed interest is something which most scholars of jurisprudence would agree is suspect if not clearly and unequivocally usurious.

Some scholars make a distinction between banks which are owned by the state and banks which are not. They say that what banks owned by the state pay on deposits is a kind of grant or reward to depositors who deposit funds in the bank and thereby serve society, since the funds are used to build schools or hospitals. This is the opinion of a few scholars, but the majority think that when the rate of interest is fixed and tied to a period of time, it becomes suspect if not downright usurious.

[MAYU] Your Eminence, how do you think unity can be established among Islamic denominations?

[Tantawi] There is nothing wrong with the denominations whose differences are not about matters that are essential to the religion. The four Islamic denominations, the Hanafi, Malki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali, do not differ about any one of the principles of religion or any one of the cornerstones of Islam. Their differences are over secondary matters, which are not the cornerstones of Islam. These matters may deal with the tradition; and they may deal with what is desirable or what is not. Each scholar of jurisprudence issued his opinion on such matters according to his own knowledge and independent judgment.

The Grand Mufti smiled and said, "Don't forget the wisdom of the statement which says that differences among scholars of jurisprudence are merciful to worshippers."

## IRAQ

**Government Plans To Privatize More Firms**  
*44000222 Doha GULF TIMES in English*  
14 Nov 88 p 3

[Text] Baghdad: Iraq will privatise more than 70 enterprises ranging from dairies to cement factories this month, a senior government economist said yesterday.

He said about 50 state-run businesses had already been sold or rented out on a long-term basis under President Saddam Husayn's drive to revive the private sector.

The economist, who declined to be named, said these firms included dairies, petrol stations, farms, foodstuff industries, clothing manufacturers and tourist and transport services.

A Trade Ministry official said the private sector imported goods worth \$340mn in the first 10 months of the year.

The ruling Revolutionary Command Council decreed in January that Iraqis could import any type of goods provided no hard currency was taken out of the country.

## ISRAEL

### Multi-Year Plan for IDF Budget Discussed 44000184 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 6 Dec 88 p 2

[Analysis by Kenneth Kaplan: "IDF Seeks Funds for Multi-Year Plan. General Opens Battle Over Military Budget"]

[Text] The public battle between the IDF and the government over the military budget has begun. That there is no news government yet doesn't matter; the IDF has fired the first shot.

On the firing line for the army was Deputy Chief of General Staff Ehud Baraq, the man who—with the help of the head of the IDF's Planning Branch, and subject to approval by the chief of general staff—formulated the IDF's budget proposal.

Much is at stake for the IDF. More than the proposed \$4 billion budget for next year. The banner the army is carrying into battle is its long-discussed, carefully nurtured multi-year plan. Work on the plan began over two years ago but the plan was not considered viable until the Lavi project was dead and buried. The current version, which has been approved by Defence Minister Rabin, contains the guidelines for the smaller, smarter IDF that Rav Aluf-Maj Gen Dan Shomron spoke of when he took over as the chief of general staff.

Baraq fired his first salvo before the Israeli Press Club on Sunday evening, where he discussed—publicly for the first time and in very general terms—some of the items on the IDF's multi-year plan, and hinted at the reasoning behind it.

Not insignificantly, Baraq opened his remarks with a brief summary of the IDF's primary spheres of activity, followed by a reference to the assumptions that guided the IDF in recent years and which were shattered over the past 12 months, among them the Iran-Iraq war and the minimal efforts the IDF needed to maintain its control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

(In response to a question, he revealed for the first time the exact scope of IDF activity in the territories since the intifadah began a year ago: a total of 3.5 million soldier-days, or an average deployment of 10,000 men per day. He didn't forget to mention that the IDF would ask for extra funds to cover their deployment).

He then discussed the potential threat of a united military front to Israel's east.

Warnings of a future threat have surfaced with increasing frequency since the declaration of a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war in July. Contributing to the fears of such a united front were reports this year on major advances in surface-to-surface missile technology and chemical warfare capabilities in the Arab world, and the acquisition by Syria and Saudi Arabia of what Baraq called "super-modern" aircraft.

Baraq was careful to mention all of these developments at the press club, despite their having been recalled almost ad nauseam in recent months.

The main military threat to Israel continues to be Syria, he said, which can wage war on Israel at the whim of one man. The possibility also exists, he said, returning to his main line of argument, that Syria will be joined by Iraq, and, "under certain circumstances," Jordan or a Saudi expeditionary force—apparently an allusion to Saudi planes.

Baraq's inclusion of Jordan, even conditionally, in this eastern coalition took public assessments by senior IDF personnel, himself included, one step further than anyone had been prepared to go so far.

His next remark shed light on the motive behind his statement.

"This increased threat is the basis for our work," he said, as he took up the cause of the multi-year plan.

The plan, he said, addresses changes in the IDF's order of battle, weapons procurement plans and development projects, levels of reserve stores, and the scope of operations. Among the items included in the plan are the purchase of 60 advanced F-16s, five F-15s, the Navy procurement plan, the purchase of more combat helicopters, and the acquisition of more command, control, communication and intelligence systems.

Baraq was quick to point out that the multi-year plan had been drawn up on the assumption that the IDF would continue to have access to a constant level of dollars and sheqel resources.

But these resources have dwindled over the years. Baraq's announcement that next year's budget is approximately \$4 billion indicates that the sheqel component of the budget (the total figure minus \$1.8b. in U.S. military aid) has fallen from \$3.2b. in 1982 to some \$2.2b. today.

And the dollar component, while rising numerically from \$1b. in 1980 to \$1.8b. today, has lost its purchasing power.

The underlying message, while not verbalized by Baraq, is that the IDF cannot afford any more budget cuts. What he did say was that the IDF would request additional funds from the government when it presents its budget in January so that it can begin to purchase some of the new weaponry called for in the multi-year plan.

To save money in the multi-year plan the IDF will not build major weapons platforms (the vehicles on which weapons sub-systems are mounted), with the exception of the Merkava main battle-tank, and will purchase only those platforms that can be upgraded for 15, 20, and even 25 years or more by replacing their armaments and electronics.

Proponents of the plan in the IDF say it meets Israel's projected security needs on a yearly basis, building and equipping the IDF to meet the challenges of the future battlefield. The need to simultaneously meet both short- and long-term threats has been made particularly difficult by cuts in the defence budget and entails some risk-taking, the proponents say.

The need for a multi-year plan has been evident to members of the general staff for several years. An analysis of the future battlefield by a team in the Planning Branch resulted in the formulation of one such plan which was put forward in 1986, but Rabin rejected the plan, which called for over half a billion dollars more per year than was available, because it did not provide adequate security in the short term.

The long hard battle to kill the Lavi was fought largely to remove that project as a stumbling block and enable the IDF to proceed with its plans for the future. Now that the general staff have finally formulated a plan which they, and Rabin, consider viable, one may expect them to fight even harder for its approval.

## JORDAN

**India Wants To Boost Cooperation With Jordan**  
44000166 Amman JORDAN TIMES in English  
17-18 Nov 88 p 6

[Article by Ghadeer Taher]

[Text] Amman—India's imports of Jordanian phosphates and other fertiliser-related products are expected to reach \$110 million for the year 1988 and New Delhi is stepping up efforts to redress the trade imbalance between the two countries through increasing its own exports to Jordan and securing industrial and construction projects in the Kingdom.

The increase in the total value of Indian purchases of Jordanian products is more as a result of the rise in international prices of phosphates and fertiliser products than an actual increase in quantity.

India, the largest importer from Jordan through the state agency Metals and Minerals Trading Corporation (MMTC), will take 200,000 tonnes of muriate of potash worth approximately \$20 million by January 1989. This is in addition to 220,000 tonnes already supplied by the Arab Potash Company this year.

The average annual Indian purchase of muriate of potash from Jordan is around 400,000 tonnes and the 20,000-tonne increase this year is only a part contribution to the increase in the value of the deals, according to A.K. Gandhi, resident manager of MMTC in Amman.

Other products that Jordan exports to India include phosphate derivatives such as diammonium phosphate—150,000 tonnes in 1988—and rock phosphates—1.05 million this year—from the Jordan Phosphates Mines Company (JPMC).

Despite the rise in Indian purchases from Jordan, there is little sign of any significant increase in the Kingdom's imports from the sub-continent, said Gandhi.

"In 1987, Jordan's exports to India amounted to JD 22 million while Indian exports to Jordan were worth only JD 1.43 million," Gandhi told the Jordan Times in an interview.

"In 1988, the gap widened to over \$100 million in favour of Jordan," he noted.

Gandhi stressed that increased efforts had been made and were being exerted to reduce the trade gap through agreements with the public as well as the private sectors in Jordan.

But, he said, the economic situation in Jordan has delayed fruition of these efforts.

"Inroads have been made into the private sector by giving them competitive prices," Gandhi said. "We have penetrated into the fields of food items, surgical equipments and paints—oxides. Once they (Jordanians) find these products acceptable in terms of quality and prices we will increase exports."

"We have also done one or two deals with JPMC for the supply of polypropylene bags, he said. "But in spite of our best efforts, we have been able to manage export contracts worth only \$8 million to \$9 million this year," he said.

According to Gandhi, there is a multitude of Indian products for Jordan to choose from. He cited tea, coffee, spices, cashew nuts, engineering and chemical products, vegetable oil, tobacco products, fish products automobile parts, etc.

In order to expose Jordanians to these products, India is interested in holding a trade fair in Jordan possibly in September 1989, Gandhi said.

According to Gandhi, the first step towards improving Indian exports to Jordan is identifying the possible market areas. "We were expecting the joint Jordanian-Indian trade committee to meet earlier this month to tackle this issue," Gandhi said. "Unfortunately, the meeting was delayed." The committee, which was formed in 1986 following the visit to Jordan of the Indian secretary of commerce, met last in March 1987 in New Delhi.

Gandhi said he found the Jordanian government very well receptive to MMTC efforts.

"On the government side, we are stressing through the Ministry of Industry and Trade to see what best we can do to generate exports from India," Gandhi said. "But, again it depends mainly on the competitiveness of the price, quality of the product etc... there are also other offers under considerations by the Jordanian government but there are delays because of the economic situation in the country."

"The best way to reduce the trade gap will be the identification of certain projects which the government of Jordan can give to Indian companies through MMTC," he said. "Then they can encourage the private sector in Jordan to buy Indian-made products if they are competitive in price and quality," he said.

Gandhi confirmed that a proposal by India to set up a fertiliser plant—mainly to process phosphoric acid—in Jordan was still alive and contacts were underway between the two sides on this subject.

**Success of Popular Army Described**  
*44040103 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic*  
16 Nov 88 p 11

[Article by Tal'at al-Shana'ah]

[Text] From North to South is a difficult, but undoubtedly beautiful journey. I carried away from it memories of the colleagues who participated with me in the series of investigations.

We went to Ma'an, al-Shawbak, and 'Aqabah and met key figures of the Popular Army in a governorate whose small population and geographical nature set it apart from other governorates.

#### **Governor of Ma'an**

At the beginning of our tour of Ma'an governorate, we met Mr Jamal al- Mu'mini, the governor of Ma'an. "Citizen response," he said, "has been good—indeed, excellent. We are proud of this response. No problem faced us with the people. Everyone is hurrying to enroll in training. Cooperation between the People's Army command and those under obligation is contributing to the success of the experiment. I have observed that all are prepared to undertake their duties, if necessity calls.

"The turnout of girls in the governorate for training exceeded all expectations. Even some housewives enrolled—as volunteers. We are very proud of this phenomenon, particularly given the conservative nature of the region.

"The number of citizens turning out for the Popular Army exceeds the military facilities of the region. These people are therefore arranged into scheduled enrollment times that fit these facilities. Department heads in the governorate were eager to enroll in the first course. His Highness Prince al-Hasan honored us by sponsoring it."

#### **Economic and Strategic Importance**

Next we met with the commander of the governorate's military region. He extended the scope of our knowledge about the experiment of Ma'an, with its villages and counties.

We asked his opinion, and he answered: "The experiment began on 30 September 1986. The first course began on 4 July 1987 and graduated under the sponsorship of His Highness Prince al-Hasan. Other courses followed. The experiment of Ma'an governorate is important for several reasons. There is the importance of the site, as well as the economic and strategic importance. The existence of economic installations such as ports renders the 'Aqabah district exceedingly important.

"People ask about the purpose of the Popular Army. The truth is that an army does not fight by itself; the people must be on its side. We expect everyone—officials and citizens—to make a commitment, so as to benefit from this experiment.

"The governorate includes a district, two subdistricts, and two counties. The population is small in comparison with the other governorates."

#### **Historical Importance**

"It is very important to remember the region's historical importance. It witnessed the outbreak of the Great Arab Revolt and was a crossing point for the entry of Islamic forces into Palestine and other places.

"As for problems, no difficulties faced us on the training level. Everyone made a commitment and cooperated with us. Housewives began volunteering on an individual basis. Sixteen of them, who were not subject to the law, enrolled. The county officers and officials provided all the necessary facilities."

#### **Refresher Courses**

"The current course at al-Shawbak includes 37 volunteers. Our training continues, and we expect the number to increase.

"Another aspect is that we have begun refresher training in Ma'an governorate for the first course that graduated in August 1987. The aim is to refresh the memory and increase our cohesion. We will begin refresher courses for the remaining trainees in the governorate.

"The response of the Bedouins exceeds our every expectation, especially since there is a nomadic group—people who reside according to the season, since there is no agriculture. We have taken account of the circumstances of these people and have adapted to them, without detriment to the established program."

#### Director of Ma'an Hospital

We met Dr Ghassan Khuri, director of Ma'an hospital and a trainee, in the hospital. He spoke about his experience: "The benefit for me had to do with knowledge, first of all. I learned what the Popular Army meant. I deepened my knowledge of regulations and laws. I benefited from arms training and from development of the group spirit. My self-confidence increased."

#### A Good and Appropriate Idea

Mrs Salfah Abutayah, director of Ma'an Secondary School for Girls (founded 1935), spoke about the Popular Army from her point of view: "It is a good idea and right for the age of the students. The good reputation of the trainers has contributed to the success of the experiment. The students acquired order, discipline, knowledge, and self-confidence. You may be surprised to learn that the students asked that the course be longer!"

Ibtisam Ahmad 'Abid (second-year high-school student, sciences) said: "The idea of the Popular Army is excellent, and the training period is important in the life of any female student.

"The benefits are many—especially learning to use a gun and give first aid. The experience also gave us more courage, self-confidence, and the ability to confront any difficulty without fear. The enemy is besieging us; we have to be on the lookout for him.

"As for disadvantages, there aren't any, despite the length of the time. I really wish that training were during summer vacation. I shall never forget going out to the shooting range. People were cooperative and encouraged us to the utmost extent."

Ikhlas Salim al-Nawafilah (second-year high-school student, humanities) expressed her opinion as follows: "We were afraid of the idea, but we learned the concept of the Popular Army from the lectures and benefited greatly. From the academic standpoint, the training did not affect our studies. The people and everyone involved cooperated with us."

#### Commander of al-Batra' Sector

Sitting next to him, I asked him his opinion. The commander of al-Batra' sector began to speak with great liveliness: "The people did not know much about the army and the armed forces. The Popular Army came to give an impetus to continued work and balanced knowledge.

"We faced several questions and answered them frankly. I remember that one of the girls asked whether it was possible to train on parachutes. That just shows the great enthusiasm and exuberance of the women students."

#### Director of al-Shawbak College

Agricultural Engineer Ahmad Fakhri Qutayfan, director of al-Shawbak College, began by thanking those in charge of the Popular Army for their cooperation and choice of al-Shawbak College, so that its students could be the first associates. He described the experience as having been successful and excellent. It was a step toward interest in the youth sector and toward opening communication channels with the armed forces.

Engineer Qutayfan added: "Our hearts were gratified when students of both sexes rushed to join. The idea was clear, and after the training there was broad education. Self-defense, participation in civil defense operations, and improvement in behavior are among the benefits of the Popular Army—as well as obedience, acquisition of skills, and preparation of students for the future."

#### With Female Students of al-Shawbak College

We took leave of the director of the college to meet with students of both sexes. We began with 'Abir Najjadat (first-year student, business administration). "I am glad I joined the Popular Army," she said. I was going to volunteer, had I not been required to join.

"When I put on the uniform, my father, who had been a Brigadier General in the armed forces, was happy and encouraged me. In the past, I used to look at guns and be afraid of them. Now it's different; I handle them with courage and confidence."

Maryam Mahmud Rawashidah (second-year student, Arabic language) said that she, as a girl, had gained physical skill. Her self-confidence had increased, and her idea of commitment had broadened to include all aspects of life.

She added: "I benefited from the first aid and civil defense classes, intending, like all the girls, to be the mistress of a family.

"There were questions in our mind, but we answered them because of the training, which has now entered the world of memories. My friends now talk about it like any other subject. It is a matter of great pride and joy."

Nuhayl Ahmad Fayad (second-year student, English language) said: "I gained increased morale, knowledge, and physical skill. My colleagues were afraid of guns, but training broke down the psychological barrier. The fact that my sisters at al-Yarmuk University and Ma'an Secondary School also trained benefited me. Now that the three of us have become enrolled in the Popular Army, we exchange anecdotes and information about the same subject."

#### With Male Students

Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Sa'ub (second-year student, agricultural secondary school) said: "The idea of the Popular Army is very good, especially since it comes as a preparation for entering the service of the flag. I learned military discipline, respect for regulations, and performance of duty. I feel pride when I walk in the street wearing a uniform."

Mashhur 'Adil al-'Ushaybat (first-year student, livestock breeding) said: "I learned infantry movements and arms training. My physical skill increased, and I learned how to serve the country."

#### Commander of 'Aqabah Sector

From Ma'an to 'Aqabah, a city that hugs the sea. Several citizens and officials spoke to us. We began with the commander of 'Aqabah sector, who was our guide during the trip. We asked him about his experience. He said: "Training in 'Aqabah district began on 5 December 1987, when the first course of the Popular Army was held. It included a large number of department directors, heads, and senior officials from agencies administering the port, education, and land transportation, the electricity, fertilizer, and thermal plant authority, the 'Aqabah regional authority, and the railroad organization in 'Aqabah."

"There was an unprecedentedly enthusiastic turnout to join the new experiment and bear arms. Trainees took well to the idea and reacted to the training, rendering the first course successful. His Highness Prince al-Hasan honored us by coming to award the diplomas. He witnessed the success and praised the quality of the training and trainees. This left a good impression with the remaining citizens in 'Aqabah district and made them hurry to join subsequent courses with great enthusiasm."

#### Health Department Doctor

Dr 'Abd-al-Rahman Shuwaykini, doctor in the 'Aqabah Health Department, said: "I had the honor of joining the first class of associates in the Popular Army in 'Aqabah district. It was graduated under the sponsorship of His Highness Prince al-Hasan."

"I am very proud of the military and training skills I gained during the course. These skills will enable me, if the need arises, to perform my sacred obligation of defending our beloved homeland as a reserve to our armed forces—may God make them victorious!"

"The royal prize for first aid, rescue, and fire prevention that His Highness presented to me has left a very great impression upon me. I am very grateful for this generous attention. What we learned during the course was highly beneficial and important for every member of society. History must record this act of royal generosity by His Highness King Husayn, the leader of the [nation's] course, toward his people, thanking the leaders, officers, and trainers of the Popular Army for their fruitful efforts."

#### Woman Volunteer

Although the law mandating enlistment in the Popular Army does not apply to women, she applied as a volunteer in order to achieve the noble goals at which the training aims. So we met with Miss Maysir Hawrani (laboratory technician in the 'Aqabah Health Department), a volunteer. She told us about her experience:

"The Popular Army was a real experience. It included a number of programs, lectures on civil defense, first aid, field skills, and weapons. I received firearms training, and one's fear of using a rifle or any weapon went away."

#### School Director

Mrs Radiyah 'Ali Ahmad al-Sayyid, director of 'Aqabah Comprehensive School for Girls, said: "In the school, we felt the student's sense of belonging to her homeland, and this affected the teaching staff. Those who did not train, followed the training with enthusiasm. This created an improvement in the students. People cooperated greatly in this area."

#### Power, Water Tariffs Reduced

44000159 Amman JORDAN TIMES in English  
13 Nov 88 p 1

[Text] Amman (Petra)—The Cabinet Saturday set new rates for electricity and water. During a regular session, chaired by Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i, the Cabinet decided to lower electricity rates as follows, effective as of 1 November.

- (1) For domestic consumers the price per kilowatt (kw) for the first 160 kw will be reduced from 31 fils to 28 fils.
- (2) For electricity used for pumping water for irrigation the price of a kw drops from 23 fils to 21 fils;

(3) Price per kw of electricity used for street lighting in Amman and Irbid governorates were reduced from 13 fils to 9.465 fils. A peak hours for industrial cities from 6 hours daily to 3. Water prices were fixed as follows, effective as of 1 October and on a 3-month cycle:

(1) In Amman, 100 fils down from 120 fils for the first 20 cubic metres of water; 190 fils down from 200 fils for the second 20 cubic metres.

(2) The rest of the Kingdom, except the Jordan Valley, 65 fils, down from 80 fils, per cubic metre for the first 15 cubic metres of water; and 90 fils down from 96 fils for the next 30 metres.

(3) In the Jordan Valley 65 fils down from 80 fils for the first 50 cubic metres and 115 fils down from 120 fils for the second 50 metres. The rest of the rates remain the same.

#### **Need of 266M. Cubic Metres of Water Expected by the Year 2005**

44000163 Amman JORDAN TIMES in English  
20 Nov 88 p 3

[Text] Amman (Petra)—Jordan is expected to require nearly 266 million cubic metres of water for annual consumption by the year 2005 and therefore the Ministry of Water and Irrigation has to intensify its efforts to provide sufficient amounts through prospecting for new resources, according to Minister of Water and Irrigation Ahmad Dakhqan Saturday.

"Jordan's needs of water can be met through additional artesian wells, the construction of dams and research on means of recycling treated water, the minister told a regional seminar which opened in Amman to discuss management of water resources in urban regions. The speech was delivered on his behalf by a senior ministry official who reviewed the ministry's programmes to supply water to all regions and to lay sewerage systems in various parts of the Kingdom.

At present nearly 99 percent of the population in the Kingdom receive water from water networks in the urban regions and 96 percent in the rural regions receive supplies from water networks. While nearly 70 per cent of the population will have their homes linked to sewerage systems by 1990, the minister said in his speech.

These achievements were realised in Jordan despite the country's meagre water resources and poor rainfall, he said.

According to the minister only 100 millimetres of rain water fall annually on desert and southern areas of the Kingdom, and 600 millimetres in northern and western areas.

A 1987 estimate of Jordan's water production was put at 150 million cubic metres mainly drawn from underground, the minister noted.

Dakhqan said that nearly 50 percent of the total amount of water used for irrigation is lost on the way to the fields either through leakage in the pipelines, or evaporation.

The ministry has introduced a system by which it imposes higher rates on major users of water thus curtailing excessive consumption, and is continually conducting maintenance on networks to prevent any loss through leakage Dakhqan said.

Health Minister Zayd Hamzah delegated the director of his ministry's Department of Primary Health Care to deliver his speech in which he stressed the need to supply all citizens with sufficient potable water.

"Drinking water helps to maintain a healthy community and enables the country to raise its social and economic standards," the minister said in his speech.

Indeed he said provision of fresh water to all people is one important element in the World Health Organisation's (WHO) endeavours to achieve primary health care to all people by the year 2000.

"The different state departments are not the only parties that should be involved in ensuring water supplies to all regions. This is a national effort that requires cooperation from all sectors. The Health Ministry can help by testing water samples and ensuring potable supplies for citizens," the minister noted. Hamzah cautioned that there should be a rationalisation of water consumption and maintenance of networks if national efforts to provide sufficient water supplies are to achieve success.

A representative of the World Health Organisation, which is sponsoring the seminar in cooperation with Jordan and the World Bank, said that nearly half hospitalised patients in the world suffer from one form of disease or another related to water. "Therefore proper management of water resources and distribution has become essential not only to save a precious source of life but to save humans from catching any diseases."

A World Bank representative who addressed the seminar later said that the meeting will try to focus attention on information that can help national authorities draw up sound water policies.

The three-day seminar will discuss the most proper types of pipes to be used in water networks, the most efficient ways to lay water systems, corrosion of pipes, water policies, means to stem leakage from water systems and special studies on water resources.



### Oil, Gas Reserves Discussed

44040107 Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 7 Nov 88 pp 10, 12

[Article under "Economic Studies" rubric: "Jordan's Oil Shale Supply Covers Its Energy Needs for 1,000 Years To Come"]

[Text] Jordan possesses an important energy source—oil shale. Estimates of the Jordanian reserve of this shale range between 36 billion and 50 billion tons, distributed in various areas of Jordanian territory. Although these rocks contain a tremendous supply of oil, the high cost of exploiting them has until now prevented their development into a reliable source for the energy that Jordan imports almost entirely from abroad, using a significant portion of its hard currency reserve in the process. Jordan's bill for oil last year was over \$360 million.

According to sources in the Jordanian Electricity Authority, the first step toward oil shale exploitation seems to have been achieved successfully. These sources recently announced that preliminary results from direct burning tests of oil shale samples at the research center of a company in the Federal Republic of Germany showed that Jordanian oil shale could be burned to generate electrical power without harmful effects on the environment.

If subsequent tests confirm this conclusion, the next step will be to establish guidelines for the special commercial stages in which this solid fuel will be burned. Tests have been run on a load of 72 tons of oil shale. Final results of the studies will be included in a report that a Canadian consulting firm is preparing about the feasibility of using oil shale to provide sources of energy.

Tests were previously run on another load at another site. They, too, demonstrated the possibility of fully exploiting the energy stored in oil shale. The burning process produced three kinds of oil—light, medium, and heavy—as well as a considerable quantity of sulfur.

The special importance of Jordanian oil shale lies in the fact that most of this rock is found in deposits on or close to the surface, making it relatively easy and cheap to mine. Also, these locations are close to the main centers of energy consumption in Jordan.

Exploratory operations by the Natural Resources Authority recently discovered the existence of six new sites rich in oil shale at Wadi al-'Asal and Kharazah in the district of al-Ghawr al-Safi, south of the Dead Sea. The digging of experimental 24 wells with depths ranging between 50 and 140 meters enabled the discovery of these and companion deposits. The wells led to the discovery not only of oil shale, but also of considerable quantities of the ground water required for oil shale exploitation operations, whether these involve burning or distillation.

### Learning From German and Chinese Experience

Engineer Kamal Juraysat, director of the Natural Resources Authority says that the direct burning method, which was used in the West German experiments, can be used mainly in the area of generating electrical power. In this context, a move will be made to build a 100-megawatt power station to contribute to feeding the national electricity network. In the long run, however, the authority expects to extract oil from the shale by distillation. The fuel produced could then be used in areas other than electricity generation. These expectations rest mainly on the promising cooperation taking place between the authority and the People's Republic of China, which has developed effective methods of oil shale distillation characterized by lack of restriction and by low cost.

The importance that Jordanian officials place upon this cooperation can be inferred from the fact that the cost of extracting 1 ton of oil from oil shale by advanced Western methods is \$45, while the same quantity extracted by the Chinese method costs only \$15. Furthermore, it is a simple method, without complicated maintenance and operation requirements.

The director of the Jordanian Natural Resources Authority states that his department will continue the program of developing the use of oil shale despite the continued decrease in crude oil prices, which have dropped to about \$10 a barrel.

This is not surprising, since specialists estimate that the quantity of oil extractable from oil shale is in the range of 3 billion tons. Theoretically, this quantity could satisfy Jordan's energy requirements at present rates for more than 1,000 years and could also provide primary material for establishing many chemical industries.

### Exploiting Natural Gas

However, before reaching this stage, Jordanian officials must still look for shorter-term solutions to the high energy bill problem. Even after the drop in oil prices, this bill still represents over 45 percent of Jordan's total exports. At present, the hopes of these officials focus on developing the exploitation of the quantities of natural gas recently discovered in the al-Rishah area near the Iraqi border. Tests have established the possibility of exploiting 15 million cubic meters a day of natural gas.

Work is under way to construct surface facilities that will allow the natural gas to be exploited. It will be used basically in the field of electricity. The supply of gas in the al-Rishah area is estimated on a preliminary basis as about 1 billion cubic feet, but there are strong possibilities that the supply is much greater. The Natural Resources Authority is now busy making the necessary studies and conclusions and is digging a pump or six other wells.

Officials of the Natural Resources Authority hope it will be possible to exploit 100 million cubic [as published, unit of measurement not given] of gas a day. This quantity would be sufficient to operate gas turbines with a power of 3 megawatts. The authority has decided to construct them at the al-Rishah site. A contract has been made with a Romanian company to build a high transmission line between al-Rishah and Amman. This 350-km-long line is expected to be completed within 1 year.

If more natural gas is discovered, the Jordanian Electricity Authority will link more turbines to the field to generate power. If the yield of the new discoveries turns out to be sufficient, gas could be piped to Amman to be used for domestic and industrial purposes.

Oil exploration operations have continued with great optimism since the discovery of the first oil well in 1984 in the Hamzah field near the al-Azraq area. Although this field produces high-quality oil, its production does not exceed 600 barrels a day, while Jordan imports 60,000 barrels of oil.

Oil exploration in Jordan began in the thirties. While analysts do not expect the discovery of large fields, such as those found in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, they say that there are good possibilities for important discoveries. Engineer Kamal Juraysat, head of the Natural Resources Authority, believes that the discovery of natural gas in the al-Rishah area indicates a new oil field. He pointed out that previous geological opinions in the Middle East were based on the fact that areas with greatest oil production were those containing rocks between 65 million and 144 million years old. However, the gas in the al-Rishah area was found in rocks going back to the Silurian Period (408 million to 438 million years old). The thickness of these rocks in Jordan is 6,500 feet, which means that Jordan contains large quantities of hydrocarbons.

In fact, Jordanian officials consider alleviation of the energy bill (\$350 million in 1987) as a basic precondition for progress toward economic balance. This sum represents the equivalent of 60 percent of the value of Jordanian exports. It represents a burden on the trade balance, despite the fact that Jordan now pays for its oil exports from Iraq in goods and services exported to the neighboring country. Imports of Iraqi oil equal only one-third of Jordanian fuel requirements, which reached 2.8 million tons in the current year. The remainder comes mainly from Saudi Arabia and is paid for in hard currency.

#### Transport Sector the Largest Consumer of Fuel

This concern explains why Jordanian officials are interested in lowering the energy bill by various means and methods. These take two main directions: rationalizing energy use in homes and industrial establishments, and attempting to develop renewable energy sources.

As for the first method, the Jordanian Ministry of Energy undertakes continual instructional campaigns to alert Jordanian citizens to the best means of conserving energy and provides practical advice to help individuals and institutions lower energy consumption. A special office offers such advice and studies free of charge to anyone who seeks them.

The Ministry of Energy has made a detailed study of a number of major industrial companies and establishments. The study, done by the American Bechtel Corporation, showed that major companies could save 60,000 tons of oil a year, valued at about \$10 million. The companies involved included oil refineries, phosphate factories, the Jordanian Glass Company, and fertilizer and potash companies. The methods proposed as a remedy involve modifying the design of some parts of these factories to assure better energy use.

The concern for energy conservation is not limited to the industrial sector; it also includes the transport sector. Statistics show that the latter consumes more than 40 percent of imported energy. This high ratio is explained by the fact that the Jordanian transport sector includes more than 20,000 trucks. Many of them work in transportation between the port of 'Aqabah and Iraq, since Iraq has come to import a great part of its requirements and to export some of its oil through 'Aqabah.

#### 'Aqabah Port Activities Described

44040102 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 7 Nov 88 p 4

[Article by Tal'at Shana'ah]

[Text] The port of 'Aqabah seems like a beehive because of its prominent position among Arab and international ports.

Uninterrupted import and export operations, trucks ceaselessly moving different kinds of merchandise to and from the world through Jordan's seaport—all this takes place with indefatigable movement and great precision.

The only obstacle to my wish to get to know the persons who work with toil and energy was the factor of time.

Time blocked my wish to meet the workers and officials, depict their cares and hopes, and obtain precise information about the port's activity and role. It was therefore necessary to shorten the distance by meeting the Port Authority general director, Mr 'Id al-Fa'iz. When he welcomed us, the first thing I saw when I sat down was the slogan on his desk: "Had it [the job] lasted for someone else, it would not have reached you." I felt delighted by the man's conviction and wisdom that translated themselves into practical conduct and into a philosophy of the responsibility that had been placed upon his shoulders.

### Great Leap

[Shana'ah] Would it be possible to sketch a map of the Port Authority? What are the features of this map?

[Id al-Fa'iz] Yes. The Port Authority is a government-owned company that began its work in 1952. It was a modest beginning, with 5,000 tons arriving in the year. By 1988, this had jumped to 20 million tons leaving and arriving.

This qualitative leap in productivity gives an idea of our great aspirations in the areas of management, employment, and productivity.

Great leaps in administrative and financial organization accompanied this development. The authority was managed by the public and private sector until the beginning of the seventies. Then a decree was issued amalgamating the two administrations, so that they became a single administration, the Port Authority. In this way, the government can control the work force and the operation from a public perspective.

In 1980, after the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War, developments occurred in the port. In step with this event, the authority began to prepare its technical and managerial cadres and to increase imports for Iraq. The southern floating wharves were built, as well as the oil and container wharves.

### Accommodation of Huge Quantities

Despite lack of previous preparation for such importing, this authority was able to accommodate huge quantities of Iraqi and Jordanian imports.

The authority still gives priority to Jordanian national shipping lines and the regular shipping lines in order to make commercial transactions, attempting to organize and diversify imported goods coming through the port.

By transporting passengers on the Nuwayba' line, the authority has been able to develop the passenger terminal into one of the most efficient terminals in the area. The new passenger terminal building will be opened very soon. Costing over 1.5 million dinars to build, it is expected to open at the beginning of 1989.

### Oil Ports

The authority has also been able to develop oil ports, so as to export more than 2 million tons of crude oil in a single year from Iraq. We have taken a new step, transporting crude oil over 1,250 km for the first time in the world. It is a new experiment both for Iraq and for the world.

The container port has been developed so that it handles 120,000 containers a year, arriving and departing. We are trying to develop this port because we feel that the future of transportation lies in containers, not in loose merchandise.

Although 1987 was a boom year for ports, reaching the high figure of about 19 million tons handled, this year we expect to reach nearly 19.5 million tons. The proportion of arriving to departing merchandise is 48.5 percent. As for types of merchandise, the authority deals with general merchandise, bagged goods, containers, and loose and liquid goods.

We are trying to develop goods for transit shipping, so that this port will compete with neighboring ports. We are trying to attract importers, so that their goods come into the port for unloading and subsequent reexport to other ports, such as Jiddah, al-Hudaydah, and Port Said.

### Interest in Personnel

The authority takes an interest in its working cadres and has established a naval training center. Through qualifying and training courses, this center is capable of turning out all the cadres that work in the port.

We cooperate in this area with the program of the United Nations. Some Arab countries, such as fraternal Yemen, have benefited from the training center. The center has graduated a number of Yemeni workers.

### Achievements

[Shana'ah] Based on what you have said, what were the port's most outstanding achievements during 1987-88?

[Id al-Fa'iz] The authority has raised the slogan of "administrative development" as a slogan for 1987. There had been no organizational structure or description of job functions in the authority. We have been able to implement an organizational structure. The authority has been divided into ten departments, consultants, and deputies. A functional description has been established for each department, division, and branch, so that each employee knows exactly what is required of him and what are his rights and duties. He is rewarded or punished on this basis.

With the approval of the board of directors, a (numerical foundation) has been established for the port.

Next, the authority has begun improving its productivity. Productivity in 1987 jumped 19 percent from what it had been in 1986. In 1986 it was 16.5 million tons; it has reached 19.5 million tons.

### Slogan, 'The Job of the Departments'

The authority has raised the slogan, "the job of the departments," and not relying on local or foreign contractors. Thus, the Department of Projects and Services has been able to undertake a number of projects at very small cost.

Among the most important projects it has completed is the employees' center, which is considered an advanced qualitative and managerial-cultural move for the work of the authority. It gathers over 118 employees under one roof with an open courtyard. All transactions are completed within the building; the owner of the goods or the clearing company does not need to spend hours or days to complete his transaction. We hope the customs department will do what we have done, to complete the chain. Productivity in this area has risen more than 300 percent.

### We Are Developing Continually

[Shana'ah] What about plans for the future?

[Id al-Fa'iz] The authority continually looks at new developments in the region. As a national organization, it must take account of surrounding conditions.

There are continuous contacts with Iraq concerning future imports. Our Iraqi brothers have assured us that their imports will not decrease for the foreseeable period, given the fact that the authority has no competitor either in the tariff it charges importers or in services. We will try to increase the number of floating or fixed wharves in the next 6 months to accommodate Jordanian and Iraqi export traffic. There are requests for the export of Iraqi and Jordanian cement, sulfur, and super triphosphate.

### After the War

[Shana'ah] What has been the effect of the end of the Iran-Iraq War on the port of 'Aqabah? Are there plans to deal with this?

[Id al-Fa'iz] As I said previously, the end of the Iraq-Iran War does not mean an end to importing or exports. The opposite is true. With peace, Iraq's development will increase its imports and purchases. In recent months, import traffic for Iraq has proved to increase no less than 5 percent over last year.

In addition, the fraternal country of Iraq is concentrating on increasing economically advantageous exports of raw materials through Jordan, since we handle the Jordanian tariff for Iraq flexibly.

### Employee Problems

[Shana'ah] From my meetings with authority employees and my attempt to probe their problems, I found that at the head of these problems was the lack of housing made

available for employee ownership. Successive administrations have not solved this problem. We have learned that you have set out to solve it and help the employees. What is your opinion, and what is your role in this area?

[Id al-Fa'iz] First, one must shed light on the problem at its roots. There are about 5,000 employees in the authority. Married people living in apartments number 600. More than 2,500 unmarried individuals live in the workers' city. Currently, the authority cannot provide housing for the remaining employees as desired.

We will study various alternatives to solve the housing problem. We know that housing in the city of 'Aqabah is very expensive, compared with equivalent housing in the kingdom. Wages and salaries hardly cover an employee's various expenses. But, as you know, the authority's budget is limited. We will do our utmost to solve the problem fully or partially.

### Wait for the Solution

[Shana'ah] As honorary head of the Fishermen's Association, is there a solution for the fishing problems they are suffering?

[Id al-Fa'iz] Since the catch in the 'Aqabah area is small and fishermen suffer from the insufficiency of what they catch, we will speak to the minister of transportation and to Egyptian and Saudi authorities to open the door to fishing in nearby Saudi and Egyptian areas.

I think our contacts will be fruitful and that we shall accomplish something for this association of 120 fishermen.

### Jordanians Residing Abroad Can Postpone Military Service

44000162 Amman JORDAN TIMES in English  
13 Nov 88 p 3

[Text] Amman (Petra)—Jordanian citizens required to do military service are now allowed to postpone this service until the age of 37 provided they acquire a valid work and residence permit from another country where they are employed or wish to get employment.

The announcement was made by Brigadier Mahmud 'Abdal-karim al-Balawinah director of the Armed Forces Conscription Department who said that the amendment to the conscription law was endorsed by His Majesty King Hussein and approved by Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i in his capacity as minister of defence, and also by the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Sharif Zayd Ibn Shakir.

Al-Balawinah said that the new amendment is bound to enable Jordanians to offer more contributions and services to the country's educational and economic projects.

According to al-Balawinah, all Jordanians who are required to do military service and had left the country before or after 1 January 1976, and or those wishing to travel abroad for work can put off their military service.

Al-Balawinah said that once citizens, who left the country before 1 January 1976, reach the age of 37 they should return to Jordan to do their national service before they are 40 years of age.

Those who left the country after 1 January 1976 and before 17 October 1988 can continue in their present employment but should report to the conscription department for re-adjustment of their position. They can postpone their military service until they reach the age of 37.

As to those wishing to get on, al-Balawinah noted, they can also postpone their military service under the above mentioned regulations, and can return for a four-month visit to Jordan every year.

Al-Balawinah said that those failing to report for conscription service before they reach 40 will be imprisoned for three years.

As to the citizens from the West Bank, al-Balawinah said they will be subject to a new set of regulations agreed on following Jordan's decision to sever legal and administrative ties with the West Bank.

Al-Balawinah noted that those carrying green cards and temporary passports will have their conscription book cancelled, but those who carry yellow cards and permanent passports will be treated as Jordanian citizens.

Those wishing to replace green cards with yellow ones can do that upon approval from the Followup and Inspection Department of the Armed Forces, according to al-Balawinah.

But he said those wishing to replace yellow cards with green ones, should be supported by the statement from the Followup and Inspection Department as well before the Conscription Department can cancel their conscription books.

According to al-Balawinah, citizens with yellow cards cannot conduct any business with government departments unless they produce a three-year valid Israeli permit and those carrying green cards will have to get the Conscription Department approval before their business is conducted through the government departments.

He said that West Bank citizens living abroad before 19 June 1983 should report to the conscription Department upon his return to Jordan within 30 days so as to get proper permits to return to the West Bank.

All conscripts who violate the law will have their military service extended but will not be fined as it was practiced previously, al-Balawinah noted.

He said that any East Bank Jordanian living in the West Bank will be treated on equal footing as Palestinians carrying yellow cards with regard to the conscription service.

#### **Linking University Courses With Economic Needs Recommended**

44000155 Amman *JORDAN TIMES* in English  
26 Nov 88 p 3

[Text] Amman (Petra, J. T.)—A 4-day seminar on access to higher education which ended at the University of Jordan Thursday has urged concerned authorities to link national economic needs with university courses and the process of admission so that sufficient numbers of skilled manpower can be made available to contribute to the development process.

The seminar issued a statement at the final session, stressing the importance of the admission and acceptance procedures at universities and institutes of higher education.

The statement recommended that students at the school level should be allowed to select specialisations at an early age and noted that this could be done by introducing new forms of training courses into the curricula of the secondary stage at the school level.

The statement also called for close coordination between universities and community colleges on the one hand and secondary schools on the other, in the course of processing applications for entry into various faculties.

It recommended that an assessment be made of students' performance at the end of the first Tawjihi semester of each year to determine the students' eligibility for higher education.

The 4-day seminar reviewed several working papers dealing with the question of admission into universities, problems encountered by foreign students upon enrolling at colleges and policies of higher education in the Arab World.

The seminar was organised by the Association of Arab Universities and the University of Jordan in cooperation with the International Association of Universities.

#### **Jordan Is Free of Locusts**

44000161 Amman *JORDAN TIMES* in English  
26 Nov 88 p 3

[Text] Amman (Petra, J.T.)—Jordan is free of desert locusts; and the coming winter season is bound to drive away any swarms of the pests that might be heading towards the Kingdom, Minister of Agriculture Marwan al-Humud said in a statement on Thursday.

But, he said, that one cannot rule out the possibility of some swarms of locusts appearing in the country by the start of next spring. "Therefore the Ministry of Agriculture has been taking all necessary precautions and has been in constant touch with Saudi Arabia and organisations concerned with fighting off the pests, and the ministry is monitoring the movement of locusts in Saudi Arabia and Yemen."

The minister, who was speaking at a meeting held at the Ministry of Agriculture, said that the responsibility in combating locusts is a national one, and the ministry has been coordinating its plans and measures with other departments, and has been spreading awareness among the public and the farmers about effective means of dealing with the locusts in the event they appeared in the Kingdom.

The minister urged the heads of agriculture departments in various governorates to remain on the alert and to coordinate their activities with civil defence centres and local municipal and village councils.

"The Ministry of Agriculture continues to provide equipment and material required to help fight off the pests, and has been training personnel to carry out campaigns and organising seminars in all regions to spread awareness among the public against the possible pest invasion," al-Humud noted.

The ministry's preparations to face the locust danger were explained to the Jordan News Agency, Petra, by the Director of Agricultural Services Huwayda.

He said central operations rooms has been established in Amman, Karak, Zarqa' and Ma'an, and 21 teams, specialised in combating pests, have been created and entrusted with touring different agricultural areas, providing farmers with insecticides and equipment to confront the pests.

Coordination is continuing with the Health Ministry, the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs and the Environment, the Jordanian Armed Forces and other concerned organisations such as Greater Amman Municipality, in the course of preparations for a unified strategy to fight off locusts if they invade Jordanian territory, Huwayda noted.

The Armed Forces, Huwayda said, have supplied transport, equipment and medical supplies for the teams to deal with poisoning cases resulting from the use of pesticides.

The Armed Forces have also arranged for aircraft to spray pesticides in areas that might be invaded by locusts, Huwayda added.

The ministry's urgent precautions were motivated by earlier reports about locust invasions of North African countries, including Egypt, and parts of Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

Ministry of Agriculture's Secretary General Salim al-Lawzi said in April that air surveillance was under way in regions that could be attacked by the pests.

According to specialists, a swarm covering an area of one square kilometre might contain 40 million locusts which eat up to 80 to 120 tonnes of plantation in one-day.

## KUWAIT

### Merchants Criticize Japanese, Korean Competition

44040078 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic  
15 Nov 88 pp 1, 15

[Text] Traditional Kuwaiti merchants and companies have complained of illegal penetration of the Kuwaiti market by Korean and Japanese companies.

They said that these companies, through their representative offices in Kuwait, have begun competing with them in projects and bidding. Lacking the proper legal regulations, these offices are enabled to exercise all commercial functions, however small their size.

Local company merchants and directors criticized what they called the Ministry of Commerce and Industry's "lenient" oversight laws. They said that although these offices were licenced to operate only in the contracting or construction sector, they did not hesitate to engage in all forms of commercial activity.

A specialized merchant said to AL-QABAS, "They deal with everything, unlike the specialization that we impose upon ourselves and that government laws impose on us."

Another merchant described these companies as working like a many-armed "octopus." They receive their governments' support to carry out this role in foreign countries, including Kuwait, in order to repatriate hard currencies. These currencies have begun to leave the country, entirely without profit from them to the local economic cycle, which relies to a great extent on the interdependence of domestic spending. Leakage of these funds abroad will tend to deprive many sectors of them.

### Details by the Economics Editor

Traditional Kuwaiti merchants and companies have criticized Asian penetration of the local market and competition with local merchants and companies in the Kuwaiti market by illegitimate methods. Some Korean and Japanese companies carry on commercial activities for which they were not licensed.

Frustrated by this damaging competition, these merchants hold the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and its oversight laws responsible for this penetration, which has begun to damage them and their activities and to harm the desired integration of the local economic cycle.

Affected merchants point out that the representative offices of some major Korean companies have begun to exercise all commercial functions in the country. These companies compete with them, entering public bidding, and pulling the rug out from under them by offering competitive prices based on the support they receive in their countries. This support so increases their ability to compete that local companies cannot withstand them by relying on their own abilities, commercial laws, market forces, and the balance of supply and demand.

AL-QABAS asked a number of merchants for their views on this issue. They stated that the offices representing these companies in Kuwait were basically set up to engage in one particular activity and should not deviate from it. This was to be done by agreement with a local agent representing these companies, with the role of the agent restricted to granting his name and permitting the opening of the office in return for a predetermined fee. Subsequently, these companies attack the local market through these offices in order to engage in all the activities on the basis of which the office was opened, plus ones unrelated to the original activity for which they were licensed. In this way, the office becomes merely a gateway or a bridge to every kind of commercial activity. The office of one of these companies was able to capture a local company's opportunity to import automobile tires to Iraq and Iran immediately after the end of the war. This occurred when the Korean company's representative office in Kuwait presented an enticing low-price offer for tires it had shipped from one of the socialist countries. It thus caused the local market to lose the opportunity to export this shipment, even though it was present in Kuwait.

Strangely, as a specialized merchant says, these offices work like an octopus with a various visible and invisible arms. These companies do not hesitate to enter any activity, project, or competitive bidding, no matter how small. Their services have even begun to reach the end consumer in countries that like Kuwait have approved the opening of such representative offices. Countries hosting these offices should take notice of the illegal activities that these companies have begun to exercise and through which they are realizing large profits at minimal expense and with minimal local commitments in the affected country.

Some of the merchants grant the principle of competition, but they stipulate that this competition should be fair, honest, and on equal terms. They would not oppose the establishment of representative offices of Asian companies competing with them, if these companies had

several representative offices, each of them in a clearly defined economic activity, rather than competing by stealth and surprise, as if these offices were working underground.

One merchant who has lived through an experience of this kind said that an Asian company's office with under five employees had begun dealing with "everything imaginable." The office hardly had a definite activity and function; it had turned into an office for investigating business opportunities wherever and in whatever field they appeared. It would then rush to inform the company's main office, which in turn would charge its offices throughout the world to create appropriate competitive proposals that it would in turn present to the commercial organization in the country from which its offices had sent the notice. Usually, the proposals that the Korean company had reformulated according to its own purposes and interests were attractive, for the simple reason that they fell into fields that were not the company's fields. Thus, the company carried no capital or operating expenses for the same activity that a local merchant had been carrying on throughout the year in a way that caused the expense of the local merchant to be higher than the expense of the Korean company.

This merchant said that the representative office of the Korean company had been established to represent the mother company in contracting activities. However, the office overlooked no opportunity, whether small or great. If bids were invited for newsprint or tires, you found representatives of the office among the first to submit final offers. Local merchant or firms were forced to stand powerless, brooding over their disappointment.

What applies to paper and tires applies to virtually everything; and the merchant states that "everything" is not meant as hyperbole. These companies, according to the merchant, are ready to import tuna, before the wood, glass, dyes, iron, and various construction materials that might relate to their construction activities. Indeed, they do not hesitate to deal in scrap.

The merchants and companies warn of the dangerous effects of these illegal activities. They assert that as a direct result of them funds will go entirely outside Kuwait, thus preventing the local economic cycle from repumping of these funds into the local economy. Many sectors will therefore be deprived of the reentry of these funds into their various activities, despite the existence of Kuwaiti merchants carrying on the same activities. The latter have begun to see their business retreat continually, and they can do nothing about it.

Another merchant says these companies have become so bold that they no longer hesitate to deal with small and end consumers. Their activities are no longer limited to contracting, bids, proposals, and major deals. This

clearly contradicts the purpose of their presence in the country and calls for intervention by the country's commercial authorities to help Kuwaiti merchants regain their role.

They suggest requiring these multiple-activity companies to deal with a different local agent carrying on the same activity the company wishes to enter, so that the profit would be divided between the Korean or Japanese company and the local company. This would be done through classifying a specialization according to commodity.

Some informed merchants assert that these companies all but concentrate their activities on Kuwait because of the ease with which they can move under lenient—or we might even say nonexistent—Kuwaiti commercial laws.

These merchants say that these companies do not have regional offices in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, or Dubayy. They all but concentrate their activities on Kuwait because they cannot carry out such activities from regional offices outside the borders of the country, inasmuch as they must have a Kuwaiti sponsor or representative for them present in the local market.

Finally, these merchants say that some big-name companies known to carry on a wide range of activities do not resort to illegal methods. These companies, which the merchants described as "self-respecting," carry on a wide range of activities by allotting each activity to a Kuwaiti agent or merchant specializing in the same field. This is something to which the remaining companies must commit themselves as a minimum solution to this dangerous phenomenon that has come to threaten commercial activity in the country.

#### **Consequences of Share Reduction in BP Discussed** *44000145a Nicosia MEMO in English Nov 88 p 47*

[Article by 'Abd al-Salam]

[Text] In a previous issue we mentioned the mounting pressures exerted by the British officials to incite the Kuwaiti Investment Office (KIO) to reduce its share in British Petroleum (BP). In the beginning of last month, this campaign was intensified as British minister of trade and industry, Lord Young, asked the KIO officials to reduce their share in the company from 21.7 percent to 9.9 percent, and their voting rights, within a year.

The decision of the British minister, on the basis of the inquiry made by the Commission of Monopoly and Integration of the House of Commons upon the request of the government. This decision was taken in spite of the pledge made last August by the office not to raise its share to reduce its voting rights.

As expected, the British government decision was faced by an immediate reaction in the KIO which declared that the Kuwaiti government is very dissatisfied with the

method adopted by the commission to reach its conclusion and with the way these were justified. This was followed by the declaration of the KIO lawyers that the office is ready to resort to British tribunals and to the European Court of Justice. This position acquired new socioeconomic dimensions when the Kuwaiti Council of Ministers in its session held on the 9th of last month, studied this issue and when the minister of State to the Council of Ministers' affairs, 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Rashid, declared that the government studied all measures on all levels to insure the protection of its economic interests and its investments abroad.

If Kuwait did not publicly announce the measures it will take the door is open for expectation in this issue. Same thing for the place of Kuwaiti investments and the orientations which were stressed up till now. This raises a number of issues:

First: What will happen if the KIO puts really the issue before the specialized British or European tribunal. And what will be the practical consequence on the implementation of the British decision within the deadline.

Second: If the British decision is implemented who will buy the surplus of BP shares? In this context, there are many forecasts. Some say that BP itself is ready to buy assets and that many international brokers houses are ready to help it, to avoid the collapse assets on London markets when a large number of the company's assets are offered for sale. Others foresee that the Gulf countries will be in turn benefiting from the surplus. It is well known that according to estimates the sale of the surplus asset by the KIO at the current market's rate will lead to a loss of 300 million pounds.

Whoever is the potential buyer, if the British decision is applied, a further drop in the asset's price will happen. Prices had already dropped when the decision was made public. However an actual application will face KIO further losses.

Third: It is clear that any tribunal award will create a precedence which will affect investments in Great Britain, and may be in other European Countries, if the award is pronounced by specialized European Court. If the award is against Kuwait, this State will be compelled to reconsider three main issues:

a. The trend to invest in big corporations with a "national" character (a company which is under a state's control activities) where it is in principle possible for the national authorities, under the cover of the law against monopolies or the law for "national sovereignty" or any other specific financial systems to prevent foreign investments from reaching the stage of influence (if this law wasn't applied, the KIO would have reached this situation when its share in BP were increased. [parenthesis as received])



b. The trend to invest in Great Britain and the selection of the investments objective there. In this respect, many non-official and indirect information revealed that a part of Kuwaiti investments were transferred from Great Britain to other financial centers namely New York. However these news are not confirmed. The same thing rules for other Gulf investment which are mostly centered in Great Britain.

c. The trend to invest in the oil sector. This applies also on other Gulf countries which attempt to acquire stakes in Western companies to contribute in the various stages of the oil industry from prospection and extraction up till commercialization and distribution. If a legal award was pronounced and if the issue is solved according to the British decision, this means that there are limits to the contribution of the oil producing country in the purchase of stakes in foreign concerns. This means also that these countries have to accept a low number of shares which have no real weight, or to invest in small companies of secondary importance. This operation has positive and negative aspects since small companies face a difficult situation. This will no doubt affect oil production in the coming years. BP has justified the decision taken by arguing that Kuwaiti interests and the company's are conflicting. The example given to illustrate the situation is the North Sea prospection and drilling policy. This shows also that the Western oil companies and the Western countries look for increasing production outside the OPEC's regions, including in regions like the North Sea where production costs are higher. This trend will not be able to affect radically the volume of oil reserves and the tension expected on the oil markets in the nineties, if applied research related to the discovery of new energy sources do not succeed. However it will affect on the middle term the situation of the oil market particularly in creating a constant surpluses in the World supply of oil.

At any rate, the matter is still in its beginning and there are possibilities for new evolution. However it raises once more and regardless of other aspects the question of investments security in the Western financial centers. The under-secretary of economy in the United Arab Emirates described the British decision as being "political" and taken in the context of western political pressures against Arabs and their fight against the growth of Arab capital.

The danger is of course not imminent. However precautions must be taken to avoid it. There is a proposal put forward by the under-secretary of the Finance Ministry in Abu Dhabi. It calls for collective coordination of investment which support the negotiations strength of GCC countries. However the most important thing is the search for the adequate investment atmosphere in Arab countries to attract a large number of Arab investments.

## LIBYA

### Report Decries Lack of Job-Related Health Benefits

45040118 Tripoli AL-MUNTIJUN in Arabic  
15 Oct 88 p 5

[Text] The Industrial Safety and Workers' Security Act, Law No 93, was issued in 1976. It required employers, whatever their activities, to take all necessary precautions to protect workers on the job as well as others from employment hazards and dangers and from diseases resulting from employment in accordance with the provisions spelled out and defined in that law. This includes the provision that an employer, whose business or profession requires the use of machinery or tools which could expose those who use them or get close to them to various levels of injury, to take all precautions to ensure the personal safety of workers in the work place. This is to be done by providing the means for protection from injury. These means are to be determined in accordance with technical principles and specifications. Employers whose employees use materials which are harmful to health must also take all measures to guarantee that the harmful effects of these materials are avoided, whether the damage is the result of direct use of these materials, proximity to them, or being in the place where they are being used and stored. The minister of labor and civil service shall issue a decree outlining the preventive measures, which are referred to, and the procedures and times for conducting medical examinations on the workers, especially at the outset of their employment. The minister's decree shall also outline specifications for tools designated for personal use. These specifications shall not violate the mandatory provisions of this law which are in accordance with general technical and medical principles.

Although this law remains in effect, many employers, such as companies, factories, and small as well as large plants, are no longer bound by it. By 1980 responsibility for overseeing implementation and application of the law had shifted from more than one agency. Then in 1980 the Basic People's Congresses issued Law No 18 regarding social security. The preamble to that law affirmed that Law No 93 for 1976 would remain in effect; it stated the following:

"The Industrial Safety and Workers' Security Act, Law No 93 for 1976, shall...." [as published] Article One, that is, Article One of the Social Security Act, states that "Social security as shown in this law is a right guaranteed by society to all citizens of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah. This law protects residents of Libya who are not citizens. Social security covers every law that is enacted or every measure that is taken in accordance with this law. It covers everything which is intended to protect the individual and care for him in old age, and so on. It also includes social care, and so on. Social security also covers procedures and measures for

industrial safety, care for work-related injuries, occupational diseases, and rehabilitation for the sick, the injured and the handicapped."

### Principles of Preliminary Health Care

Preliminary health care covers at least:

- Educating people about prevailing health problems and methods of prevention and control.
- Providing food and supporting healthy nutrition.
- Providing a sufficient supply of pure water and basic sanitation.
- Providing maternal and child care, including family planning.
- Inoculating people against the main contagious diseases.
- Protecting people from indigenous diseases and fighting those diseases.
- Providing appropriate treatment.

Paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the Social Security Act discusses specific kinds of health care and mentions the following:

"The aim is to guarantee industrial safety and workers' security. It guarantees care for work-related injuries and occupational diseases, rehabilitation, and care for the physically disabled and handicapped, and so on." Article 30 of the Social Security Act, Law No 13 for 1980, which went into effect on 1 June 1981, provided more details about the specific kinds of health care which are to be offered by social security. These include:

A. Industrial safety measures are to be taken. These include periodic examinations [of workers] to ensure the prevention of work-related injuries and occupational diseases. Workers' safety is to be guaranteed, and the necessary industrial medical services are to be offered to provide prompt treatment for the aforementioned cases of injury and disease as soon as they occur. This is in compliance with the provisions of the Industrial Safety and Workers' Security Act, Law No 93 for 1976, and regulations which are issued in that regard.

B. The sick and the injured are to be rehabilitated so they can have new opportunities to work and produce and so that the effects of their handicap can be removed or alleviated by means of training them in their professions or crafts or in other suitable professions or crafts.

C. Complete medical and rehabilitating care is to be provided for the physically disabled and the handicapped.

D. Health disability is to be appreciated.

E. Complete health care is to be provided for patients at [health] care centers.

The aforementioned special kinds of health services are to be offered at [Social] Security Centers, at factories, and at other work and production sites.

Regulations show the coordination and integration measures which the Social Security Secretariat and the Health Secretariat are to follow with regard to specific kinds of health care.

They also show the coordination and integration measures that the Social Security Secretariat and the Public Service Secretariat are to take regarding industrial safety, workers' safety, and professional and vocational training.

For further clarity social security services and benefits are not offered free of charge. They are offered in return for payments paid by those who are ensured. Article 32 of Section 4 states that social security revenues are as follows: "Social security is to be financed by payments made by subscribers. These payments which are made in exchange for social security services are as follows:

A. One payment for old age and disability pensions, and so on.

B. One payment for monetary assistance and so on.

C. One payment provides partial coverage for the cost of social care services.

D. One payment for different kinds of health services and basic health services to subscribers and members of their families.

The rule regarding registration, payments and inspection which was issued in accordance with a decree from the General People's Committee on 17 Muharram 1389 from the death of the Prophet, coinciding with 24 Nov 1980, stated the following in Paragraph D of Article 29:

"D. The health care premium which is payable by all classes of health care subscribers is divided into two sections:

"A. The first section is payable for specific kinds of health care services offered by the Social Security Secretariat. This has been set at 1.5 percent.

"B. The second section is payable for basic health services offered by the Secretariat of Health to subscribers and members of their families. This has been set at 2.5 percent."

As of 1 June 1981, the day the Social Security Act, Law No 13 for 1980, went into effect, the Social Security Secretariat has been collecting social security payments in full from all producers, workers, employees, and others. These payments include the special premium for specific kinds of health care. That is, coverage is provided for industrial safety measures, and that includes

periodic examinations to ensure prevention of work-related injuries and occupational diseases, to guarantee workers' safety, and to offer the necessary industrial medical services to treat cases of injury and disease.

To implement that a general department was set up at the General People's Social Security Committee. Sections and offices were also set up at specific social security secretariats in the municipalities. Their main function and task was to conduct preliminary and administrative examinations and offer industrial medical services and so on. A new relationship of productive work and favorable results did actually start between Social Security and the various factories, plants, and work units. As a result of that thousands of production line workers were examined, and different kinds of medicines and treatment were offered to them. Different employers were also required to abide by conditions that were set to protect workers from work-related injuries and occupational diseases. And yet Social Security did not stop there: it outlined a plan to set up first aid units and full-fledged medical service facilities at the units of production and services. These first aid units and medical facilities would offer special kinds of health care benefits. Social Security also devised a plan to set up centers specializing in this kind of service. All this, however, suddenly came to a standstill. Everything was suddenly cancelled. Suddenly, this medical service vanished. Suddenly, there were no specific kinds of health care. There were no preliminary examinations, and there were no periodic examinations. How did that happen?

There is a story to be told here, but before we present that story to the reader, we wish to emphasize at the outset that the Social Security Fund is still by law collecting premiums for specific kinds of health care, and it is receiving and levying payments every month for such health care regarding industrial safety measures, preliminary and periodic examinations, and protection from work-related injuries and occupational diseases. In other words, it is receiving premiums but is not offering services or benefits. How did that happen? Here is the story.

When the General People's Congress issued its Decree No 5 for 1986 regarding the reorganization of the secretariats, the General People's Committee for Social Security was abolished. The General People's Committee had issued two decrees. The first one, Decree No 65 for 1986, dealt with organizing the Social Security Fund. No mention was made in that decree of the special domain and responsibilities for specific kinds of health care which were offered by social security secretariats in municipalities where the committees were not abolished and are still operating. The second decree, which is Decree No 66 for 1988, dealt with the distribution of the Social Security Secretariat's jurisdictions. That decree mentioned the following:

#### Article 1:

The Public Service Secretariat shall have jurisdiction over industrial safety and over ensuring workers' safety,

and it shall coordinate its activities with the Secretariat of Health in exercising its authority.

#### Article 2:

The Health Secretariat shall manage and supervise medical and first aid treatment facilities at units of production and at factories. It shall also manage and supervise periodic examinations of the ensured to guarantee protecting them from work-related injuries and occupational diseases. It will offer the necessary industrial health services to treat the aforementioned work-related injuries and diseases as soon as they occur.

#### Article 3:

All medical personnel, all support medical personnel and all medical gear, equipment, tools and ambulances presently located at social security centers in the various municipalities are to be moved to the Health Secretariat.

#### Article 5:

Medical materials and equipment and drugs stored in warehouses for drugs and medical equipment which belong to the Social Security Fund are to be turned over to the Health Secretariat and so on.

#### Article 7:

The Health and Treasury secretariats and the Social Security Fund are to make the necessary arrangements for the settlement of insurance premiums which have to do with health care.

There are several comments to be made about this decree. Perhaps the most important of these comments is that the General People's Committee violated a law issued by the Basic People's Congresses. That law is Law No 13 for 1980, which provides specific kinds of health care services and benefits regarding preliminary and periodic examinations, industrial medicine, work-related injuries and occupational diseases. It would have been better and more appropriate to present the matter to the Basic People's Congresses and request an amendment to the law during the congresses' first session.

The objective comment which matters to us here is having these benefits and services continue. These benefits and services were established by laws which were issued. These laws are the Industrial Safety and Workers' Security Act, and Law No 13 for 1980 regarding social security. The latter law required everyone who is insured to pay a monthly premium for these services and benefits. Many factories and units of production and services have no health care services of any kind. And so far, no specialized health care units have been established. In bringing up this important matter, our goal and our intent is to have preliminary and periodic examinations for workers. We want workers to be protected from work-related injuries and occupational diseases on an

ongoing and permanent basis. Thus, we would not lose productive workers as injuries and cases of occupational diseases rise in our country.

But professional conferences must have something to say on this matter. They must discuss it, look into it, and prepare a memorandum about it to be presented at the next session of the Basic People's Congresses. The congresses can then make an appropriate decision on the matter. This matter has to do with protecting producers and workers; it has to do with protecting them from occupational diseases and from work-related injuries.

### **Official Outlines Plans for Utilizing Great Man-Made River**

45040067a Tripoli AL-MUNTIJUN in Arabic  
3 Sep 88 pp 4, 5

[Article by Fathi 'Ali 'Isa: "The Great Artificial River: Miracle of the 20th Century"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] In the course of this investigation, we will become acquainted with the manner by which the water of the great artificial river project will be used and the programs and studies which have been prepared by the department to exploit the waters of the great artificial river project, in order that use may be made of the waters of this massive project—whether it was erected so that the inhabitants of the 7,000 housing unit project in al-Bayan al-Awwal city in Benghazi should use it to provide their requirements for potable water; or so that car wash stations and swimming pools could be erected and recreational projects set up; or whether it was erected in order to cover the ground with a green hue, the color of verdure and growth, for the sake of forging the future and realizing self-sufficiency in agricultural and livestock products.

These queries and others have been awaiting an answer. In a meeting with our brother Muhammad al-Hajani, director of the department to exploit the waters of the great artificial river project, our brother Muhammad al-Jahani talked about this achievement, stating:

"In the great jamahiriya, farming represented the main activity in the Libyan economy, since economic activity in other spheres was extremely limited. Therefore, we find that most of the population pursued the profession of farming and irrigation and relied on it as a main source of their income, in spite of their use of primitive methods in agricultural production activities and the paucity of water sources. Their production would meet the country's needs for agricultural production, and many agricultural commodities were exported, such as wheat, citrus, sheep and hides, until the early fifties.

"The discovery and export of oil in the sixties created great changes in the structure of the Libyan economy. This affected the role of the agriculture sector as a result of the migration of farmers to the cities and oil industry centers, where the job opportunities were great and

income relatively high in comparison with the income from agriculture. The great increase in per capita income, the increase in the number of foreign workers in the oil and other sectors, and the percentage rise in the population were all factors that led to a large increase in demand for various agricultural products and the failure of the agricultural sector to respond to all these needs, and that led to the deficit in the food balance.

"In light of these considerations, given agriculture's natural role in realizing the greatest level of self-sufficiency in food, and to create more balanced development in the various areas of the jamahiriya to fill the gap between supply and demand for agricultural goods... [as published] In spite of the tremendous sums which have been allocated since the early seventies to carry out agricultural and livestock development programs, which have included most areas of the great jamahiriya and made an effective contribution in raising the rate of self-sufficiency in agricultural commodities, Libya still remained deficient in covering local consumption in some foodstuffs such as grains and meat.

"Therefore there has been a search for sources of water in order to transform part of the barren land to irrigated land, to help modify the food balance. Since water sources on the coastal strip are limited, the quantity of rain is slight, and its distribution irregular, this region is in general facing low annual rainfall and also irregularity in its distribution, since the rate of rainfall in the areas proposed for exploitation of the waters of the great artificial river ranges from 100 to 200 mm a year, which is inadequate for stable production under dry-farming circumstances. Water requirements for agricultural purposes in accordance with the regional plan are estimated at 1 billion to 2.712 billion cubic meters. The soil in the desert areas is also different from that in the coastal region, since the soil of the desert areas is considered to be generally uniform, is not sandy and is normally poor in food elements, while the soil in the coastal areas proposed for exploitation of the great artificial river project is sandy to sandy-silty and argillaceous to argillaceous-silty.

"After technical studies were carried out by specialists, people decided on exploitation of the waters of the underground reservoir in the south. With the issuance of the general people's conference decree on execution of the great artificial river project at its session held on 3 July 1983, the first phase began in which water was transported from the south to the north, where the population concentration of consumer centers and new soil [as published] are located.

"On the basis of General People's Conference Decrees 161 for 1986, regarding the shift of subordination of the technical committee to prepare the means for exploiting the great artificial river project waters, and 684 for 1986, regarding the dissolution of this committee and its incorporation into the agency for the execution and

administration of the great artificial river project, the water exploitation department was founded and its tasks were defined as the following:

"1. Definition of the sites and area of the agricultural projects and performance of the necessary soil studies.

"2. Determination of the crop composition of these projects and the crop cycle in them.

"3. Determination of the appropriate irrigation system.

"4. Determination of the industries which will be based on the output of these projects.

"5. Preparation for the conclusion of contracts on execution of the various projects which must be carried out as part of the plan, the stages of execution of each project and supervision of their execution.

"In addition, the water will be transported from the Tazirbu and al-Sarir fields on the basis of the piping of 2 million cubic meters a day over a period of 250 days a year by natural flow to the Sirt and Benghazi areas. It is estimated that the distribution of this volume will be as follows:

"1. The volume of water whose transport is allocated is 700 million cubic meters per year.

"2. The volume of water which it is expected to be allocated to industrial and personal use is 60 million cubic meters a year.

"3. The volume of water anticipated for irrigation of the existing Jarif, Talal and al-Hunaywah watercourse projects is 10 million cubic meters a year.

"4. The volume of water it is expected will be allocated to the irrigation of new agricultural projects is 620 million cubic meters per year.

"The goal of the first phase of the great artificial river project is that of reclaiming and newly planting an area of approximately 65,000 hectares distributed among a number of productive projects extending from southwest Benghazi in the east to the Sirt area in the west. The area of irrigated land has been determined in accordance with the volume of water to be transported following the deduction of the minimum amount for industrial and personal use.

"In order to determine the sites of the projects, detailed soil studies have been carried out over an area of 121,000 hectares along the route. These include field and laboratory studies and soil classification. Maps and final reports have been prepared for most of them, and in the light of these studies comparisons have been made to determine the areas that can be exploited in accordance

with the volume of water it has been planned to transport, the proposed crop composition and water requirements. These are as follows:"

Site	Area Studied (hectares)	Area Proposed for Exploitation (hectares)
Southwest Benghazi	92,000	44,000
Bishr	8,000	3,000
Al-Nawfaliyah	3,000	2,000
Sirt	18,000	16,000
Total	121,000	65,000

A number of projects complementing the agricultural ones will also be established. The existing possibilities for investments in the area of agricultural industries have been surveyed, and the following was apparent:

From the survey it became apparent that the grain milling capacity available on the coastal strip can accommodate the production of the first stage projects. Therefore, the erection of any new grain mills has been ruled out.

**Slaughterhouses:** Through the survey, it became apparent that there is a need to establish integrated new slaughterhouses in the first stage projects to slaughter their output, provided that they be supplied with industrial units to benefit from meat and bone byproducts as animal fodder and treat hides with new methods in a manner conforming to the requisite specifications for leather industries, and provided that refrigerated storehouses be annexed to the slaughterhouses.

**Milk and Milk Product Plants:** In view of the nature of milk production and the difficulty of transporting it (since it is apparent from the survey that there are no dairy plants in the Sirt region and there is one dairy plant in the Benghazi area with a productive capacity of 110,000 liters a day, which is designed to accommodate existing projects in the region) it has been recommended that a plant for milk and milk products be established in the Sirt area along with another one, or that the existing plant in Benghazi be expanded, so that it can accommodate the projects' output.

**Fodder plants:** It was apparent that a total of 11 fodder plants are currently being erected in the jamahiriyyah; they are distributed among a number of municipalities, with an annual productive capacity of 1,545,600 tons. Of these, there are three plants close to the project sites, in Sirt, Benghazi and al-Abyar, and they are adequate to cover the expected output.

**Units for Drying Green Fodder and the Silage Industry:** The project requires the establishment of drying units as well as silage industry units in view of their absence in the exploitation areas.

With respect to the areas which will be irrigated in the winter and summer, the areas irrigated during the summer and winter seasons have been determined in accordance with a number of factors, including:

1. The volume of water available for irrigation during the two summer and winter agricultural seasons.
2. The proposed land areas which have been tabulated and classified in light of the soil studies.
3. The creation of balance between the volumes of water transported at constant rates and the uses of water in varying rates, with the objective of allocating the volume of agricultural reservoirs.
4. The development of an orientation within the society to produce basic foodstuffs and realize the highest rate of self-sufficiency.

On the basis of the aforementioned considerations, the crop composition studies have concentrated on basic crops in order to achieve the greatest degree of self-sufficiency, especially in wheat and fodder, which will be converted into meat and milk and milk products.

In addition, statistics show that wheat crop production comes to 422,000 tons, assuming that the great artificial river project in the first stage will proceed with the production of 1,600 [as published], while wheat requirements in the same period are expected to come to 760,000 tons. This production will bring about a self-sufficiency level of 57 percent. A number of studies have been carried out on the possibility of producing some other crops and their water requirements have been estimated, but they have been kept out of the crop composition for a number of considerations, one being that they are of a lower level of importance in comparison with the wheat and fodder crops. In addition, the private sector produces a proportionate amount of this; in fruit and vegetables for instance, a computer has been used to carry out a number of comparisons to arrive at the optimum crop composition, and it has been possible to determine this and recommend that it be put in general application in productive projects in accordance with the following ratios and areas:

#### Winter Season:

The crop area for this season comes to 56,000 hectares, broken down as follows:

1. Wheat represents 70 percent of the crop composition and an area of 29,000 hectares.
2. Egyptian clover represents 15 percent of the crop composition and an area of 8,500 hectares.
3. A mix of oats and mint (seasonal fodder) represents 15 percent of the crop composition and an area of 8,500 hectares.

Summer season: The crop area for this season comes to 25,000 hectares, broken down as follows:

1. The permanent Egyptian clover crop represents 15 percent of the crop composition and an area of 8,500 hectares.
2. Corn represents 20 percent of the crop composition and an area of 16,700 hectares.

The anticipated production in accordance with the recommended crop composition is as follows:

Crop	Total production (tons)
Wheat	175,000
Egyptian clover	209,000
Oat and mint mixture	42,000
Corn	83,000

Since livestock production projects in the first stage of exploitation of the great artificial river waters will complement plant production activities, they are aimed at converting the fodder which is produced, as well as the by-products of plant production, into livestock production units (meat and milk), in order to achieve the project's objective of increasing production and self-sufficiency in meat, milk and milk products. Through the studies which have been carried out to choose the livestock production pattern, and in the light of the anticipated volume of production from the projects to cover the livestock's concentrated and rough fodder requirements in accordance with the proposed crop composition, it has been possible to determine the type and quantity of livestock to be raised as follows:

Dairy cattle	15,000 head
Camels	5,000 head
Sheep	250,000 head

Settler farms will be established. The total proposed area for these settler farms will come to 8,400 hectares under permanent irrigation distributed among 1,400 6-hectare productive farms in Aswawah, al-Nawfaliyah, Bishr and al-Khadra'. These projects are aimed at providing fruit, vegetables and meat for the populations in Benghazi, Brega, Ras Lanuf and Sirt. They also have the goal of raising the standard of living of a number of families by providing an appropriate income and shifting part of the labor in the service sector to the agricultural production sector. The crop composition of each farm has been determined as follows:

- Egyptian clover, 2 hectares
- Wheat, 2 hectares
- Fruit trees, 1 hectare
- Vegetables, 1 hectare

Every farmer will raise a herd of sheep, consisting of 50 head, on the fodder produced in the farm, since the volume of the fodder produced in each farm is considered sufficient to cover the requirements of 70,000 head of sheep for concentrated and rough fodder.

This has been the result of our meeting with our brother the director of the department to exploit the water from the great artificial river project—a project which will transform the great jamahiriya into a new society and will move it to another stage on the road to progress and triumph over backwardness, so that the world may be persuaded that the Arab nation is the nation of civilization and glory and not the nation of hostility, and that it is the nation of struggle and not the nation of terror. It is the Arabs who built Iram of the pillars, whose likes have not been built in other lands; they are the Thamud who laid stones across the watercourse, that is, the historic Ma'rib dam; and they are the ones who today are building the great artificial river.

In concluding this investigation of ours, we would like to point out that the Arab nation is facing a real food crisis. This is an appeal to think of means for confronting and challenging this plan for the sake of building civilization, for the sake of living and survival and for the sake of the future whose interpretation we Arabs fear to confront, living in the present and leaving the future to come as it will, a day for people other than us and not for us. We must plan for our own future, carry out international studies on it and propose ways, means and strategies for the transformation.

What is desired regarding this future is that it be feasible. Some studies point out that no social, geographic, economic group whose population amounts to less than 100 or 150 million will be able to live and grow at the beginning of the 21st century in an independent manner, and this prompts us to unity, solidarity, an increase in the population of the Arab nation and the elimination of phenomena of birth control. We must double the amount of agricultural land and increase Arab agricultural output in order to eliminate subordination to the West, rely on ourselves, work to dominate all sources of energy, be they solar or nuclear, rather than relying on the energy from oil, which is considered limited; we must transform the water of the sea into water fit for drinking and farming so that the seas in the Arab region will be just like the rivers—that is, if we want to live in dignity under the sun and on the earth. As we are on the threshold of the 21st century, we have stated that the future is planting its seeds at the present time, and those who do not plant anything now must not expect a harvest at all.

### **Report Enumerates Development Projects in Tarhunah**

45040116 Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic  
13 Oct 88 p 4

[Text] Over a period of 19 years since the Great September Revolution, the Tarhunah region has witnessed

achievements and transformations in agriculture, industry, education, housing, and health. Before the revolution, this region was completely forgotten and contained only grass and arid desert.

Over the past years, transformation plans in this region have included the construction of many schools, institutes, and agricultural projects to overcome the desert and transform it into a green garden blessed with vegetation and growth, the paving of roads, the building of clinics, the establishment of factories, the construction of housing units, and concern for everything beneficial to the welfare of Libyan Arab people on this earth. A correspondent of JANA in Tarhunah wrote briefly about these achievements, as follows:

### **Sidi al-Sayd Agricultural Project**

The agricultural field is in the front rank of the huge achievements that have been realized at Tarhunah. A number of clear and conspicuous facts stand out, and these have made an enormous change that has drawn the attention of us all as people who used to be deprived of the benefit of the expanse of their land, which, in the past, was a thorny or barren wasteland—a desert that devoured every living thing.

But after the Great September Revolution of 1969, because of the continuous care that the revolution gave to the agricultural sector, enormous areas of wasteland were turned into a green garden bestowing blessing and yielding growth.

In a region about 20 km west of Tarhunah (average annual rainfall 200-270 mm, average summer temperature 33 degrees centigrade, average winter temperature 5 degrees centigrade), a huge agricultural project was established—the Sidi al-Sayd Agricultural Project. Joining a series of gigantic achievements that have been realized, it transformed vast areas of arid land into productive agricultural areas that provide their inhabitants with the means of a dignified life.

Work on this project began on 15 August 1973 with work to combat erosion. An area of 21,404 hectares was reclaimed, out of the project's total geographical area of 41,617 hectares (the project has 34,491 hectares of arable land).

After reclamation, this area was divided into 550 farms, which were distributed to citizens in accordance with Law 70/123 and its implementing regulation, which provided that a sanitary dwelling, a barn for raising animals, vehicle sheds, and an underground reservoir to collect rain water for drinking and irrigation should be included with each farm. Of the houses provided in the plan, 240 have been completed, while 310 are in various stages of implementation.

Nine deep covered wells were dug in the project to be used for watering trees and livestock and for drinking water for the farmers.

Along the outer perimeter, 739 km have been fenced to protect the farms from animals.

Two hundred and seventy-nine canopies to provide shade for sheep have been constructed, and 80 underground reservoirs with a capacity of 100 cubic meters have been implemented.

Since the beginning of the project, 981,141 fruit tree seedlings have been planted, along with 1,101,751 forest seedlings, and 1,433,209 windbreak seedlings.

The project has established a number of diversified courses for farmers—first, anti-illiteracy, and then guidance in sound methods of agriculture, such as pruning, fertilizing, grafting, and the use of insecticides to destroy agricultural pests. The farmers are also taught how to drive agricultural tractors.

The project has distributed 352 agricultural tractors, 270 water tanks (2,000 liter capacity), and 270 insect eradicators to the farmers in the project.

Under the project for self-sufficiency in livestock production, 6,907 sheep have been distributed to participants. The project has a barn for laying hens and another for chickens raised to be eaten, each holding 10,000 birds.

The project aims at creating a culturally and productively developed society. In this context, the al-Nahdah [Renaissance] Center for Rural Development was built. Opened in 1976, its purpose is to train the daughters and wives of farmers. More than 400 trainees have been graduated.

#### **Electricity in Tarhunah**

Electricity has been brought to most areas in Tarhunah. Seven hundred km of medium-tension (11 kilovolt) overhead lines have been constructed, along with 1,300 km of low-tension lines for homes, projects, schools, and hospitals.

A number of 220-kilovolt distribution stations have been built at Tarhunah, al-Khadra', al-Dawun, Suq al-Ahad, and Wishtan to supply projects, houses, and schools. Also, the Tripoli/al-Khums electricity net has been connected to Tarhunah to assure a constant electrical current without interruption. The 11-kilovolt underground cable network in the city of Tarhunah has been altered; new cables have been installed in all parts of the city, and 11-kilovolt distribution stations have been built to feed public utilities. Most of the low-voltage lines (220/380 volts) have been changed, so as to do away with the

presence of poles in the city. Work is underway to extend other electrical networks to link the distribution stations. Electrical lines are being constructed for schools and other utilities.

#### **Agriculture**

The Famm Mulghah cattle station, built on approximately 10 hectares and containing 450 dairy cows in 4 barns, along with a barn for bulls and 2 veterinary clinics, contributes to supplying some of the region's food requirements, such as milk and meat. Average daily milk production is 9,850 liters. The cows are milked mechanically, and the milk is collected in special coolers.

Work is under way to construct a pasteurization unit to provide for the pasteurized milk needs of the people of the region.

The station has a 50-hectare irrigated farm with a fixed irrigation network. It provides the green fodder used in feeding the cows. It has three deep wells, three reservoirs, a complete workshop, and a feed storehouse. There are about 55 workers at the station, including managers and technicians.

#### **Transportation**

The People's Transportation and Navigation Committee of Tarhunah says that before the 1969 Great September Revolution there were three roads at the level of Tarhunah and its subdivisions: one linking Tarhunah and Tripoli, one between Tarhunah and al-Khums, and one between Tarhunah and Bani Walid. Their width did not exceed approximately 3 meters. After the outbreak of the Great September Revolution, which took great interest in the transportation and navigation sector, many new modern roads were constructed linking the cities and villages of the Jamahiriyah, municipalities and their subdivisions, and agricultural projects. Roads crossed canyons, wadis, and mountains. Many roads were built at the level of the Tarhunah region and its agricultural projects and remote villages, measuring 5,952 km, at a total cost of approximately 54,893,310 Libyan dinars. The number of roads is 25.

#### **Post Office**

As part of the achievements of the Great September Revolution, four post office buildings were constructed: Central Tarhunah, Suq al-Ahad, Sidi al-Sayd, and al-Dawun.

Al-Dawun, al-Khadra', and Sidi al-Sayd have been provided with a 1,000-line exchange and have been connected with centimetric wave stations.



The 1,500-line Tarhunah exchange was built in 1986. Of the lines, 1,400 (the number of telephones) have been distributed. Lines have been distributed to citizens as follows: Tarhunah, 1,400 lines; al-Dawun, 160 lines; al-Khadra', 170 lines; and Suq al-Ahad, 20 lines.

The Great September 1st Revolution took a great interest in wire and wireless communications. Cities, villages, population centers, and neighborhoods have benefitted from telephone service. Tax bills are distributed every 3 months, so that each citizen benefitting from telephone service can pay each month according to the procedures, taking account of citizens' circumstances.

Future plans of the company include the construction of a 10,000-line exchange in Central Tarhunah, as well as a new (transit) station that will be linked with Sidi al-Sa'ih/Tripoli in order to benefit from the telephone channels.

#### Industry

The People's Committee for Industry in Tarhunah works to encourage the cooperative activity of individuals by simplifying administrative procedures for issuing industrial permits to individuals desiring to obtain them. Four hundred and twenty individual and cooperative permits for various activities have been issued.

Secondly, public-sector industrial projects are being expanded. Work is under way to implement a number of projects:

1. A shoe factory is being built on about 40,000 square meters of ground and is 90 percent complete. The factory's expected production capability is 112,500 pairs of shoes. It will employ 55 workers.

2. A pickle factory is being built on about 20,000 square meters of ground and is 50 percent complete. Its expected production capability is 3 tons an hour. It will employ 35 workers.

3. A factory to produce trousers for young people is being built on about 1,500 square meters of ground and is 90 percent complete. Its production capability is estimated as 300 pairs of trousers a day. It will employ 150 women workers.

4. A men's shirt factory is being built on 1,000 square meters of ground and is 60 percent complete. Its production capability will be 450 shirts a day. It will employ 180 women workers.

#### Statistics Show Poultry, Cattle Production Increase

45040113 Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic  
2 Nov 88 p 5

[Text] The Great 1st of September Revolution wants Libyan Arab society to turn from a consumer society into a productive society. It wants to use every grain of sand suited for production and yield. Huge industrial citadels have therefore been established in every municipality of the Great Jamahiriyah. Productive farms have been established to provide food locally and not to rely on overseas, thus making a reality of the saying, "There is no freedom for a people that eats from beyond its borders." In the field of agriculture and production, the September Revolution has established many productive projects whose products are now in markets and marketing centers. One of these projects is the Tawurgha Poultry and Cattle Production Complex.

#### Site and Climate

The complex is located opposite the Tripoli-Banghazi coast road, about 35 km south of the city of Misratah.

It is 26 km from the sea, and is located at 32 degrees north latitude, and 15 degrees east longitude.

The climate of the project area is marked by dryness and large temperature variations. The region is subject to weather influences from the Mediterranean Sea and the desert. In winter, the temperature sometimes drops to the freezing point. In summer, the temperature is high, not to mention the hot, dry, dusty desert winds that blow from southeast to southwest, causing the temperature to rise from 15 to 20 centigrade degrees within a few hours.

#### Goals

To complete implementation of the goals of the Plan for Economic Transformation, realize self-sufficiency and maximum food production, and dispense with importation, the complex was established for the following reasons: 1) utilization of natural resources, especially water; 2) exploitation of technology and science; 3) encouragement of individuals (men and women) to participate in production; and 4) contribution of approximately 18 kg of white meat to the diet of each Libyan citizen a year.

The complex is composed of two principal divisions: 1) the poultry plant; and 2) the cattle plant.

#### I. Poultry Plants

The poultry division contains a total of 146 runs, each with full mechanical facilities for feeding, drinking, light, ventilation, and humidifying of the air. To make monitoring and operation easier, all of these things are controlled by a control panel connected to a warning apparatus. One person is sufficient to operate a run big enough for 4,000 to 10,000 chickens.

Taken together, these runs form 20 integrated farms. In addition to runs, the farms have a social building for the farm administration consisting of a rest house and stores for the farm workers. There is also a reserve power plant to deal with any interruption of electrical current.

The complex imports day-old first-generation chicks at the rate of 4,400 day-old first-generation chicks. These chicks are raised in farms for first-generation chicks. The complex contains two farms for first-generation chicks to produce the eggs needed to hatch day-old second-generation chicks. It has a capacity of about 502,200 fertile eggs per farm a year.

#### **Chick Hatchery**

The complex contains a chick hatchery with a capacity of approximately 7,862,400 eggs a year. The hatchery receives the eggs and sorts them. Fertile eggs are transferred to incubators and then to (hatchers), to produce the chicks. The chicken-raising farms are supplied with approximately 6,000,000 chicks a year.

Surplus eggs are marketed to citizens. Eggs from the sorting process are sold as table eggs, according to their condition.

#### **Automated Slaughterhouse**

The complex includes an automated slaughterhouse. The chickens are taken in regular batches to the automated slaughterhouse, which has a capacity of 21,000 chickens a day (about 3000 birds an hour), to be slaughtered, bagged, frozen, and packed in boxes containing 10 birds weighing between 1.2 and 1.6 kg. The slaughterhouse has freezers (minus 25 degrees centigrade) for preserving the product.

The discarded chicken viscera, blood, and feathers are cooked and turned into protein, which is taken to the feed factory to be used as a primary material for making cattle feed.

Since cleaning the slaughterhouse consumes large amounts of water, a plant was constructed to treat the water from it and convert it into water that can be used for irrigation.

#### **II. Cattle Plant**

The goal is to produce:

- (1) 2,270 tons of raw milk; and
- (2) 127 tons of veal.

To achieve this, about 600 dairy cows are raised. To shelter them and their facilities, the following buildings were constructed:

- (1) six 100-cow barns, each with a cleaning and drain system;
- (2) one open barn for dry and pregnant cows, with cages for calves;
- (3) two barns for calves;
- (4) a barn for new-born calves;
- (5) an open barn for calves;
- (6) a closed barn for calf boxes;
- (7) a calving barn;
- (8) a quarantine barn;
- (9) a sick-ward barn;
- (10) silos for concentrated feed.

#### **Automated Dairy**

The plant contains a 48-cow automated milking barn of the most modern type. After being extracted, the milk is cooled to 4 degrees centigrade and pumped through pipes directly to the dairy products factory.

#### **Dairy Products Factory**

Associated with the plant there is a dairy products factory with a production capability of 120,000 liters a day of pasteurized milk and yoghurt (regular and fruit).

Attached to the factory is a cold storeroom to keep the production of dairy products.

#### **Field for Producing Coarse Fodder**

The herd is fed on coarse fodder from the complex's 250-hectare farm. Modern motorized equipment is used to plant and harvest, and the farm is watered by an advanced irrigation system. To store the fodder and repair the motorized equipment, fodder storehouses and a workshop for motorized farm equipment have been built.

The plant contains buildings for administration and a rest house for workers, in addition to a reserve electricity generating plant.

#### **III. Service Units**

The following service units are attached to the complex:

- (1) a 20-ton an hour feed factory (total annual capacity 30,000 tons), producing concentrated feeds needed for poultry and cattle;
- (2) an administration building, central repair shop, and fuel station;
- (3) a training building and laboratories;
- (4) a residence village to house the management team (45 family residences, 64 bachelor rooms, and other services);
- (5) a 2,000 cubic meters-per-day water desalinization plant to provide water for drinking and for boilers in the various factories.

#### **Production**

The management of the complex began its production plan at the beginning of November 1983, adopting a policy of maximum food production. Men and women (women number 30 percent) worked together to make the complex and various distribution centers a reality. The following quantities have been produced:

**First Year—1984**

	Unit	Goal According to 5-Year Plan	Adjusted Yearly Goal	Achieved
1. Pasteurized milk	tons	—	—	561
2. Natural yoghurt	tons	—	—	66
3. Table eggs	eggs	—	—	3,500

**Second Year—1985**

	Unit	Goal According to 5-Year Plan	Adjusted Yearly Goal	Achieved
1. Pasteurized milk	tons	1,560	3,415	4,177
2. Poultry meat	tons	3,090	4,036	4,204
3. Veal	tons	12	40	96
4. Table eggs	eggs	—	243,100	2,338,900
5. Natural yoghurt	tons	—	107	235
6. Fruit yoghurt	tons	—	107	221
7. Day-old chicks	chicks	—	643,850	676,945

**Third Year—1986**

	Unit	Goal According to 5-Year Plan	Adjusted Yearly Goal	Achieved
1. Pasteurized milk	tons	2,241	3,200	4687
2. Poultry meat	tons	6,016	7,700	7,727
3. Beef	tons	80	135	265
4. Table eggs	eggs	—	1,000,000	1,605,580
5. Hatching eggs	eggs	—	1,000,000	721,540
6. Natural yoghurt	tons	—	225	326
7. Fruit yoghurt	tons	—	580	393
8. Day-old chicks	chicks	—	990,000	1,005,951
9. Rejected birds	birds	—	65,000	35,590

**Fourth Year—1987**

	Unit	Goal According to 5-Year Plan	Adjusted Yearly Goal	Achieved
1. Pasteurized milk	tons	2,270	4,666	5,053
2. Poultry meat	tons	6,600	7,850	8,010
3. Veal	tons	123	160	172
4. Table eggs	eggs	—	1,054,000	1,547,710
5. Hatching eggs	eggs	—	821,000	642,260
6. Natural yoghurt	tons	—	345	133
7. Fruit yoghurt	tons	—	696	676
8. Day-old chicks	chicks	—	970,000	581,545
9. Rejected birds	birds	—	12,000	14,688

**SAUDI ARABIA**

**New Power Plant To Become Operational**  
44000192 Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English  
24 Nov 88 p 3

[Article by Sa'id Haydar]

[Text] Dammam, Nov 23—The test run of the first unit of the Qurayah power plant off Buqayq has proved

successful and now the first phase of the plant, which will generate 1200 megawatts of electricity, is expected to become formally operational next February, according to an official of the Saudi Consolidated Electric Company of the Eastern Province.

The official disclosed that work is already in progress on the second phase of the plant which will be completed in

three years' time. The SCECO (East) signed a contract recently with Mitsubishi of Japan for the project. The second phase also as a capacity to generate 1200 megawatt of electricity.

SCECO officials do not rule out the possibility of expansion beyond the two planned phases. There are already provisions in the design for adding more units in future. The project was planned in 1981 and work started in 1985 with the signing of the contract for the construction of the first phase.

Qurayah power plant was essentially planned to meet the power requirements of the Central Province. According to SCECO officials, most of the power generated through the plant will be transferred to Riyadh. The project will transfer 1,700 megawatts of electricity to the Central Province, the officials said.

For the transfer of power from SCECO-East to the Central Province, a 311-km double circuit 380-KV overhead line from Shadqam to Riyadh and a 230/380-KV, 1,500 MVA substation at Shadqam have already been added to the network. The company also completed construction of the second 265-km 380-KV double circuit line from Faris to Al-Kharj (Riyadh area) along with the second 230/380-KVA, 1,500 MVA substation at Faris.

The prestigious power plant is coming up near the seashore in Qurayah off Buqayq. The reason for constructing the plant in such a far-flung area, according to Industry and electricity Minister 'Abd-al'Aziz al-Zamil, was that since the plant required constant cooling, it was essential to build it on the seashore.

Transportation of heavy equipment on the site was a herculean job for those working at the plant. King Fahd Causeway, which is a boon for millions of people, was in the way of the shipments arriving from the Far East. Plant workers had to adopt a novel method to cross the bridge. The vessels, after nearing the bridge, had to be vacated except for essential crew and machinery. It was then filled with water so that the ship will 'sink' enough to cross the bridge. After the crossing the water was again emptied. On the site too the movement of turbines was a difficult task. Turbines from the ships were carried on specially built trucks to the place of installation.

Apart from the plant, the SCECO-East has also built a massive housing complex for its employees. The complex, which is already completed is equipped with all modern facilities and is self-sufficient.

#### Statistics for Wheat-Processing Facilities Described

44000202 Jeddah ARAB NEWS in English  
27 Nov 88 p 11

[Article: "GSFMO Plays Crucial Role in Development"]

[Text] Jeddah—The Grain Silos and Flour Mills Organization (GSFMO) was established in February 1972 and has since then been playing a key role in the

agricultural development especially with regard to receiving, storing, treating and marketing wheat in and outside the country.

Five objectives were set for the organization to perform. They were:

- To form an integral industry of grain storage, flour production and processing of animal feed.
- To establish any other relevant nutritious industries.
- To market its products inside and outside the Kingdom.
- To purchase grains and create a convenient reserve stock to face emergency circumstances.
- To meet the goals of the approved agricultural policy.

The organization started operating its first projects in 1973 with silos of 800,000 tons capacity each in Riyadh and Dammam. Today it has about 2,000 operating silos with a combined capacity of 2,380,000 tons while work was progressing on 400 additional silos in Wadi al-Dawasir and al-Kharj to further increase its storage capacity.

Of these operating silos, 535 are in Riyadh with a total capacity of 535,000 metric tons, 120 in Jeddah with a capacity of 120,000 metric tons, 80 in Dammam (capacity 80,000 metric tons), 485 in Qasim (capacity 485,000 tons), 40 in Khamis Mushayt (capacity 40,000 tons), 20 in al-Jawf (capacity 20,000 tons), 300 in Ha'il (capacity 300,000 tons), 300 operating and 200 under progress in Wadi al-Dawasir (500,000 tons), 100 in Tabuk (capacity 100,000) and 200 under progress in al-Kharj with a combined capacity of 200,000 metric tons.

The production capacity of the organization's flour mills have likewise tremendously increased. The current output capacity per 24 hours reached 960 tons in Riyadh, 1,800 tons in Jeddah, 990 tons in Dammam, 750 tons in the Qasim and 900 tons in Khamis Mushayt, accounting for a total of 5,400 tons per day.

GSFMO sales of flour and its by-products have constantly increased, reflecting the extent of acceptance and promotion in the markets due to the high standards of such products and their distinct quality.

The number of its 45-kg flour bags increased from 11,844,916 in 1983 to 170,061,668 in 1987. During the same period its one-ton bulk bagged flour rose from 20,674 to 25,645, the 20-kg flour for home bags from 111,402 to 525,549, the 40-kg bran bags from 2,409,045 to 4,238,248 and the 50-kg feed bags from 1,647,373 to 3,663,242.

The organization's products fall into two main categories, namely flour (principal, types (flour 75 percent extraction, flour 95 percent extraction, Semolina, Jarish Harish...etc) and feeds (the concentrates include more than 20 types for different animals and uses (broiler grower, layeration, concentrates for cows, broiler layer breeder and livestock feed).

GSFMO also produces bran for livestock which is used as a cheap alternative compared to other feeds specially in dry seasons. It is also producing a new kind of bran for human use for its manifold benefits.

Within the framework to its comprehensive strategy, GSFMO has established integrated factories for animal feeds which have greatly increased their capacity during the past decade. The current production capacity of its feed factories per eight hours (single working shift) has amounted to 217 tons each in Riyadh, Jeddah and Dammam, 259 tons in Qasim and 259 tons in Khamis Mushayt accounting for a total of 1,169 tons for every eight-hour working shift.

In addition to the abundant production of bran which is a strong support to the Bedounis specially at times of drought and rain shortfall, the organization produces more than 20 types of feeds and concentrates to feed livestock, poultry and other animals.

On Dec. 6, 1985, GSFMO's board of directors decided to export surplus wheat abroad. Total exports during 1986 and 1987 crop years amounted to 1.5 million tons. On Oct. 1, 1986 a royal decree was issued banning the import of wheat and flour as the Kingdom has reached self-sufficiency in these products.

The organization has satisfactorily achieved the goals set for it as the very beginning of its establishment. However it is continuing its strenuous efforts to achieve more gains within the country's drive to become one of the major wheat exporters in the world.

### **New High Technology Projects To Be Implemented**

44000223 Doha GULF TIMES in English  
1 Dec 88 p 22

[Text] A SR 460mn aircraft modification centre, now being implemented at Riyadh's King Khalid International Airport, is expected to become operational by the first half of 1990 and produce about 8.4mn man/hours worth of aircraft maintenance and modification in the first 10 years of operation.

A source of the National Industrialisation Company (NIC) said the project will promote different income sources to the kingdom and create jobs in high technology.

The project's activities include maintenance and renovation of aircraft, transfer of modern modification technologies and development of manpower in aircraft modification, he said.

NIC holds 10 percent of shares in the project, which will have 1,137 employees (at maximum capacity). Its other shareholders are the Saudi Arabian airlines (Sa'udiyah), Saudi Advances Industrial Technology Company and Boeing Industrial Technology Group (BITG).

On completion, the project will have a market in Saudi Arabia and some other Arab countries.

Besides this, NIC holds shares in nine other ventures, all set to be operational by the end of 1989 or 1990, and has markets in Saudi Arabia, other GCC states and some Arab states.

The National Glass Industries Company (Zujaj), involving a capital investment of SR180 (NIC share 30 percent) will be operational in 1990 in Riyadh with a production capacity of 50,000 tons of returnable and disposable glass bottles for soft drinks.

The project, with an expected manpower of 200 employees, involves technical participation of an internationally famous French company.

The SR 262mn National Wire Products company (ASLAK), expected to become operational in early 1990 at al-Jubayl industrial city, will have an annual production capacity of 33,200 tons of specialised steel wires and related wire products as well as special fasteners such as hardened nails, staples, bolts and nuts, etc.

The Riyadh-based National Furniture Manufacturing Co Ltd (Athath) with a total investment of SR 35mn and paid up capital of SR 12mn, is expected to go on stream in the first half of 1989, with an annual production capacity of 4,000 bed room sets, 4,000 sitting room sets, 4,000 dining room sets, and 4,000 office furniture sets. With its 237 employees, it will produce wooden and metal furniture for use in housing, offices, hospitals, etc. in Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries.

The Saudi Pharmaceutical Industries and Medical Appliances Corporation (DAWA), a joint stock company with an authorised capital of SR 300mn, in Qasim will go on stream in the first half of 1990.

The company envisages to undertake all kinds of activities in manufacturing, marketing, and promotion of medical raw materials, intermediates, finished medicines and medical appliances and equipment.

The first phase of the Advanced Electronics Company's project at King Khalid airport is expected to become operational by this year end. The project with invest-

ment of SR 383mn and 1,934 employees, will have a production capacity of 3,245 units of tactical radios and 2.1mn man-hours of electronics test and repair services.

The Riyadh-based Saudi Advanced Industrial Technology Company, established in November 1987, with an authorised capital of SR 108mn, is expected to boost further its activities in coming years to help facilitate transfer of advances industrial technology to Saudi Arabia through the off-set programme and enlarge the Kingdom's export base through exports of industrial products.

The Yanbu'-based SR 480mn National Titanium Dioxide Company, expected to be operational in 1990, will have an annual production capacity of 45,000 tons of titanium Dioxide, a white pigment used in manufacture of paints, synthetic fibres and plastic products.

## SUDAN

### **SPLA Chief of Staff Seeks Cairo's Intervention in Peace Process**

45000087 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic  
17 Jan 89 p 8

[Text] AL-MAJALLAH has learned that Colonel Yusuf Kuwah, SPLA chief of staff, has informed President Husni Mubarak of the results of the neighborly contacts with Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's government regarding a peace settlement in Sudan.

Cairo had invited Col Kuwah for consultations. He spent a week there making contacts with a number of Egyptian officials.

Kuwah implored Cairo for swift intervention to rescue the peace process in southern Sudan before a state of frustration and despair leads the members of the front to once again cause the situation to explode.

Kuwah placed the responsibility on Al-Mahdi for the failure of the peace effort, as the Cabinet did not sign the agreement that was reached in Addis Ababa between Garang and Muhammad Mirghani. He asked Egypt to continue its efforts for peace.

## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

### **Military Reportedly To Boost Ties With Italy**

44000178 Dubayy GULF NEWS in English  
24 Nov 88 p 4

[Text] Abu Dhabi—Italy and the UAE have decided to prepare a framework of agreement to establish their priorities for a defence co-operation.

This was revealed by Italian Defense Minister Valerio Zanone at the end of a two-day visit to the UAE.

He told the press yesterday that this co-operation could involve the use by the UAE of advanced Italian technology and the staging of joint military exercises and preparation in the areas of naval, helicopter and land training.

Zanone ended his visit with a symbolic and ceremonious tour of the Italian frigate, Euro, where he congratulated the sailors for admirably completing their three-month-long mission in the Gulf.

He told them the mission, which had started off by being controversial and acceptable to many Italians, had been governed by a "coherent line of rules and purposes."

In addition, the mission had succeeded in providing valuable experience for the Western European Union (WEU) nations "in one of the most difficult areas of the world."

"It showed that we finally helped achieve a truce and the opening of negotiations by showing interest for peaceful initiative and concrete action," said Zanone.

He told the sailors that their discipline on board and on land will help enhance relations with this part of the world "which is destined to great developments in the future."

Earlier, speaking to the press Zanone said Italy's involvement in the region ends with the return this week of two frigates, Sagittario and Stromboli from Dubai, and by the end of this year, the return of the remaining frigate Euro and the two minehunters, Loto and Castagno.

The two minehunters will remain for another month accompanied by the supply frigate Euro to assist in the combined WEU efforts to comb out remaining mines from Gulf international waters.

Zanone said Italy has ended its mission of escorting Italian merchant ships and contributing to "the vigilance on international routes."

Asked if there are any threats of an Iran-Iraq military flare-up, he said the experience accumulated by the Italian forces will be valuable in case of any future breakouts.

"This mission has shown the effectiveness of the Italian navy and its capabilities in peacekeeping forces outside the Mediterranean."

He added that there is a sensible reduction of the threat of Iran and Iraq going back on their ceasefire.

"Of course, it is difficult to foresee the future but I believe that it is possible to evaluate that the danger is sufficiently decreased."

Zanone said Italy is still participating in the UN peace-keeping forces as it has 15 officers engaged as observers.

## AFGHANISTAN

### Facts, Figures on Islamisation

46000039b Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English  
21 Oct 88 p 1

[Text]—To date, 166,589,078 Afs have been distributed to ulema and clergymen as cash assistance.

—As many as 256 mosques have been newly built during the post revolution years.

—1,259 mosques and takias have been whitewashed and repaired.

—There are a total number of 43,253 mosques in our country.

—About 59,273,870 and 9,119,000 Afs have been given as subsidy to Haj and Karbala pilgrims during the same period.

—To serve the sacred religion of Islam, repairing and building of mosques and takias and sacred places, the popular government of Afghanistan has carried out tangible work in the country.

To protect and maintain religious rites and assist the ulema and clergymen the government of the Republic of Afghanistan has spent over three billion Afs. Such expenditure was never incurred during 50 years before the revolution.

### Solar Energy Unit Commissioned

46000039c Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English  
4 Nov 88 p 4

[Text] Kabul, Nov 3, (BIA)—The solar Energy System of the construction Department of the Ministry of Water and Power was commissioned yesterday by Raz Mohammad Paktin Minister of Water and Power.

The unit can heat 1,200 liters of water per day up to 84 degree centigrade. It also has a storage tank 1000 liters.

The Solar Energy System which costs 1,38 million Afs will operate for 20 years.

### First Aid Clinic Inaugurated

46000039a Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English  
20 Oct 88 p 4

[Text] Kabul, Oct 18, (BIA)—To hail the special week of the Red Crescent Society week, a first aid clinic in Qalai Fathullah area of Kabul city was inaugurated yesterday morning by the Secretary General of the Afghan Red Crescent Society and a representative of the residents.

The clinic was built on an area of 1800 square meters costing six million Afs, twenty percent of which has been financed from the state budget and the remaining 80 percent from the society's developmental budget.

Present at the inaugural ceremony of the clinic were Secretary General of the Afghan Red Crescent Society, representative of the International Committee of Red Cross ICRC and a number of Qalai Fathullah inhabitants.

### Commentary Dismisses Mine Threat as Propaganda

46000038 Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English  
2 Nov 88 pp 1, 2

[Text] Information imperialism and the U.S. Pakistani backed extremists lose gradually their stand in the field of propaganda. What they said or say is proved wrong in action. Even what they say today they stand against it next day. The legends [as printed] of danger to Islam, non-existence of freedom and democracy in Afghanistan and finally the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet troops have all been disproved. For the people of Afghanistan and the world public found in practice that all these issues are nothing but lie and fabrications and employed to confuse the public. [sentence as published] To survive, the propaganda machinery of imperialism needs raw materials. Otherwise, apart from losing their propagating stand, they will lose gigantic sum which go to the credit of the organizer of propaganda campaign, thus the mammoth western mass media and its regional accomplices nowadays disseminate the monotonous news of mines. [sentence as published] They fill dozens of pages of newspapers with this legendry [as printed] and allocate radio-TV programmes for this purpose.

With the start of the return home of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan and ridiculous myth of the occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet troops lost its significance. Without missing the time, they immediately picked up pens and wrote about the remaining mines planted according to them in some regions following their leaving from the areas.

At the same time the commanders of the limited Soviet military contingent declared that they have cleaned the mines which they had planted around their military establishments, and put their maps at the disposal of Afghan authorities. The mines as western mass media claim have not been placed as fall leaves everywhere. The areas where the mines were planted are fixed and known to all. Because an advanced army which is the conquerer [as printed] of the Second World War would never resort to such act.

The responsibility of defusing of some mines which have been planted without map by U.S.-Pakistani backed extremists will rest on U.S. and Pakistani patrons of the extremists. The mines placed around some military headquarters by Afghan armed forces are according to a

plan and would cause no problem in the future. Having no material for propaganda, the western mass media are compelled to narrate, the same story i.e. the story of mines. What lies behind all these hues and cries? Our noble people who are now living in alien countries due to false propaganda of the enemy opened their ways to return home. It cause that the enemies of Afghanistan lose their reserved forces for continuation of war and bloodshed in Afghanistan. [sentence as published] To prevent their return home, they have resorted to different means and created obstacles. As we stated earlier, they have now no pretext such as Islam is in danger in Afghanistan, non-existence of freedom and democracy etc. They have to speak of mine plantation in Afghanistan and by doing so they create panic among the Afghan refugees not to return home. Time and action proved that no false propaganda can hinder the return home of Afghan emigrants. The leaders of the U.S.-Pakistan backed extremists based in Peshawar attempt to resort to force to prevent the return of Afghan refugees.

Apart from punishing those emigrants who want to come back home, they have fixed barbed wires around refugees camps. Pakistani militia in collaboration with intransigent extremists sentence to jail those refugees who do not join them in subversive activities. No hinderance [as printed] and panic can prevent the return home of our countrymen who naturally love their country and homeland. As other stories, the myth of mines will also lose its significance for no lie can hold ground.

## INDIA

**Indo-Nepal Relationship Discussed**  
46240008 New Delhi DINMAN in Hindi  
31 Oct 88 pp 72-73

[Article by Kamasheesh: "Danger Knocks"]

[Text] King Mahendra of Nepal had announced: "There is no Himalaya between Nepal and India" and "Chinese communism will not enter the Indian subcontinent by travelling on the Kathmandu-Kodari national highway." The Nepalese emperor had made these 'restrained' and 'self-confident' statements in the early 1960's in response to Indian concerns about the strains in the Indo-Nepalese relationship, and Nepal's strengthening of ties with China. King Mahendra had just suspended the first elected parliament of Nepal with the help of the armed forces and had jailed the whole cabinet along with Vishveshwara Prasad Koirala, the first elected prime minister of Nepal. He had also banned all political parties and had taken over the reigns of the country under the emergency clause of the constitution. Nepal's Congress party had strongly opposed this action and the royal Gurkha family, which had just freed itself from the 104 years of Rana despotism, was again in trouble. Even Nehru, then India's prime minister, did not like this action. Ever dedicated to democracy, Nehru had told the Indian Parliament, "An infant democracy has been murdered in Nepal."

China had taken in its clutches, the peace-loving, helpless Buddhist country of Tibet on Nepal's northern border. China had attacked India and occupied thousands of square miles of Indian territory. People in India were scared of another Chinese attack and news of Chinese atrocities in Tibet and the Chinese Cultural Revolution were making headlines all over the world. At that time, Nepal had opened its northern door to China by permitting it to build the Kathmandu-Kodari highway between Lhasa and Kathmandu. India had opened its own northern border to Nepal by building the Tribhuvan highway only a few years earlier. Therefore, it was natural for India to become worried when Nepal opened its own northern door to China.

Those two 'restrained' and 'self-confident' statements made by King Mahendra during that period when there was so much unrest in the border area appear very meaningless today. During the last 27 years of Nepal's 'non-party Panchayat system of government,' India has helped it with billions of rupees that were earned by the blood and sweat of poor Indians. Still, Nepal has never promised to help with India's defense. Instead, India keeps hearing danger knocking on its northern frontier.

In this context, an incident last 6 September appears to be related. Dr Balram Jakhar, speaker of Indian parliament, was on a 4-day tour of Nepal on the invitation of Navuraj Subedi, speaker of Nepal's Rashtriya Panchayat, i.e. national assembly. Dr Jakhar was greeted with slogans like 'down with Indian expansionism' and 'death to Indian brokers' when he entered the National Assembly. Dr Jakhar was to witness the National Assembly proceedings for 1 hour, however, he was hurt with this kind of 'welcome' and left within 10 minutes of his arrival.

This 10-minute period was like hell. Umesh Jung Thapa, member of the National Assembly from Morang District, raised objectionable anti-India slogans, and the majority of the assembly members expressed anger at India's delay in accepting the 'Nepal Zone of Peace' proposal made by King Birendra. During these few minutes, many assembly members demanded the nullification of the 1950 Indo-Nepalese treaty which has several clauses regarding mutual Indo-Nepal defense. As a result of this bedlam, India's ambassador Arvind Ramchandra Dev, Lok Sabha secretary-general Dr Subhash Kashyap, and the rest of the Indian delegation walked out. Dr Jakhar's trip to Pokhara scheduled for the next day was also cancelled due to the "unexpected Himalayan weather."

Surya Bahadur Thapa, former Nepalese prime minister and a member of the national assembly, expressed strong disapproval to Umesh Jung Thapa's objectionable behavior. He blamed the government and the speaker of the national assembly for such disgraceful behavior. He said that the unsavory characters that the government had reared had now turned on the government itself.



The speaker of the national assembly later suspended Umesh Jung Thapa for 15 days. He said that the majority of the national assembly members called this incident unfortunate and considered it embarrassing for the country. However, the way things happened, one wonders if the whole drama was not rehearsed.

Umesh Jung Thapa is from Morang district which adjoins Purnia district's Joghani area. The district headquarters is located in Viratnagar, a prominent industrial town. He had opposed the 'unfair salary increases for government employees' and had made headlines in privately-owned local newspapers by going on a fast unto death opposition to the nonparty administrative system. Mr Thapa is considered one of the closest allies of prime minister Marich Man Singh Shrestha and is known to have refused to sign a no-confidence motion against the prime minister and his cabinet. It is important to note that, the prime minister had left the House just before Mr Thapa had started his slogans in that meeting. It is difficult to believe that the whole affair was not pre-planned since several offending members had brought up anti-India resolutions within the short period of 10 minutes. The weekly SAPTAHIK VIMARSH declared that "Umesh Jung Thapa's actions are not his but Prime Minister Shrestha's well-planned strategy." The cat was out of the bag! Was this the only time available for the enlightened national assembly members to discuss Indo-Nepalese affairs? Did they have to discuss this in front of the invited guest? Were these discussions necessary since these members had already expressed their anger on these issues during discussion over the foreign ministry? According to SAPTAHIK VIMARSH, "Since the proposal to declare Nepal a zone of peace has been approved by 97 countries but has not been accepted by India for the last 14 years, perhaps Prime Minister Marich Man Singh was expressing his resentment by insulting the speaker of India's Lok Sabha."

Navaraj Subedi, deputy speaker of the national assembly, and several other assembly members called Umesh Jung Thapa crazy in an Indian embassy reception in order to put salve on the hurt feelings. Still, people kept asking, "Was a crazy person responsible for these slogans?" Nobody can deny the fact that Thapa is one of those fortunate persons whom only recently King Birendra granted an audience. Only selected people are bestowed with the honor of 'Darshan,' i.e., a personal audience with the King. What is more? It is funny thing that an assembly member who is professedly pro-India observed a one-day token hunger strike in his room in support of Thapa! So how can we call Thapa crazy?

In Nepal Krishna Prasad Bhattarai, chairman of [illegible] expressed strong resentment to the treatment given to Dr Jakhar and called it unfortunate. At the same time, Nepal's democratic elements expressed great surprise and hurt at Jakhar's visit to the national assembly. This was the first time in 27 years that an important official from a democratic power like India had had the opportunity to observe Nepal's nonparty 'national assembly.'

Even though he was just a visitor, the democratic forces in Kathmandu were shocked. They wondered why Dr Jakhar had visited the national assembly while Nilam Sanjiv Reddy and Gurudaval Singh Dhillon, previous speakers of Lok Sabha, had not visited the national assembly during their respective trips to Nepal. The local democratic forces were assured by the activities of India's previous 'speakers' that, India, and China as well, had not recognized Nepal's national assembly under a nonparty 'Panchayat' system, as a 'center for democratic experimentation.'

This is not the first incident of improper treatment of visiting Indian leaders. Government newspapers had published objectionable pictures during former Indian president Dr Zakir Hussain's visit to Nepal. Former President V.V. Giri was ready to leave a very important international reception because of some insulting behavior toward him. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had also to suffer insult at a royal dinner where the host did not attend. Even a popular leader like Jay Prakash Narain was 'welcomed' with insulting slogans while being driven from the airport to the capital.

The selfconfident statements made by the former Nepalese King Mahendra concerning the India-Nepal defense pact appear meaningless during his successor's rule. The Kathmandu-Kodari highway, which until now has not been used for introducing Chinese communism, is being used for bringing Chinese weapons in large quantity to Nepal. It is said that these weapons include anti-aircraft guns and missiles. These weapons were openly paraded in the capital. We cannot say with certainty that these weapons, brought under the supervision of over 1,000 Chinese military officers, have not already arrived in the military barracks in towns like Manebhajang, Viratnagar, Makauli (Jaleswar) and Birganj on the Indian border. We wonder what is going on when we see military trucks with Chinese registration numbers running around in the Terai region on India border. Why all these preparations?

All this is not unexpected. Nepal's prime minister Kirtinidhi Bisht visited China for ten days in 1971-72. Chinese leaders had assured him in receptions arranged in Beijing and other cities that "China's 630 million people are ready to help Nepal against any outside attack." Bisht had never objected to this assurance. Yet an Indian reporter had asked him on his arrival at Tribhuvan airport, "Is there a possibility of a foreign attack on Nepal?" Mr Bisht had turned red with anger and had biting replied, "No." It was obvious that the Chinese leaders were talking about India and Bisht, known to be very pro-Chinese, was being stirred up against India. Now that Chinese weapons are arriving in Nepal, cannot we say that China has kept its promise? Meanwhile, Indian diplomats stationed in Kathmandu and our government in New Delhi have not expressed any concern.

Several legislators in Sitamarhi district of Bihar; other leaders belonging to Congress (I), Communist, Lokdal, and Janata parties; heads of Panchayats and independence veterans had demanded of the prime minister and the foreign minister in a memorandum that Chinese military activities be closely watched along the Indo-Nepalese boarder in Bengal, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh and that the border should be controlled by the central government in order to strengthen defense positionss. In this memorandum, they had pointed out that Kodari-Sindhul-Janakpur road, also known as Janakpur highway, was dangerous to India's security. They had also expressed apprehension about Sursand, a village in Sitamarhi district on the Janakpurdham-Mitthamor road, becoming the point for Chinese entry. This appeal also expressed concern about the construction of three dozen [Chinese] military encampments and a dozen airstrips within five kilometers of India border. The Indian government, however, turned a deaf ear toward this appeal and 830 kilometer long Indian border adjoining Nepal is still unprotected.

#### **Farmers on Warpath**

46240010 New Delhi DINMAN in Hindi  
15 Nov 88 pp 19-21

[Text] Residents of the capital, habituated to sit-ins and rallies at the Boat Club, had never witnessed such a crowd. Thousands of farmers who had come for a day's rally under leadership of their leader, Mohinder Singh Tiket, had camped there. Most of the farmers had come from Uttar Pradesh, while a few came from Haryana and Punjab.

The patience with which the farmers waited for their leader from 10 in the morning to 5 in the evening on the day of the rally, 25 October, did not tire for 1 whole week. They agreed to Chaudhury Tiket's idea of spending the first night in the open grounds of the Boat Club. There was no question of loosing heart due to the cold of October-November nights. For them Tiket's call was an order. There and then thousands of beds of blankets and rugs were made under the open sky. "Have you come prepared to camp out here?" On being asked this question, a farmer replied, "We have come with a sheet and a rug on the understanding that we may not be able to return by nighttime. We are making do with this. We could have done even without these and laid on the ground."

The next day Chaudhury Mohinder Singh Tiket announced that the 1-day rally would be converted into an indefinite sit in. So long as their demands were not accepted, none of them would budge from the Boat Club. In the same breath the farmer's leader announced that they would not make way for the scheduled Congress rally on the 31st of October to mark the late Indira Gandhi's martyrdom. "We will let the government test

our true power. If tear gas is thrown to displace us, the hired men of the Congress will be routed and our meeting continue." Tiket roared this out amidst thunderous ovation.

In the following days, temporary shelters were made by spreading sheets on tractors. Everywhere hearths were lighted to cook food with whatever provisions the farmers had brought. Chapatis and potatoes were the staple diet 3 times a day. Despite this and with all the discomforts, no one talked of returning home. Their leader, whom their followers give the status of God, a messiah or a mahatma [great soul] also stayed in the same conditions. This time Mohinder Singh Tiket decided that he would not go to any court of law with the farmers' problems. On the contrary, others will have to come to them. Therefore, he made use of the platform provided for him for all kinds of purposes. It is there that, surrounded by his armed guards, he ate and slept, addressed the farmers, consulted his associates and welcomed leaders of the opposition.

Because of the sudden death of the 45-year old Bhup Singh on the third day of the sit in, the administration saw the specter of farmers resorting to violence. Chaudhury Tiket was telling his associates that agents of outsiders would try to provoke them but they should not be taken in and should remain peaceful. In death Bhup Singh has attained immortality. His mortal remains were placed on slabs of ice wrapped in the Indian Farmers Union flag. Report of this death came when Chaudhury Tiket was addressing farmers. Right then he announced that every year on 27 October, they will come together to the Boat Club and will observe that day as "Farmers Martyrdom Day."

Bhup Singh's death either resulted from spending a chilly night under open skies or he had a heart attack. There was no way then of finding out because the dead man's associates were not prepared to yield the body for post mortem. For its part the police were saying that it is illegal to keep a body in a public place like the Boat Club and this information was repeatedly announced over a microphone. The opportunity was provided for delivering the body to police. When even this had no effect, the police increased its vigilance. In no time its strength was quadrupled. Across the road farmers and police were eyeing each other with suspicion. A little later there came a change in the situation when police suddenly bought forth a youth and described him as Bhup Singh's son. Even then the farmers were not convinced and they agreed to give up the body only after making completely sure that it was really Bhup Singh's son who upon hearing the report of his father's death, had come to get his body.

By then the day of the Congress rally had arrived but since the farmers were nowhere near budging from the Boat Club, all kinds of pressure techniques began to be applied on them. Their drinking water was then cut off. Ramkumar Singh, a farmer of Muzaffarnagar got it

restored only on orders from the Supreme Court. The farmers claim that the government made every attempt not only to deny them water but even to starve them. If their sympathizers brought them cooked food, they were not allowed to reach the farmers. Thirty-one October was a day when the strength of the Indian Farmers Union and the Congress(I) was tested. In view of the farmers mood, the place of the congress rally was moved so as to preclude any possibility of confrontation which might result in violence. Despite this, new groups of farmers left for Delhi to honor Chaudhury Tike's determination. On reaching Loni on the capital's border, they were stopped by police. According to farmers, at 7:30 in the morning 10 tractors carrying food and men proceeded to enter the capital, when police without any warning, began firing indiscriminately, killing three men. The police, in clearing themselves, claimed that the tractors were carrying rocks which the farmers began throwing at police as a result of which nine policemen were injured, and only then did they use tear gas in their defense. An eye witness farmer who later managed to reach the Boat Club alleged that "the police were allowing trucks and buses full of Congressmen to proceed ahead but they were stopping us." At any rate, a day earlier farmers at the Boat Club also fell victim to police canes and tear gas. It is no wonder that they were enraged. Despite this, police held the farmers' hostile mood responsible for the police action.

As a rule, this was also an opportunity for the participants in the rallies and sit-ins to see the city. But the strange thing was that hardly any farmer could be seen roaming anywhere in the city except at the Boat Club. One farmer described the reason for this: "We are here to deal with the government. Once this is taken care of, we will think about roaming Delhi." All the farmers, whether poor, or rich, big or small, were angry with the government and their anger was barely contained. "We are not getting a fair price for our produce," they all said with one voice. Even though the prices of equipment, fertilizers and diesel needed for agriculture have multiplied many times, the farmer's incomes has only doubled.

Farmers are also sick of government corruption. They complained, "We have to grease the palm of officials in order to obtain loans for installing transformers or for buying tractors or cattle." The fertilizers to be sold at subsidized rates never reach them. There are no satisfactory arrangements for their children's education or employment. Sher Singh of Podpura village, Patiala, is under a debt of 50,00 rupees, which he despairs of repaying in his own life time. "Every 6 months I make 15,000 rupees from crops, which is not enough to meet my family's needs. How can I repay my loan out of this?" he asked in a reflective tone while pulling at his water pipe. Shivcharan of Kasthala Village Meerut joined in: "We are left with only our emaciated bodies. Everything else has been taken from us."

The farmers had braced themselves for an indefinite sit-in but when following the congress rally, their leaders

directed them to return to their respective homes, it was as if there was a collective sigh of relief. Most of the farmers were going to reach home that very night even if late. Within no time tractors began humming. Mohinder Singh Tike's tractor was running even before the decision. In 2 hours, the Boat Club lost its week long liveliness. The farmers rushing home had only one regret: that they had not achieved anything tangible. "The decision not to pay government revenue had already been taken." Some of the farmers returning home showed their disappointment.

During the sit-in, the farmers cordoned off the Delhi Rajpath. This interfered with the local residents' movement. The police spent sleepless nights. But the interesting thing is that the farmers retained the sympathies of people from the common man to the policeman. In this context, the comment of a constable hailing from a farmer family, who had been stationed at the Boat Club during the sit in, is very interesting: "It is good that they harassed the government. They produce food for the country but themselves cannot afford three square meals a day." "But you lashed the farmers' backs with canes." He replied softly, "It is true that I was ordered to hit them but I only pretended to lift the cane. In fact I gave sound advice to farmers who were keen to go and join the Congress rally to pay homage to Indira Gandhi. I asked them what did Indira Gandhi do for you? If you must observe something today, observe Sardar Patel's birthday. He at least came from a farmers family."

Following the farmers' departure, Rajpath was deserted as it has not been seen deserted for a long time and the Boat Club resembled a battle field where an indecisive battle had been fought. Isn't it enough that the farmers' crusade did not develop into a terrible war, in preparation for which they had removed iron bars from the fence surrounding the sit-in site.

## IRAN

### Minister Expounds on New Tax Laws

46400024b Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian  
23 Oct 88 p 14

[Interview with Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance Iravani by reporters in Rasht; date not given]

[Text] Rasht. ETTELA'AT correspondent. Mr Iravani, minister of economic affairs and finance, who had traveled to Gilan to introduce the new director general of economic affairs and finance of that province, introduced Mr Hadi Rambod as the director general of that department, met separately with the governor general of Gilan and the representative of the Imam and the Friday Imam of Rasht, and took part in an interview with reporters in Rasht.

Concerning the new tax bill, the minister of economic affairs and finance said: The new direct tax law has been announced and will be implemented from the beginning

of 1368 [21 March 1989]. According to this law, on the whole, tax sources will not increase, and neither will the amount of taxes increase, while the rate of inheritance taxes has decreased, and in connection with business taxes, tax rates have decreased with regard to lower incomes.

He added: Taxes on vacant residential units have increased in accordance with this law in the area of property taxes.

Mr Iravani added: If a person has one house in addition to his residential house, in regards to the second house, he will be exempt from taxes up to 2 million tumans.

The minister of economic affairs and finance pointed out: In the agricultural sector, tax exemptions will continue for the next 5 years. Also, in the industrial sector and with regard to the creation of industries, certain exemptions have been anticipated.

Concerning the collection of business taxes, he said: Business tax collections increased by 11 percent in the first 6 months of this year over last year.

He added: Business taxes in cities will be spent on developmental projects in the same cities.

Then, concerning tax revenues, he said: On the whole, taxes collected nationwide have decreased by 0.5 percent compared to a similar period last year. The main reason for this decrease was the 40 percent decrease in commercial gains taxes and 28 percent decrease in customs duties.

Concerning the providing of foreign currency expenditures, the minister of economic affairs and finance said: In order to provide for the foreign currency expenditures of industrial projects and production factories the operation and establishment of which have priority, based on Note 29 of the budget law, this year it is projected that \$1.4 million will be allocated to reconstruction and developmental projects, including those in the governmental and non-governmental sectors.

According to the report of our correspondent in Rasht, continuing his visit in Gilan, the minister of economic affairs and finance participated in a gathering of the employees of the economic affairs and finance office of Gilan and spoke at the prayer hall.

According to this report, Mr Iravani, accompanied by a group of officials of the province, left for Kiashahr Port in order to take part in the ceremonies commemorating the anniversary of the martyrdom of the children of Hujjat ol-Eslam Esma'ilian, the Friday Imam of that city.

### **Discussion May Lead to Sale of Gas to Soviet Union**

46400035c London KEYHAN in Persian 24 Nov 88 p 4

[Text] Representatives of the Ministry of Petroleum of the Islamic Republic have recently resumed negotiations with the trade representatives of the Soviet Union concerning the export of natural gas to that country.

According to the report of an oil journal published in Cypress, if the negotiations between the Islamic Republic and the Soviet Union concerning the export of Iranian natural gas to that country are fruitful, the natural gas pipeline from the south to the northern areas of the country, of which about 80 percent has been constructed, will be completed. A portion of Pipeline No 2, near Esfahan, has been damaged and worn as a result of disuse, in addition to the negligence of officials. If the repair operations begin in the near future, with the operation of this line as well as the completion of the remaining 20 percent, Iran will be able to transfer natural gas from the southern reservoirs to the northern part of the country, and possibly export it to the Soviet Union.

The natural gas pipeline installation experts project a period of at least 2 years to repair the damage to Pipeline No 2 as well as to construct the remaining 20 percent. According to reports we have received from oil sources, the Islamic Republic is trying to complete the "Kangan-Nar" natural gas complex in order to provide the natural gas needed for export to the Soviet Union, and also for domestic use in the northern part of the country. Experts have estimated the time necessary to complete these facilities to be about 18 months.

According to the OIL STRATEGY WEEKLY journal, published in Cyprus, an Italian contractor called "SAIPAM" has begun negotiations with the officials of the Ministry of Petroleum of the Islamic Republic and the Iranian National Oil Company to resume the completion operations for the construction of this natural gas pipeline, which were stopped in 1985 as a result of the emergence of the financial problems of the Islamic Republic in meeting the related expenditures as well as the escalation of the war with Iraq.

### **Non-Oil Exports Drop Compared to Same Period Last Year**

46400035a London KEYHAN in Persian 24 Nov 88 p 4

[Text] While the Islamic Republic had exported goods valued at 37,268 million rials during the first 6 months of last year, in the first 6 months of this year, these exports dropped significantly. The total value of goods exported from Iran (excluding oil) did not exceed 27,950 million rials (about \$399 million). A comparison of these figures shows a decrease of 25 percent.

The decrease in Iranian non-oil exports in the past few months comes at a time when the Islamic Republic needs foreign currency more than at any other time. The revenues of the Islamic Republic from the sale of crude oil in the past few months have decreased significantly, due to the unprecedented decrease in the price of crude oil. If the situation of the world oil market continues in this way and the price of this fuel does not increase, it is anticipated that the oil revenues of the Islamic Republic will not exceed \$5.5 billion and will decrease by about 50 percent compared to the projected revenues in this year's budget.

The public relations office of Iranian customs announced some time ago that Iran's major export items in the first 6 months of this year were handwoven woolen carpets; pistachio nuts, shelled and unshelled; various kinds of hides; various kinds of intestines; and caviar. In terms of value, these items made up more than 70 percent of the total non-oil exports of Iran during the period in question.

The report of the Iranian customs public relations office makes clear that the export of Iranian handwoven woolen carpets in the first 6 months of 1366 [21 March-22 September 1987] has decreased by about 30 percent in weight and 35 percent in value. The export of pistachio nuts, shelled and unshelled, also stagnated during the first six months of this year. A comparison of the figures concerning the export of this traditional item shows that pistachio exports have decreased by 14.07 percent in weight and 18.2 percent in value compared to the first 6 months of last year.

According to the above-mentioned report, compared to a similar period in the previous year, the export of various kinds of hide also decreased, by about 13 percent in weight and 21 percent in value.

#### **Export of Caviar Increased**

Among the non-oil exports from Iran in the past 6 months, the export of caviar has increased significantly compared to a similar period last year.

According to the Iranian customs statistics, in the first 6 months of this year, compared to a similar period in 1986, the Islamic Republic exported to the world markets 62 percent more caviar in weight and 135 percent more in value. Experts have mentioned that this major increase in caviar exports by Iran is the result of the pollution of the caviar from the Caspian Sea in the Soviet Union by radioactive substances as well as the increase in the price of this export item by the Iranian fishery company.

The Iranian customs statistics indicate that the non-oil exports of the Islamic Republic decreased in Shahrivar [23 August-22 September] of this year. The Islamic Republic exported about 118,000 tons of non-oil goods at a value of 5,898 million rials.

The Iranian non-oil exports in Shahrivar [23 August-22 September] of this year decreased by about 28 percent in weight and 21 percent in value, compared to the same month last year.

In its statistical report on the export activities of the country in Shahrivar [23 August-22 September] of this year, the Iranian customs mentioned that about 88 percent of the total value and 86 percent of the total weight of all non-oil exports passed through the customs of south Tehran, Mehrabad, Kerman and Bandar 'Abbas.

#### **Billions To Be Spent on Improving Iran's Neglected Areas**

46400031a Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian  
24 Oct 88 p 4

[Interview with head of the Plan and Budget Organization of Eastern Azarbaijan by IRNA; date and place not given]

[Text] One hundred ninety-two geographic areas in the country are recognized as oppressed areas.

Tabriz. The amount of 3 billion rials in funds has been allocated to the eradication of deprivation from the oppressed areas of the country this year.

This statement was announced by the head of the plan and budget organization of Eastern Azarbaijan in an interview with IRNA. He added: In implementing the plan to identify the oppressed areas, 192 geographic areas throughout the country have been identified as oppressed.

He said: This plan identifies 11 geographic areas in the Province of Eastern Azarbaijan as oppressed areas, including Namin, Hurand, Varzaqan, Khoda-Afarin, Haris, Emamrud, Sanjbad, Khorosh-Rostam, Kaghazkonan, Torkaman, and Chahar Oymaq, to which areas, in accordance with the budget law, a special fund has been allocated this year.

The head of the plan and budget organization of Eastern Azarbaijan said: These areas have been identified as geographically oppressed on the basis of numerous scientific indexes, such as health and treatment, social security and welfare, education, agriculture, communication, housing, urban development and rural services, electricity and industry programs.

He then said that about 15 billion rials in funds have been allocated to the province for this year.

He said: A third of this amount has been allocated to education, for the creation and expansion of an educational atmosphere in the province.

### **Loans for Setting Up Small Industries Increase Fivefold**

46400021c Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian  
19 Oct 88 p 4

[Interview with director of the small industries credit administration of Central Province by IRNA; date and place not given]

[Text] Arak. The amount of industrial loans given to applicants to establish small industries was increased about fivefold by the small industries credit administration of Central Province.

This statement was announced by the director of the small industries credit administration of Central Province in an interview with IRNA. He said: This branch will extend up to 100 million rials in loans to applicants to establish small industries.

He added: The extension of loans by this branch to establish small industries in cities and villages requires agreements in principle to be received from the central office of industries and the Reconstruction Crusade.

He pointed out: The ceiling for the extension of industrial loans by this administration, which was active until the end of last year under the name of the industrial guarantee fund, was 20 million rials. From the beginning of this year, by combining this fund with the industries and mines bank, the ceiling was increased to 100 million rials.

He said: The small industries credit administration of Central Province, in addition to extending industrial loans to applicants of this province, will also give loans to those interested in establishing small industries in the Provinces of Lorestan, Hamadan and Kurdistan.

In conclusion, he announced: By making use of the credit facilities of this branch, during the first half of this year, several industrial units, including metal industries, salt-crushing factories and a unit for heating asphalt, have been established in Central Province.

### **Land Distribution Project Implemented in East Azarbaijan**

46400021a Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian  
13 Oct 88 p 4

[Interview with Minister of Housing and Urban Development Kazeruni by reporters in Tabriz; date not given]

[Text] Tabriz. ETTELA'AT correspondent. In East Azarbaijan Province, 17 land projects are under way at a cost of 2.7 billion tumans, to be implemented on 16,800 hectares of land, and through which 37,725 plots of land will be distributed among applicants.

Mr Kazeruni, the minister of housing and urban development, announced the above statement in an interview with reporters in Tabriz and spoke about the assurances that 12 new cities will be created in the country.

He said: At the present time, 4 of the 12 new cities have been started, and the people in those cities are engaged in construction activities. Hence, our actions are our guarantee of implementation and are better supported by the people than at any other time.

Concerning the new city of "Sahand," the minister of housing and urban development said: In creating this city, 75,000 plots of land will be distributed among applicants, and the city will have a population of 500,000 people. So far, in connection with this project, a great deal of funds have been spent, and soon the implementation will begin.

Also, in connection with the modification of the land under construction, he added: Based on the ratification of the economic council in connection with the policy of modification and reduction of the amount of land under construction, several mechanisms have been planned and sent to the proper authorities. According to this ratification, the government has decided to assist those who have received large plots of land and will try to use smaller amounts of land for construction.

Concerning the creation of small houses for teachers in villages, Mr Kazeruni referred to the housing foundation projects for villages with a population of more than 4,000 people and added: In every village in which the housing foundation engages in improvements, with the funds obtained from the sale of organizational houses in Tehran, the Ministry of Housing will also build five small houses for the teachers of those villages. Also, according to this interview with the minister of housing and urban development, in connection with the reconstruction efforts in the country, this ministry has proposed three projects to the heads of the three branches.

Continuing his statements, in connection with the project for the revitalization of old neighborhoods in the cities, he said: The revitalization of the old neighborhoods in the cities has been decided upon for 10 areas, some of which are being implemented. Also, a very good project has been prepared for the old area of the city of Ardabil, construction operations for which we hope to start by the beginning of the next season.

In conclusion, it must be pointed out that the seminar of the directors general of housing and urban development and the urban lands of the provinces of Tehran, East and West Azarbaijan, Gilan, Zanzan and Mazandaran was opened yesterday in the presence of the minister of housing and urban development in Tabriz in order to familiarize the executive authorities with the new urban land law.

**Agricultural Bank's Quarterly Activities Reported**  
*46400024a Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian*  
*23 Oct 88 p 4*

[Text] Economic service. The Agricultural Bank extended to farmers 110,352 lines of credit in the first 4 months of this year in the form of Islamic contracts worth 68.6 billion rials.

This credit includes 130 cases amounting to 7.7 billion rials in interest-free loans to fishing cooperative companies, 23,275 cases amounting to 9.2 billion rials in interest-free loans to individuals, 2,560 cases amounting to 2.6 billion rials in interest-free loans to cover streams, 751 cases amounting to 600 million rials in interest-free loans for water and soil, 46,323 cases amounting to 33.2 billion rials in installment sales, 31,231 cases amounting to 9 billion rials in advance purchases, 5,173 cases amounting to 4.9 billion rials in payment for services, and 909 cases amounting to 1.4 billion rials in other payments.

According to this report, during the same period, farmers paid 52.3 billion rials in debts to the bank.

**Several Articles of Islamic Law Ratified**  
*46400021b Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian*  
*17 Oct 88 p 3*

[Text] In its meeting yesterday (Sunday), the Supreme Judicial Council continued its examination of the Islamic punishment law and ratified several more articles of this law.

According to one of the articles ratified, a person who engages in manipulating the price of merchandise or goods in such forms as promissory notes, shares, or foreign currency in excess of fair rates as the result of the spread of fabricated rumors or unfounded or false announcements, by purchasing at high prices in excess of the rates determined by sellers, or through conspiracy with and distribution as gifts among owners, shall be condemned to 3 months to 3 years of imprisonment as well as one of two punishments: a fine of 50,000-600,000 rials or 20-74 lashes.

According to the ratified law, if such actions involve grains, public food items or essential goods, the punishment shall be double that mentioned.

**Iranian Professionals Abroad Ready To Return Home**  
*46400031c Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian*  
*3 Nov 88 p 19*

[Text] Kiel University in West Germany has awarded the Free Islamic University four educational grants.

Karaj. Simultaneous with the announcement of the readiness of a large group of Iranian experts residing in Europe either to return to their Islamic homeland or to

extend effective help and cooperation to reconstruct the country, another group of Iranian professionals who live in West Germany has announced its readiness to offer scientific cooperation in academic affairs.

This statement was made by Mr Mohammad Pirayandeh, president of the Free Islamic University at the Karaj unit, who recently returned from a trip to Germany.

He said: Professor Mohammad Reza Parvaresh, vice chairman of the Pathology Department of Kiel University and professor of pathology of that university, provided the Free Islamic University with four educational grants from Kiel University. He will soon accompany his wife, who is the head of the women's division of Kiel University, to Iran for a scientific conference.

Also, Professor Sadeq Masarrat, who recently held a conference at the Free Islamic University at Karaj unit, entitled "Endoscopy Versus Radiography Under the Existing Conditions in Iran," agreed to teach at the medical college of this university for two weeks next year. He also donated an IBM typewriter to the college. Following the announcements of readiness, several Iranian physicians residing in Cologne and Hamburg agreed to purchase a computer valued at about 7,000 DM to donate to the Free Islamic University at the Karaj unit. Professor Khaledpur, another Iranian professor residing in West Germany, also announced his readiness to come to Iran for a scientific conference.

Mr Mohammad Pirayandeh added: Recently, an agency has been established in West Germany by the office of scientific and technical cooperation of the Free Islamic University. Individuals wishing to provide cash or other assistance to Iranian universities, particularly the Free Islamic University, can do so through this agency. The amount of aid they give will be tax deductible by the German government.

Mr Pirayandeh said: In talks held with the president of Hamburg University, he has agreed to send professors to Iran for scientific conferences.

The interest of Iranian physicians and professionals residing in Europe in participating in the reconstruction of the country and helping equip and expand the Iranian universities is increasing.

**Requirements for Study Abroad Detailed**  
*46400036b Tehran RESALAT in Persian 20 Oct 88 p 2*

[Text] The documents necessary to examine the foreign currency files of those students studying abroad in 1368 [21 March 1989-20 March 1990] were announced as follows: The final deadline for sending documents for students studying in Italy, Pakistan and Bangladesh is the end of Khordad 1368 [21 June 1989], and for other countries, the end of Dey 1367 [20 January 1989]. All documents must be sent to the agencies of the IRI in the

country of study for verification before the deadline. Obviously, documents sent after the deadline or to places other than those agencies will not be considered.

A. General documents:

1. Photocopy of educational residency permit valid at least until 10/88, or a residency permit in the passport (students studying in the United States, must send a photocopy of both sides of their forms, which has been verified after 10/88 by a notary public or by the University).

2. Photocopy of all pages of the passport, which is valid at least until 1/67 [21 March-20 April 1989].

3. Photocopy of the last educational degree, if the student has received a degree in the 1987-1988 academic year.

B. Special documents for those on an academic year system:

1. Original 1988-89 academic registration form indicating the field of study, academic level, and dates of start and completion.

2. Original transcripts of courses or units passed or certificate of completion for 1987-88, depending on where the student is studying.

3. Certificate of payment to the university of tuition for 1988-89, stating the amount of payment received.

C. Special documents for semester or quarter systems:

1. Original copy of student enrollment papers for Fall 1988 semester. In German-speaking countries, for winter 1988-89.

2. Original transcript of grades for fall 1987 and spring 1988 for semester systems, and fall 1987 and Winter 1988 and spring 1988 for quarter systems. In German-speaking countries, grades or sections passed in winter 1987-88 and summer 1988, in addition to their "Studirn Plan" [as published].

Note 1. Masters and doctoral students who have passed the necessary course work and are writing a thesis, or, depending on the educational system, will only present their thesis during this period, should also present, in addition to the general documents for all countries, a signed certificate from the university concerning their research, a transcript of grades for every term necessary in which the thesis is mentioned.

Note 2. All above-mentioned documents will be accepted on official university forms, and in countries where the IRI has agencies, with verification of that agency, and in the United States, in a sealed envelope of the university.

**Low Wage Earners Exempted From Income Tax**  
46400035b London KEYHAN in Persian 24 Nov 88 p 4

[Text] Early last week, the public relations and guidance office of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance of the Islamic Republic announced the main points of the tax exemptions for salaried employees as follows:

1. Up to 720,000 rials in annual taxable income from one or more sources shall be exempt from taxes. This level of exemption will increase to 840,000 rials for those employees whose salaries are paid by the ministries, government agencies, establishments and companies, municipal offices or governmental funds, if they have dependents.

2. Harsh climate bonus pay shall be exempt from taxation. In regards to private sector employees, up to 30 percent of their regular pay, wages or main salaries will be exempted.

3. Annual New Year gifts or end-of-the-year bonuses are exempt from taxation, up to 100,000 rials.

4. During the year, bonuses and overtime work shall be taxed in accordance with the content of the direct tax law ratified in Esfand 1366 [20 February-20 March 1988].

**Salaries of Tehran Municipal Employees To Increase**

46400036a Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian  
3 Nov 88 p 18

[Text] Economic service. With the signing of the agreement between the Tehran City Hall and the deputy minister of labor and social affairs concerning the plan to classify and evaluate workers' jobs, which took place yesterday, 30,000 municipal workers of Tehran became eligible for a 7 percent increase in salaries and benefits.

In the ceremonies for the signing of this agreement, which took place in the presence of deputies and Tehran municipal officials, as well as representatives of about 60 areas of the organization and the central office of the Tehran municipality at the Park-e Shahr central library, the elected representative of the workers stated the problems of his colleagues.

He asked for improvement in housing, health, insurance, transportation and consumer cooperatives as well as complete implementation of the labor law, more support for the drivers of heavy machinery in times of incidents and accidents, and, finally, an increase in work for those workers nearing retirement.

According to this report, then Engineer Tabataba'i, deputy minister of the interior and head of the Tehran municipality, spoke in overall support of the Tehran



municipal management of the workers of this organization and added: This is the definite right of the municipal workers, and in exchange for our expectations that you will provide the comfort of the citizens, we must provide a minimum of comfort for you and your honorable families.

In praise of all the municipal personnel, particularly the workers of this organization, he said: These dear people offer about 200 services regularly, in cold and heat and under any condition, within an area of 600 square km, to a settled and mobile population of 6.2 million to 10 million people.

In these ceremonies, the deputy for financial affairs and director general of the municipal organization said about this plan: Since 1352 [21 March 1973-20 March 1974], no change has been made in the classification of workers' jobs. And today, Tehran is the first large workers' unit to have reached this important achievement in response to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and for the welfare of our fellow workers.

It should be pointed out that the implementation of this project which, according to the law, includes a 7 percent increase in salaries and benefits, will start today, but workers want its implementation from the beginning of this year.

Also, in writing the implemental bylaws, other worker benefits can be taken into consideration.

#### **Earthquake Safety Regulations To Become Compulsory**

46400031b Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian  
26 Oct 88 p 15

[Interview with Engineer Ghaffari, director general of the architectural system of the Ministry of Housing; interviewer, date and place not given]

[Text] There is no need for special materials or complicated techniques to build homes resistant to earthquakes. Merely the kind of building and the use of materials will change.

Economic service: By observing the instructions in the earthquake bylaws for construction design, buildings can be made safe enough to withstand earthquakes of up to 7 degrees on the amended Mercalli scale (about 6 on the Richter scale) without any damage, and earthquakes of up to 9 degrees on the amended Mercalli scale (about 8 on the Richter scale) without the collapse of buildings.

In an interview, Engineer Ghaffari, the director general of the architectural system of the Ministry of Housing, made the above statement concerning the earthquake engineering bylaws and added: The implementation of these bylaws will not require the use of special materials

or complex techniques. Merely the kind of building and the use of materials will change, and no additional expenditures will be imposed on buildings.

He also said: The earthquake engineering bylaws will be given to all city halls implementing the architectural system law through the Ministry of the Interior after the ratification of the Cabinet is announced. Thereafter, engineers in all cities will be required to incorporate these bylaws in designing buildings.

Also, according to Engineer Ghaffari, bylaws are being written so that, with the use of construction and reinforcement materials, safe buildings can be built.

At the end of his talk, he announced the publication of the earthquake intensity map of Iran, which has been provided for the first time in Iran. This map indicates the relative danger from earthquakes in the various Iranian cities.

### **NEPAL**

#### **Editorial Alleges Government Fears Free Press**

46000051 Kathmandu THE MOTHERLAND in  
English 16 Nov 88 p 3

[Article by Wendell L. Willkie: "Faulty Tower"]

[Text] Never before has the Nepali media come under as much criticism. But the fact remains that the media has never before been as active and wide reaching. Especially after the sea changes brought about in 1979, this decade has been productive for the media. The clout thus garnered has brought the media into public focus and so the chinks in the armour have never before been as obvious. So we hear of journalism and journalists that must be taken to court for violating salient codes of conduct. So far so good since the court must be the arbiter in such matters. However, the arbitration must also prove exemplary deterrents to further abuse of journalistic clout. What, then, should we say of a Bagmati zonal court ruling that a vernacular weekly had defamed the Rashtriya Samachar Samiti and thus should be fined one rupee? The ruling, one notes, comes four years after the national news agency first filed a defamation suit against the guilty party.

The fact remains that a systematic approach to the press remains lacking in the country and the ad hocism so blatant in every other sphere of life is equally present in the fourth estate. Since government is reluctant to see the growth of an institutionalised press the anarchy that prevails can do nothing but harm. The legal system, moreover, is ill equipped to judge the extent of damage in the absence of laws regarding damage caused by the media. We have a media widening its readership and gaining in influence and we have little by way of effective legal deterrents to abuse. Apart from, of course, abrupt government closures and seizures which contribute more to the anarchy than to correct it. An institutionalised

press is vital for the success of democratic development and in the absence of the right legal approaches to evolve such a scheme of things, the media can only harm.

## PAKISTAN

### Writer Sees Active Opposition as Key to Democracy

46000050a Karachi DAWN in English 2 Dec 88 p 9

[Article by Mushtaq Ahmad; "Imperatives of the New Phase"]

[Text] The undisturbed atmosphere in which the elections were held was a wholesome tribute to our untutored masses, so often held responsible for the failure of democracy for no fault of their own. If after they had cast their verdict, the process of peaceful change made no headway its responsibility must lie squarely on the shoulders of politicians who claim to be the standard bearers of democracy.

The all-pervading climate of uncertainty makes it difficult to predict the future course of events. A rational analysis of the body-politic riddled with countless imponderables, is a dangerous exercise even for the most objective observer. We cannot be forgetful of past experience when the high hopes we entertained, were suddenly dashed to the ground by untoward developments, our political parties in or out of power, were unable or unwilling to foresee or forestall. For them the polls were a ladder they had to climb only once to remain at the top as long as they liked, not knowing that it would be taken away to topple them from the seat of power without a moment's notice.

A week and a half after the announcement of results the nation was kept guessing as to which party or parties would be in power at the Centre and in the Provinces, and who the Prime Minister and the Chief Ministers will be. The reasons given for the delay instead of allaying suspicions had given cause to suspect intense politicking going on behind the scenes, encouraged by members of doubtful loyalties. About such a breed of politicians Lloyd George had once remarked that they had been sitting on the fence for so long that the iron had entered their souls. We have seen the fate of some of them in our midst who without the slightest qualm of conscience crossed the floor to join the very government they had scathingly criticised to become Minister of even Religious Affairs.

Once in power always in power has become a maxim in our language of politics, which is not the language of democracy. Among dictators who are afraid even of their shadows, it is a universal trait; its prevalence in the democracies is the very negation of the ideal. A government by consent by its very implication is a government in which dissent is its inalienable feature. The quality of consent is that it is periodically renewable, and if not renewed the government is subject to removal. The

Opposition in the birth place of democracy is not unjustifiably called His or Her Majesty's Opposition. Its concept as a shadow government has never been a part of our tradition. The governments that rose and fell in the so-called democratic era in the past, were the handiwork of ambitious Heads of State and not the products of the electoral process.

The obvious choice before the President was to nominate the leader of the largest party in the National Assembly as the Prime Minister, and let the second largest party sponsor its candidate to contest the election and the Assembly decide who the Leader of the House would be. In case, neither of them was able to secure its confidence, the option open before him was to order fresh elections for the nation to make its own decision. In the ultimate analysis in all democracies or part-parliamentary democracies, the leader of the majority is the prospective Prime Minister since the polls are not a contest between political parties but also between two rival candidates for the high office of the chief executive. Because a country in our financial straits cannot afford another expensive electoral campaign, discretion would dictate that the possibility of a coalition be explored from an exercise from which the President must remain scrupulously aloof in the interest of his impartiality and detachment from the power struggle.

For the first time in our history the prospects of a strong opposition have emerged giving democracy a chance to survive, provided the parties play the game according to rules and not break the rules to destroy the game. The role of the Opposition in the past was negative and sterile. Its membership was barely a dozen. The United Democratic Front or the UDF as it was called in the Parliament that came into being in 1972, had no unified leadership nor a united programme with the result that it was not able to make a constructive contribution to the deliberations of the Assembly. A redeeming aspect of the prevailing situation is that no matter which party or coalition of parties forms the government, so formidable will be the opposition that it cannot push through its legislation in the Parliament with a steamroller majority as it used to happen previously.

The IJI opposition will be numerically strong—much stronger than the country ever had before. But numerical strength by itself can be of little avail unless inspired and informed by a political philosophy and backed by genuine popular support. Being an improvised alliance of nine different political parties, most of them a mushroom growth it is organisationally loose and programme-wise does not conform to the definition of a political party which has an end to achieve and a mission to fulfil.

In the reality of the present-day Pakistan the slogan of ideology has lost its magic appeal. Even the disunity in its ranks to which the Muslim League, the centrepiece of the Alliance, has attributed its failure to get a majority, did not centre round differences of policies or programmes but the leadership and power. Unarmed with

an economic weapon it suffered at the hands of the parties which were better organised and well disciplined. The Muslim League before Partition had thrived in the opposition by virtue of its programmes and the calibre of its leader, after independence it rapidly tended to disintegrate once thrown out of power. The party in its hey-day had never hankered after enlisting the backing of independents to swell its membership in the legislatures. With its strength in the National Assembly and a majority in the Punjab Assembly, it has the opportunity to demonstrate that the League is capable of delivering the goods and also exercising an effective check on the the Federal Government. Still controlled by vested interests who have taken advantage of their association with the government, it has an uninspiring leadership and a reactionary programme which have been the major causes of its discomfiture at the polls. Only by their removal through a process of self-analysis, can it place its disorderly house in order. Otherwise, its parliamentary performance in the opposition is bound to be disappointing, and its following in the Assembly composed as it is of diverse and discordant elements, certain to dwindle. It is not the size of the vote but the amount of home work the parliamentary party does in the discharge of its legislative duties that will determine its prospects in the future elections. To be the nucleus of a future government it must act as a responsible opposition responsive to the wishes of the people. Nawaz Sharif has a long enough tenure as the Chief Minister of the premier province of Pakistan at a time when the government was not accountable to the governed. He will soon realise that the conditions under which he and the party he represents, will have to work now are very different.

The PPP has deeper roots among the masses, a leadership cadre at all levels and an organisation more cohesive than that of the Muslim League. But even Ms Benazir Bhutto will not take long to realise that the party she leads cannot evade the sense of accountability under the new dispensation, faced with a formidable opposition. It is the fundamental assumption of democracy that after the people in power have forfeited the confidence of the masses they must vacate the seats of authority regardless of the party to which they belong.

The PPP will be as much bound by the tradition as the Muslim League. A healthy and strong opposition which can operate as a check on a strong and powerful government, is an essential ingredient of a vigorous democracy.

#### **Writer Condemns Punjab Chauvinism as Divisive Force**

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[Article: "But Seriously...And Now, Punjabism"]

[Text] The latest in "isms" in Punjabism, insidiously floated for the consumption of politicians in the biggest province, and based on the question, "If we Punjabis are more in number than the people of the other three

provinces put together, then why shouldn't we rule at the Centre?" The promoters of the idea forget that this is exactly what the Punjabis have been doing all these years, according to the rest of Pakistan.

Let me state at once that I am a Punjabi, by birth as well as by inclination. Let me also say that I do not belong (by inclination again) to that self-righteous crowd which claims to be the sole contractor for Islam and the so-called Pakistan ideology, and which is ready to dub as traitor anyone who talks in terms of provinces and nationalities. I have, in my long career as a bureaucrat, seen too many patriots putting self before the country. Also, I am not exactly enamoured of the Punjabi feudal's constancy and loyalty in politics.

No doubt Punjab is the most populous province. In a way it is also the most developed, barring Karachi of course. It can be said that by virtue of its special position it is the eldest of four brothers. Its always the eldest brother who is supposed to keep the joint family together. Not by thrusting his hegemony down the throats of the younger brothers, but by persuasion and palpable show of affection. The younger brothers will always have the feeling that they are not getting a fair deal. It is but natural for them to think so, because younger brothers always think like that. It is for the eldest to disabuse their minds of fears and the feeling of deprivation by giving something here, conceding something there. Frequently out of his own share.

So much for allegory. The state of affairs on the ground is that in respect of its share in the armed forces, Punjab is far far ahead of the other provinces. The Frontier comes next, and after that no one. It can be said that Sind and Baluchistan are not represented in the military. I don't have to say that because of the successive periods of martial law, the impression is inevitable that the Punjab (and to a much lesser extent, the Frontier) has ruled Pakistan at different periods for a clear eighteen years.

During the rest of the period out of Pakistan's age of 41 years, the administration was dominated by a bureaucracy hailing from Punjab, in sheer numbers at least if not in seniority/quality. The Mohajirs had quite a bit of a share at the senior levels. We have seen that in former East Pakistan, whatever the provincial origin of an officer from West Pakistan he was called a Punjabi.

What does the Punjab slogan mean now? That the wave of popular democracy originating from Sind is too much to stomach? That those who played surrogates to the military dictatorship for eleven years should continue to rule the roost? That it is not the sacrifices made for democracy that matter but who made it to the top by going up the ladder held by the armed forces? That instead of the slogan "Islam in danger", which no longer holds water, the slogan should be "Punjab in danger," and therefore "Pakistan in danger?" That the Punjabi common man has been misled by Sindhi leaders in the

elections? Apparently this is all there to the new-fangled "shosha" of Punjabi nationalism. It means that those who have been bitterly opposed to the concept of nationalities are themselves taking to that concept for their own advancement.

It's a pity really that Mr Mohammad Khan Junejo lost in the election. To him goes the credit for rehabilitating the image of the Muslim League as a party devoted to democracy during his tenure as Prime Minister. I have it on good authority that he was forever restraining the Punjab administration from the usual tricks that our regimes play in politics and with politicians. His efforts have really helped to win back lost votes for the Muslim League in the federal and provincial elections. Of course, there have been serious allegations about subtle rigging, and the effect of the ID card condition, but I will not say anything about that.

Had Mr Junejo won his own seat, it is he who would have been invited by the President for talks preceding the appointment of the new prime minister. And he still commands a lot of respect in the Punjab. But, unfortunately respect does not entail a following also. His unceremonious exit has left the field open for the mafia which is no longer content with ruling the Punjab and is

straining at the leash to go and conquer new pastures-in Islamabad. Hence all this talk about Punjab claiming to get its rightful due at the Centre.

I don't believe that the Punjabis can be deluded into thinking that the PPP is a Sindhi party. It's adherents are much larger in number in Punjab than in the other three provinces put together. If anything, it is a Punjabi party, and it was born in Punjab. Only its top leaders are Sindhis. The top leaders of the Muslim League were also Sindhis, though they lost in the elections.

It's time for Punjabis to take a leaf out of Mr Mustafa Khar's book. There was a time when he was called Sher-i-Punjab and revelled in the title. He got the reputation for being a fighter for his province. But look at him now. A more mature, sober and rational politician is hard to find. He knows that only a truly national attitude in politics can bring good to the country.

But seriously, Punjab should endeavour to play the benign paterfamilias rather than the draconian head of the family jealous of his powers and reacting to any move by his juniors to seek more authority. It can earn the respect of the entire country by playing this role and providing conclusively that it will do anything to maintain Pakistan as a united nation.